


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12 MARCH 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR DEFENSE OFFICIAL ON RISK OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR, SDI, ASAT

AU301235 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov in the "Expert's Opinion" column: "Eliminating the Threat of Nuclear War: Acute Danger" — first paragraph is paper's introduction]

[Text] In the middle of December 1986 the Pugwash Committee discussed an important problem in Geneva — the issues of accidental nuclear war. The results of the meeting showed that the scientists who participated in the meeting correctly assumed that the problem has to be resolved, above all, by political means, stressed Colonel general Nikolay Chervov, a USSR Ministry of Defense expert writing about this meeting, he says.

Despite the adopted technical measures, the possibility of an accidental nuclear war resulting from a failure, defect, incorrectly working instruments, and so forth -- no matter how small -- nevertheless exists. Denying such a possibility means closing one's eyes to a real and existing danger. Assurances about the absolute reliability of nuclear weapons, warning systems and the adoption of measures for the use of these weapons concentrate on playing down the degree of nuclear threat and creating the illusion that this threat can only be eliminated by technical measures, thus seeking to substantiate that there is no need for nuclear disarmament.

The fact that the danger of an accidental nuclear war exists is attested to, for example, by the 1971 agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war between the USSR and the United States, as well as the relevant Soviet-French agreement (1976), and the agreement between the USSR and Great Britain (1977). [paragraph continues]

Naturally, all the parties have been taking every possible technical and organizational measure to minimize the element of chance in this vitally important area, but it cannot be excluded completely.

A cardinal solution to the problem of the elimination of the nuclear danger from the life of mankind can only be found in substantially reducing and subsequently completely scrapping nuclear weapons. In a nuclear space century security cannot be founded forever on the fear of a retaliatory strike, that is, on doctrines of "revenge" or "intimidation," which the West terms eternal immutable truths. For the entire postwar period these doctrines have been accelerating the feverish arms buildup and have brought us into a situation in which the whole of mankind has become the hostage. It is impossible to find the way out of this blind alley by adhering to these doctrines.

The continuation of feverish arms buildup objectively leads to an increase in the nuclear danger; it upsets strategic stability; and drives the world to the verge of war. I will present the facts.

In accordance with the "Star Wars" program, the United States is developing the potential for a "scot free" first strike. New "space-space"- and "space-earth"-type offensive weapons with a practically zero warning time are being developed in American laboratories. The deployment of an extensive space system of antimissile defense will in the future lead to a situation in which the decisions on activating weapons will be received by machines.

The offensive space devices which are being developed in the United States are, according to their characteristics, offensive weapons. They can be used to unexpectedly destroy the other side's most important space satellites in order to "blind" and surprise it, and thus deprive it of the possibility of launching retaliatory actions for the nuclear attack. The space devices developed within the framework of the SDI have a very long range -- 4-5,000 km. Can one consider weapons having a range of 4-5,000 km defensive weapons? Of course not. They are capable of destroying targets in space and destroying targets on earth from space. According to their range, these weapons are globally deployed in orbit around the earth and equipped with a maneuvering system, they are capable of popping up above the territory of any state practically at any moment and genuinely endangering its security.

The SDI program is oriented toward the United States acquiring the capability to launch a first strike and achieve military superiority over the USSR and other countries so that it could blackmail them and force its will upon them. This means that, from a purely military viewpoint, SDI undermines the strategic equilibrium and threatens the existing command, control, communications, and surveillance systems.

The same thing can also be said about the development of antisatellite systems. The great importance for strategic stability of the two sides' safety [zabezpechivaniye] of systems based on utilization of satellites is known. A party which is preparing to launch the first nuclear strike is interested in creating antisatellite systems. This is precisely why Washington's dogged refusal to agree to banning antisatellite systems and destroying the ones that already exist calls for vigilance.

The development of strategic nuclear devices employing the Stealth technology, as well as the deployment in Western Europe of American Pershing II and cruise missiles capable of attacking targets on USSR territory must be regarded as the preparation of a material base for launching surprise attacks. As we know, the flight time of Pershing II is 8-10 minutes. What can be done in those few minutes? Practically nothing. Also the other American programs for enhancing the strategic nuclear potential do not strengthen stability and security.

Was it a coincidence that when on 3 December 1986 voting was conducted in the UN on a resolution on averting feverish armament in space, the United States was the only one of 155 states that did not support that resolution. The White House's betting on military force in international relations must inevitably give rise to concern.

If we are to speak about the standpoint of the USSR, that standpoint is generally known: Halting the feverish arms buildup, preventing the deployment of weapons in space, reducing and completely scrapping nuclear and other mass destruction weapons -- this is precisely where the Soviet Union sees the main directions in respect of averting the nuclear threat. And these views are affirmed by concrete deeds. The pledge that it will not be the first to use the nuclear weapons, the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests which has been in effect for 18 months now, the program for completely scrapping nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons before the end of the century, the proposals for peaceful cooperation in space, for reducing the number of troops and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, the packet of extensive compromise proposals submitted during the Reykjavik Summit Meeting -- this is the foundation on which the USSR proposes to build the security of all states in the current conditions.

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CSO: 5200/1287

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA REVIEW: DELHI SIX ON TESTING, U.S. 'HASTE' ON SDI

PM281201 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[Pavel Demchenko "International Review"]

[Excerpts] It's a Complex, Complex World

Without fail the editorial offices of major newspapers and radio and television centers have a room to receive information flowing in from all over the world. [paragraph continues]

The flood of facts and events also contains something that attracts universal attention and perturbs people in all continents.

People everywhere are following the steps and efforts which could help get rid of the threat of nuclear destruction hanging over our civilization. It is already too great. 50,000 warheads have accumulated on earth—the equivalent of 1 million charges like the one that destroyed Hiroshima. One million! A terrifying figure, a universal danger.

It is evident that the responsibility of great power leaders, primarily those of the USSR and the United States, is particularly great in these circumstances. There is exceptional interest in their actions and initiatives. This week, too, there was extensive comment on M.S. Gorbachev's message to the leaders of the "Delhi Six" — Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania — in reply to the declaration they adopted to mark the end of 1986. That year, as our readers recall, was a particular year — it was proclaimed International Peace Year by the United Nations. This fact reflected mankind's interest in breaking the chain of years of preoccupation with the arms race.

Was this goal successfully attained? Unfortunately not. The reason is well known. Not all states, and primarily not the United States, strove to attain it in practice rather than in words.

Now the Soviet leader reaffirmed in his message to the "Delhi Six" that, on the basis of the program put forward on 15 January 1986, our country will continue the struggle to free the world from the nuclear burden by the end of this century, to prevent the creation [soudaniye] of space weapons, to ban chemical weapons, and to reduce the confrontation of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. The Soviet Union, the message says, will resolutely struggle for progress from the positions reached in Reykjavik and is not canceling any of the proposals made there by us aimed at reducing and subsequently eliminating all nuclear means and ensuring a peaceful space around the planet.

A large part of the message was taken up by the question of banning nuclear explosions which, as is well known, have not been conducted in our country for 18 months. Explosions have thundered on 24 occasions in the United States during that same time period; a program for further nuclear tests has been planned. It is understandable that such a turn of events cannot fail to have an effect on our security. This is precisely why the Soviet Government was forced to take the decision to extend the moratorium until the first U.S. nuclear test in 1987. Of course, if a realistic approach were to prevail in Washington and the United States were to join our unilateral action, the cause of nuclear disarmament could advance. This has not happened yet even though the door remains open: The Soviet Union would be prepared to return to the moratorium on any day of any month if the United States were to decide to end its nuclear explosions. Even if our country were forced to resume nuclear explosions, it will advocate with equal persistence the start of full-scale talks on the problem of the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons, talks which we are prepared to conduct at any level and at any forum, subject, of course, to participation by the United States.

This message should have been perceived as yet another peace-loving signal originating from Moscow, a call to embark at long last in a businesslike fashion on the solution of a task which perturbs mankind to such an extent, but there has been no favorable reaction in response from Washington. Some people say the White House is now apparently so paralyzed by the "Irangate" it is incapable of taking any decisive actions at all. Is this so in actual reality? After all, we have seen something that is exactly opposite to what would have seemed a logical response to the call by the "Delhi Six" and the signal from Moscow.

Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger persistently urged the speediest deployment of space weapons and said that a decision on this matter will be made in the very near future. [paragraph continues]

Why such haste? After all, until quite recently Washington administration spokesmen were saying that, to start with, all research work and tests will be completed, and only then will the question of SDI's deployment be resolved. All of a sudden the "hawks" have launched a frontal attack, leaping, as people say, two steps at a time. The reason for this was explained by Attorney General E. Meese without beating around the bush. The SDI champions, he admitted, are in a hurry to move on to the practical implementation of their plans so this program "cannot be interrupted by future administrations."

Weinberger's statement was followed immediately by a press conference by Senators W. Proxmire and B. Johnston and representatives of the Union of Concerned Scientists, who spoke out against the Pentagon's intentions. "Such a decision," Johnston said, for example, "would be not only irresponsible but also dangerous for the country, ... it certainly would open the door for an arms race in space."

Professor K. Gottfried noted the only objective of early deployment of SDI is to eliminate the arms control process. In his words, more than 80 percent of U.S. physicists believe the SDI program could be neutralized by Soviet countermeasures, while 98 percent of members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences do not believe in the efficiency of "Star Wars" in the foreseeable future.

We can see that the opposition to Reagan's "Star Wars" plans in the United States is now considerable. Admittedly it cannot be described as dominant, but it is highly influential, even though it is still difficult to say what effect this will have on actual policies.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

U.S. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS MEMBERS VISIT MOSCOW

Meet Dobrynin, Korniyenko

LD061908 Moscow TASS in English 1840 GMT 6 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS — Anatoliy Dobrynin, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today received a group of American politicians and public figures visiting Moscow. Among them Harold Brown, Cyrus Vance, David Jones, Peter Peterson and William Byland. All of them expressed their great satisfaction with Mikhail Gorbachev's conversation with them on February 4.

In exchanges of opinion, Anatoliy Dobrynin and the American visitors concentrated on problems related to nuclear and space weapons from the point of view of a search for way to accords on these matters.

Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy head of the International department of the CPSU Central Committee also took part in the conversation.

Dobrynin Meets Kissinger, Vance

LD051446 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS — Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received in Moscow members of the American Council on Foreign Relations former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger (on February 3) and Cyrus Vance (on February 4).

The sides discussed in detail the present unsatisfactory state of Soviet-American relations and the search for possible ways to rectify them, which would meet the imperative of the time.

Gromyko Receives Vance

LD061349 Moscow TASS in English 1301 GMT 6 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS — Andrey Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, received in the Kremlin today Cyrus Vance, a prominent American lawyer, member of the leadership of several major corporations, member of the Council of Foreign Relations (New York City) and former secretary of state.

In addition to legal practice and business, he is actively engaged in political activity, holding the post of vice-president of the Centre for Democratic (National) Policy, an organization of the moderate wing of the Democratic Party, and is also a member of several American public foreign-policy organizations.

Vance is in Moscow at the invitation of the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies at the USSR Academy of Sciences.

During the conversation Gromyko described tasks in the field of home and domestic policy that were put in the focus of attention by the January (1987) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

It was stressed from the Soviet side that an honest and candid dialogue between political figures from the Soviet Union and the United States at all levels was a major and necessary component in the development of relations between the two countries.

All foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union were subordinated to ensuring the peaceful future of mankind. They were based on the programme for ridding the world of nuclear weapons by the turn of the century, set out in the January 15, 1986 statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The 27th CPSU congress developed it further and turned it into a basis for forming the idea of establishing a comprehensive system of international security.

The Soviet proposals advanced in Reykjavik vividly demonstrated the USSR's peaceful policy and the possibilities it offered for all of mankind.

The Soviet side observed the potentialities for economic relations and cooperation in the field of science, technology, culture and education between the USSR and the United States were broadening.

"But we are not satisfied with the present state of affairs," Gromyko observed. "For our part, we are ready to do more. The USSR builds no obstacles to that. It is now up to the U.S. Administration to say its word on this issue. Peoples in both countries are waiting for that."

Gromyko and Vance held a frank exchange of views on the present state of Soviet-American relations and on problems related to talks on nuclear and space arms.

The Soviet side drew attention to the Reagan administration's non-conservative stand at the talks on the limitation and reduction of arms, its aspiration to carry out the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative programme, that is to start the militarization of outer space with all ensuing dangerous consequences.

The meeting was held in a businesslike, frank atmosphere.

The meeting was attended by Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies.

Gorbachev Receives Americans

LD042016 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Feb 87

["Vremya" newscast"]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS — Today Mikhail Gorbachev received the prominent American public figures and politicians — Peterson, Brown, Vance, Jones, Kirkpatrick, Kissinger, Mandelbaum, Mathias, Tarnow and Hyland — who are staying in Moscow at the invitation of the Institute of United States and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In an informal and frank atmosphere they discussed a wide range of problems that cause the concern of the American and world public and the Soviet people.

Mikhail Gorbachev characterized the mainstays of Soviet foreign policy noting that Soviet-American relations, too, are viewed by the Soviet side in the context of the entire world development. This policy is based on the realities of the present-day world, that is — nuclear war is a catastrophe for all without exception; the appearance of arms in outer space undermines the security of those who strive for that and makes control over nuclear arms impossible; the world is complex and diverse, it consists of scores of independent states with their own at times most acute problems and woes, with their own interests, with their right to uphold them and to take part in common affairs. Attempts to suppress these interests, to subordinate other countries, to use their resources in the way it was done in the past is an anachronism fraught with danger to civilisation.

That is why we uphold the need of new thinking which calls for level-headedness, for precise assessments and first of all for the understanding that no matter how strong somebody is he cannot command the present-day world. The world has reached the point when everybody must start thinking very hard.

In this situation a special responsibility rests with the great nuclear powers even though they represent only 10 per cent of mankind. The from-a-position-of-strength policy, the attempts to achieve superiority and to teach others how they should manage things in their own home have no future and are baleful to the world community. From such a policy in respect of our country we have drawn serious lessons both in the sphere of the economy and in the sphere of science, and in the field of relations with the West in general, Mikhail Gorbachev said.

Answering a question about what future historians would have to say on Soviet-U.S. relations, Mikhail Gorbachev said that irony and surprise are already being expressed in the world on this score. The way these relations have been shaping up so far is unworthy of great nations. The duty fallen to the lot of this generation of politicians is to put the situation right before it is too late. The Soviet Union is doing the maximum to live up to the role given to it by history. In our foreign policy proposals we do not lay claim to the ultimate truth, and we are always open to constructive ideas. But in our proposals we never detach our own security from the security of others and we try to take others' interests into account in these proposals.

In America, by contrast -- and this cannot be denied -- there are forces to which hostility is profitable, which need the USSR to have "the enemy image" and which use high-powered information media to sow hatred toward the Soviet people. This is a very serious problem which may not be sidestepped.

The most dangerous thing now is irresponsibility in policy, whereby the latter is replaced by a game of politics and is hard to tell from politicking and demagoguery.

The Soviet-U.S. relationship is still at the crossroads and we must muster the will and strength to turn it around. There is no alternative to co-existence. This is not the question of whether we like each other or not. That is something outside politics. America will be such as is liked by the Americans. But the Soviet Union, too, will not build its society by following recipes from outside.

Mikhail Gorbachev supported the opinion that the Soviet-U.S. relationship should be developed in many areas, including the economy, science, culture and human contacts. This will serve well also political relations. He expressed the conviction that accords on disarmament are possible. But what was achieved in the past must not be destroyed. Reykjavik, too, was not a setback but another point reached in approaching the problems of disarmament, from which we should go forward, not back. We should work, without wasting time, on the whole gamut of the problems, move to meet each other halfway, and demonstrate readiness for give-and-take. Nobody can foist anything on anybody. One should give up the notion that the Soviet Union is more interested than the United States in better Soviet-U.S. relations. [sentence as received]

Replying to questions, Mikhail Gorbachev briefly described the changes under way in the Soviet Union. Their purport is more socialism and more democracy. It is not renunciation of the socialist system -- let nobody have any hopes for this -- but full use of the latter's potential. The key to this is in making certain that the whole nation is involved in upgrading society which is ripe for thorough-going change. The reorganization in the USSR does not run counter to the interests of other nations. What is now happening in this country is the most convincing and objective argument that it needs a peaceful, constructive policy and will follow it dedicatedly and consistently.

Despite the obvious and natural differences in our views on the past and the present, our conversation showed the area of understanding is also considerable and there is serious concern about the current international situation and tension in the U.S.-Soviet, relationship.

No matter how difficult it is, let's move toward each other on the basis of an objective analysis of reality and common sense, Mikhail Gorbachev told the visitors in conclusion.

Yakovlev Receives Group

LD031947 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1745 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (TASS)—Aleksandr Yakovlev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today received members of a group of representatives of the International Relations Council (New York City).

This included eminent political figures and former members of a number of U.S. Administrations and Congress, and scientists: G. Brown, C. Vance, D. Jones, J. Kirkpatrick, H. Kissinger, C. Mathias, P. Peterson, S. Tarnow and others. There was a conversation that took place in a frank [otkrovennyy] business-like atmosphere. On the same day the representatives of the council were received by Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and had a conversation with him. Meetings were held with Guriy Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the leaders of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat.

Gromyko, Kissinger Met

LD051241 Moscow TASS in English 1226 GMT 5 Feb 87

["Kremlin meeting" — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS — Andrey Gromyko, member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, received former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the latter's request. Henry Kissinger is staying in Moscow with a group of prominent politicians and statesmen of the USA at the invitation of the USA and Canada Institute, the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Andrey Gromyko called the guest's attention to the documents of the January plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on the problems of restructuring and the party's personnel policy. This plenum was an event of special importance and the decisions it took will undoubtedly have a great influence on the implementation of the strategic policy charted by the 27th congress of the CPSU both in the home and foreign policy fields.

During a conversation, held in a frank and businesslike atmosphere, A.A. Gromyko noted the absence of any progress on a number of basic issues of Soviet-American relations in view of the obstacles raised by the American administration in the way of their solution. As a result the present state of relations between the USSR and the USA remains complicated and causes concern.

The Soviet Union comes out for achievement of mutually acceptable accords on arms limitation and disarmament and strives for ending the arms race and preventing it from spreading to space. The Soviet side came up with the idea of carrying out an all-embracing programme of building a nuclear-free world, delivering mankind from other weapons of mass destruction, reducing conventional armaments and creating a security system for all.

Unfortunately, Andrey Gromyko stressed, we do not see on the American side a desire to go ahead and build relations in a new way on the basis of what was achieved during the Geneva and Reykjavik meetings. On the contrary, it shows the intention to aggravate relations. The latest example of this is the new nuclear explosion in the American testing range, staged on February 3. The U.S. Administration actually tore up the SALT-II Treaty and is moving to break out of ABM accords and taking practical steps to carry out the SDI program, i.e. to militarize space. On the whole, all this can only be interpreted as attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR. Simultaneously the United States is working up tension in different regions of the world thus increasing international instability.

The Soviet side is firmly against any such encroachments. At the same time it is consistently working to establish a basis for a constructive dialogue with the USA. The Soviet Union is interested in straightening out Soviet-American relations and giving them a fresh impetus. In our opinion, Andrey Gromyko said, the key policy statement of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev of January 25, 1986, as well as his proposals made in Reykjavik constitute a good basis for such a dialogue.

During the conversation opinions were exchanged on principal issues of Soviet-American relations and on a wide range of international problems.

Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute, the USSR Academy of Sciences, was present at the meeting.

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CSO: 5200/1303

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR PUBLISHES BOOKLET ON REYKJAVIK DOCUMENTS, ARMS NUMBERS

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 23 Jan 87 pp 1-4

[Article by B. Kotov: "Reykjavik: Restoring the Truth"]

[Text] This small booklet with a little more than 20 pages is quite heavy in its political significance. Entitled "Reykjavik. Documents and Facts," it restores and reaffirms the truth about a hallmark event in the international life of our troubled days--the Soviet-American summit meeting held in the capital of Iceland on October 11 and 12, 1986.

It is very important today to tell the truth about what happened in Reykjavik, because government leaders in the United States and some other Western countries and, with their prompting, the bourgeois mass media continue to falsify the positions of the sides and thus distort the meaning of the talks. In a bid to scare the public, the American "interpreters" of the results of the Reykjavik meeting dodge backward and forward like hares. At first, they vainly tried to present the US President's position in Reykjavik as that of a "peacemaker" but soon adopted the tactic of political backsliding. Like a character created by Saltykov-Shchedrin, who threatened "to close America," the "hawks" in Washington would like "to close Reykjavik." Nothing happened in Reykjavik, declared US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger.

Published by the Novosti Press Agency, the booklet contains major excerpts from Mikhail Gorbachev's October 10 and October 12 statements in Reykjavik and his October 14 and October 22 addresses on Soviet television and other official materials. And they all clearly show that the meeting in Reykjavik and the bold peace proposals made by the Soviet Union there brought about a qualitatively new situation and raised the struggle for nuclear disarmament onto a higher level.

Now, in the context of the Reykjavik meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev said, "one can see new prospects for the solution of urgent questions, such as security, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of new rounds of the arms race and a new understanding of the opportunities that have opened up before humanity."

A full text of Soviet-drafted instructions to the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the United States on the drafting of an agreement in the area of nuclear disarmament is published for the first time in the booklet. The Soviet leader handed that document to the US President in the course of the talks. It envisaged the drafting of the following three agreements: in the area of strategic arms, in the area of medium-range missiles, a Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and a nuclear test ban agreement.

"The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the US President," the draft instructions say, in particular, "consider that these accords are a major turning point on the way towards realizing the objectives set by them in Geneva in November 1985: those of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, preventing an arms race in space and ending it on the Earth, and strengthening strategic stability and general security."

Of course, no agreements were concluded. While being literally one or two or three steps away in Reykjavik from taking the decisions that could have become historic, the USSR and the US failed to take that step or those steps. There was no turning point in world history. Although it was possible. The reason was the unconstructive position of Washington and its peace-endangering stubborn commitment to the plans for the militarization of space.

The Soviet leader handed the President, besides, a table of the strategic offensive arms holding of the USSR and the US.

As the reader can easily see for himself, these figures leave nothing of the stories circulated by Western propaganda services about "Soviet nuclear superiority" which is alleged to induce the White House to go ahead with its pseudodefensive Strategic Initiative. Moreover, they attest to an almost 1.5:1 US advantage in nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles.

The documents and other material contained in the booklet produced both in Russian and in a number of foreign languages, will make it possible for many abroad to form an objective and proper judgment of the upshot of Reykjavik. On balance, this collection conclusively demonstrates the persistent efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet State towards saving this planet from the danger of nuclear catastrophe.

Strategic Offensive Arms Holdings of the USSR and the USA *

(as of October 11, 1986)

	USSR	USA
ICBM launchers including: launchers for ICBMs equipped with independently targetable warheads	1,396 820	1,018 550
SLBM launchers including: SLBM launchers equipped with independently targetable warheads	922 352	672 640
ICBM and SLBM launchers, total including: ICBM and SLBM launchers equipped with independently targetable warheads	2,320 1,172	1,690 1,190
Heavy bombers including: Heavy bombers equipped to carry Cruise missiles	160 53	518 127
ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers, total including: ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped to carry independently targetable warheads and Cruise missiles	2,480 1,225	2,208 1,317
warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, total	10,000	14,800

* This table was handed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the US President during their meeting in Reykjavik.

(PRAVDA, January 23. In full.)

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CSO: 5200/1279

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET PRESS PRAISES INFLUENCE OF FRG'S GENSCHER

PRAVDA on Reykjavik

PH031025 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 87 First Edition p 4

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev "International Review"]

[Excerpt] After the Elections

The week after parliamentary elections in the FRG — which was last week — is always a period of summing up. The main task for the political forces participating in the election is naturally to retain or capture the heights of government. In this sense the result was superficial. The ruling coalition between the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] and the Free Democratic Party [FDP] remains in force. It holds a parliamentary majority. However, politically speaking, this result of the 23 January vote does not tell the whole story.

On the other hand, why did the CDU/CSU suffer while their coalition partner, on the contrary, boosted its votes and mandates and was a clear winner?

Many people think that the FDP's approach to important international questions had something to do with it. One FDP figure — H.-D. Genscher, federal vice chancellor and foreign minister — managed to maintain his reputation as an advocate of detente in the eyes of a substantial part of the public. During the election campaign, for instance, he stated that "whoever rejects detente also rejects the eastern treaties" and supported the results of Reykjavik, the "zero option" for medium-range missiles, and observance of the ABM Treaty. Since all this was bitterly attacked by the most right-wing CDU/CSU circles, the FDP's success undoubtedly reveals corresponding views on the part of their voters. Many observers in the FRG and abroad are also interpreting this as a partly personal success for the head of the foreign policy department. They believe the election results strengthen his positions and expand the possibility of Bonn translating positive statements into practical steps to promote detente, disarmament, security, and cooperation in Europe.

NATO Role Noted

PH051033 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Kuznetsov Geneva dispatch: "H.-D. Genscher: We Have Reached a Crossroads"]

[Text] The future of East-West relations was the subject of the 17th International Symposium plenary session held by the "World Economic Forum" in the city of Davos.

Opening the session, former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre stressed the importance of taking comprehensive account of the new political realities and of the West working out a long-term strategy in its relations with the East. Reflecting the viewpoint of the Reagan administration, Joseph Nye, a professor at Harvard University, defended the need for "strong-arm tactics" in the NATO countries' relations with the Warsaw Pact and urged West Europeans to be cautious in their development of political and economic ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist community.

Regarding the stand taken by the North Atlantic Alliance, Genscher, FRG vice chancellor and foreign minister, said in his speech, we must make use of the new opportunities offered by Soviet foreign policy. We understand that Reykjavik has underlined the possibility of new prospects: Cooperation could replace the arms build-up and West Europeans must adopt this new philosophy.

For more than 40 years confrontation has dominated East-West relations and we have now reached a turning point. It would be a historic mistake, the FRG foreign minister said, if the West were to reject this opportunity because it is incapable of giving up its old stand. This approach must not determine our policy, otherwise we will cease to exist as farsighted politicians.

We must state our willingness to cooperate in all economic spheres on the basis of mutual benefit. We must say that Europe, the European continent, is our common home and we would like to strengthen the security of this home together with the Soviet Union. We must shake off the old prejudices which divide East and West, Genscher stressed. The policy of acting from a position of strength and seeking military superiority must be removed from our political vocabulary.

We have reached a crossroads: Either we slide toward confrontation or we cooperate with one another and thereby survive our nuclear age.

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CSO: 5200/1289

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPER INTERVIEWS USSR'S KUITINSKIY ON DISARMAMENT

LD062124 Hamburg DPA in German 2008 GMT 6 Feb 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — Soviet Ambassador in Bonn Yuliy Kvitinskiy has called for an "elimination of hostile concepts of one another or both sides" in German-Soviet relations. Kvitinskiy said in an interview with the *Bonner Generalanzeiger* (Saturday's issue) that the controversial remark made by the chancellor about Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Nazi propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels had "caused damage." Kvitinskiy said: "The comparison was the most indefensible thing there could be."

On the subject of disarmament, Kvitinskiy stressed that a zero option on European intermediate-range weapons remains part of a "package," which also contains the avoidance of a nuclear arms race in space. The ambassador spoke out against any linkage between a zero option on intermediate-range weapons and disarmament in short-range missiles. "We are ready/ immediately to enter negotiations on short-range missiles, but we are against a linkage."

On economic cooperation with the West, Kvitinskiy said: "We want production links instead of the simple trade relations usual so far, and joint ventures — in any event more intensive forms of cooperation." This also includes nuclear energy. The interview was prereleased to DPA in edited form.

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CSO: 5200/2398

SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA REBUTS SENATOR DOLE'S ARGUMENTS ON SALT

FMD41109 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 February 1987 First Edition carries on page 4 an item entitled "Who is in a Hurry to Bury the SALT II Treaty and Why." It comprises a "verbatim" reprint of an article in THE NEW YORK TIMES by Robert Dole, Republican leader in the U.S. Senate, and a commentary by PRAVDA international observer Nikiolay Kurdyumov. There is an explanatory introduction.

"Today PRAVDA introduces a new rubric — 'Different Standpoints.' Under it it will be publishing the most typical articles by journalists and politicians in the West on topical problems and commentaries by Soviet journalists, academics, and public figures."

The article by Robert Dole supports the U.S. President's decision to cease voluntary observance of SALT II and he calls the treaty "dead and buried."

The Kurdyumov commentary is as follows:

"Frankly, the Republican senator from Kansas has assumed the unenviable role of grave-digger for the SALT II Treaty. The article he has published is a typical example of an attempt to justify at all costs and by any available method Washington's decision to torpedo this important document. I will point out that even many of Dole's colleagues in Congress called this action a 'tragic mistake.'

"Such opinions are fully justified. The provocative nature of U.S. actions is evident. Washington has flouted the treaty. By means of President R. Reagan's statement and the bringing into service of the 131st strategic bomber with cruise missiles on board the United States has officially ceased to observe the document which for a number of years has been an inhibiting factor in the main area of the arms race — in the sphere of strategic offensive armaments. And it was not done in order to remove the threat of the U.S. 'retaliatory strike potential,' as Dole would have it, but for the obvious purpose of demolishing military parity between the USSR and the United States.

"It is generally accepted that observance of the SALT II Treaty has ensured strategic stability and helped strengthen mutual trust between the sides and was the springboard for the quest for ways of reducing and eliminating

nuclear weapons. There is something else that is equally apparent. By exceeding one of the main limits laid down in the treaty, the United States took a very dangerous step aimed at dismantling the arms race limitation treaty structure. But for all his efforts to mangle logic, the senator could do no better than to claim that it was not the administration's abandonment of the treaty, but Congress' decision to observe it which had 'undermined' the chances of achieving an arms reduction agreement.

"The 'arguments' in support of the so-called 'substantial reasons' which allegedly exhausted the president's patience and forced him to cancel the treaty are equally erroneous. Dole follows the well-trodden path of brazen claims of Soviet 'violations' of the SALT II Treaty. As has been repeatedly stated by official Soviet bodies, the Soviet Union has created a light ICBM, called an SS-24 in the West, in response to the deployment of the new MX first-strike missile in the United States. But this is fully in line with the treaty, which permits the creation of one new missile. Moreover, a missile which was brought into service around 15 years ago has been modernized also within the framework of the treaty provisions. It has been replaced by a missile which is called the SS-24 in the West. [sentence as published] So why, one wonders, is the senator trying to cloud the issue? Is it not to prevent Congress from curbing the administration's militarist frenzy?

"For want of facts the senator constantly resorts to falsification. For example, what about his claim about the 'massive buildup' of the Soviet military potential. In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. The quantitative data on Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive armaments presented to the U.S. president by the Soviet side during the Reykjavik meeting convincingly demonstrate that whereas parity, approximate equality, exists between the sides in terms of the overall number of launch installations, the correlation in terms of the quantity of charges on strategic delivery vehicles is 10,000 to 14,800. In other words, the number of U.S. nuclear warheads exceeds the number of Soviet warheads by nearly 50 percent.

"Of course, all this is or should be familiar to a senator who has the prominent post of leader of the Republican minority in the Senate. So if Robert Dole is resorting to cock-and-bull stories and deliberate misinformation it is obviously not for the good of his health.

"It could not be otherwise. In fact, even Republican senators have joined the Democrats in cosponsoring a bill which has been submitted to the Senate and which envisages the administration resuming observance of the SALT II Treaty numerical levels. Indeed, even 'hawks' in Washington are beginning to realize that efforts to slander the USSR's peace-loving policy and cast aspersions on it are unconvincing and are not having the desired effect. And Dole's article, obviously intended for 'domestic consumption,' is new evidence of this. Incidentally, from where did the senator produce 'Moscow's obvious and correct opinion' about the SALT II Treaty being 'obsolete'? Moscow has no such opinion. In fact, we have a high opinion of the

of the significance of the treaty. The Soviet Government has stated that it will adhere to the treaty's provisions for the time being, despite the U.S. abandonment of it. The Soviet Union's restraint in response to the U.S. provocation in trampling all over the treaty has met with extensive worldwide appreciation and approval. At the same time, it is driving the Washington administration into a corner.

"So you have people like Senator Dole throwing their weight about, invoking the specter of Frankenstein, in an effort to bury the SALT II Treaty and Mankind's hopes of an end to the insane arms race even deeper."

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CSO: 5200/1290

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER COMMENTS ON UK TRIDENT PROGRAM

Linked to Spy Satellite

PMO41444 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Within the Framework of the Trident Program"]

[Text] London, 2 Feb — There are serious grounds to suggest that the British Government's secret plans to create a satellite for espionage against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are directly linked to the implementation of the Trident program, the TODAY newspaper writes.

Specialists believe this satellite is capable of functioning as an autonomous control system for targeting Trident missiles, which the Conservative government intends to deploy on submarines. The newspaper notes that in the event of a nuclear conflict the British satellite could be included with analogous American systems.

The suggested link with the Trident program largely explains why Margaret Thatcher's government is now searching so feverishly for materials relating to a film on the spy satellite. The film was made by journalist Duncan Campbell, but its showing on television was banned by the BBC leadership. The government hastened to ban its viewing even by parliamentarians. British special service agents spent more than 24 hours searching the premises of the BBC Glasgow department, where the film was made. They confiscated more than 200 reels of film and several boxes of documents. Earlier the police searched Campbell's apartment, as well as the editorial offices of the weekly NEW STATESMAN, which published an article on the illegal actions of the Tory government in drawing up the plan to create the spy satellite in secrecy from parliament.

'Anti-Soviet' Movie Hit

PMO61233 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Falsehood on Film"]

[Text] London, 5 Feb — "Preserving Peace" is the pretentious title of an anti-Soviet movie produced on instructions from the British Defense Ministry. Everything said in the movie about the USSR has the aim of instilling in the British people the idea of a

"growing Soviet military threat" and the intention of this "communist country and its Communist Party" to pursue an "expansionist policy" after World War II and "attack Western Europe."

In order to present greater cogency, these "fears" experienced by NATO and the British Government are backed up by statements from the officers of British troops stationed in the FRG. According to them, the West expects and "attack" from the USSR and, moreover, Moscow's advantage lies in the fact that it supposedly will "determine the time and place of the attack."

This idea also is conveyed by Lord Carrington, NATO general secretary, during his appearance in the movie.

It is no secret that this movie is needed by those who initiated it to justify the presence of U.S. nuclear cruise missiles in the British Isles and to give theoretical foundation to plans to reequip the British submarine fleet with the latest Trident nuclear missile system. The real, ill-concealed purpose of this movie is to intensify mistrust of the Soviet Union and whip up the atmosphere of anti-Sovietism.

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CSO: 5200/1281

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW WEEKLY QUESTIONS WHAT EUROPE NUCLEAR FORCES NEED

PM131233 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 4, 2 Feb 87 pp 22-24

[Aleksandr Lebedev article: "Bomb for Europe — And Alternatives to the Strategy of 'Deterrence'"]

[Text] The chief argument advanced in favour of a "European bomb" is the alleged superiority of the Warsaw Treaty in conventional armaments. Assessments of this superiority vary widely, from double to fivefold.

Meanwhile, the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and various specialized publications, such as the French Defense Nationale, have systematically reaffirmed the approximate parity between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in Europe in conventional weapons and armed forces (with due account taken of the differences in their structure).

Paradoxically, London, Paris, Bonn and their allies, while talking about the East's superiority in conventional, nuclear (medium-range and tactical) and chemical weapons, are avoiding serious discussion of the Warsaw Treaty's proposals for drastic cuts in all these types of weapons.

Is Western Europe indeed so "defenceless" that it needs the nuclear bomb to protect itself, or can the same end be achieved at a smaller risk? An interesting remark on this score was made by Richard Burt, U.S. ambassador to the F.R.G., in an interview for STERN magazine last November. Having in recent months spent much time with the U.S. and West German armed forces, he said he believed the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would not leave Western Europe defenceless. And he reassured Europeans that in any case the Old World was under the American strategic umbrella.

Why then must Western Europe stockpile dangerous weapons — both its own and imported — if Washington's strategic forces guarantee its security (against a nonexistent threat, incidentally)?"

This is the question that occupies the minds of many West European politicians. The remarks made by former F.R.G. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who shares much of the responsibility for bringing American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles to Europe, are worthy of note. He has said that the Soviet operational-tactical weapons could not serve as an instrument of political blackmail and that the imbalance between East and West in conventional armaments was grossly overestimated. Schmidt has noted that "European conventional forces by themselves could deter the Soviet Union from attack or blackmail without requiring the American nuclear umbrella." The former chancellor went even further, saying that if America continues to threaten to withdraw its troops from Europe then "the sooner the better."

Perhaps by coincidence, Schmidt seemed to be replying to the recent statement by General Rogers, the American supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe, who had threatened to pull out 350,000 U.S. troops from Europe if Britain closed U.S. nuclear bases in its territory.

The word for this in any European language is blackmail. Meanwhile General Rogers is constantly warning West Europeans against blackmail...by the Soviet Union. [paragraph continues]

True, even he stops short of claiming that the Soviet armies are preparing to cross the Elbe. But he holds out an even more lurid prospect: The Soviet Union could bring Western Europe to its knees without firing a single shot — by brandishing its nuclear superiority. In this connection, it would not be out of place to cite the opinion of the British Labour Party expressed in its recent statement on defence and foreign policy. It says that there has not been a single instance when NATO countries, whether or not they have nuclear weapons in their territory, have been subjected to "nuclear blackmail."

NATO leaders, however, assert that it is only fear of U.S. retaliation that deters the Soviet Union from using blackmail. What, then, is the "deterrent" role of the British and French nuclear weapons? The usual answer is: as insurance against the possibility of American withdrawal from Western Europe.

The chances that the U.S. would leave West Europeans to their own devices are very remote. The aim of all the current talk about the danger of the United States reverting to its isolationist policy of the 1920s and 1930s has been unambiguously expressed by General Rogers: to scare Western Europe and make it more amenable.

The Americans do not want to withdraw from Western Europe for many reasons, of which the fact that the present West European leaders are asking them not to do so is far from being the chief. It is not a reason at all, but a justification. Nor are sentimental considerations — the common origins of Western civilization in the Mediterranean, ethnic roots and historical ties — of decisive importance, especially for a power committed to a global strategy.

What, then, draws the U.S. to Europe? The need for an American military presence on the continent is usually explained, on both sides of the Atlantic, by the United States' desire to be on the line of confrontation between the two systems and blocs as a guarantor and symbol of Western solidarity.

Another reason, not usually mentioned in the West, is that Washington feels more comfortable and better ensured against unpredictable twists in West European politics — domestic and foreign — with its troops on guard duty on the continent.

A still greater source of confidence to Washington is the presence of its nuclear weapons in Europe. To keep them in Europe is the prime U.S. concern, as Neil Kinnock was given to understand during his recent visit to Washington. He was told that while it was up to the British to decide whether to buy or not to buy Tridents, throwing American nuclear weapons out of the British Isles was another matter.

As noted in the first part of the article, Washington was initially less than enthusiastic about the appearance of British and French nuclear weapons. But it has since learned to derive strategic and economic benefits from them (incidentally, the sale of Tridents to the British is no exercise in philanthropy: It would earn U.S. war manufacturers at least 14 billion dollars.) At the same time the U.S. is wary of any signs of excessive West European activity in the direction of autonomous military integration, especially on a nuclear basis. Washington reminds its West European partners that their prime concern should be NATO, and the strengthening (and broadening) of its European base, and not the building of a new structure. Here one can discern the hand of the U.S. military-industrial complex, which hates competition.

All these issues seem to be the subject of an intense diplomatic struggle of which not much is known. But judging from what comes to the surface there are loose ends in the West European arguments. If London and Paris (as well as Bonn) are so committed to the idea of "European nuclear forces," why are they clinging so desperately to the American medium-range missiles that can reach Soviet territory? If they are seen as an answer to the Soviet SS-20s, then why do Britain and France need their own nuclear weapons?

They do not want their nuclear potential to be classed as European nuclear weapons, as they do not wish it to be counted in the European balance. They prefer to think of their forces as strategic. But as soon as discussion turns to strategic weapons, London and Paris vehemently object to their nuclear forces figuring in any talks or being counted in any reductions.

One might think these forces a mirage. But one cannot manipulate a dozen submarines carrying hundreds of nuclear warheads as a magician manipulates a white rabbit at one moment producing it out of a hat and at the next putting it back.

In short, if the British and French nuclear forces exist (and they are certainly no hallucination), the possibility of their military use cannot be discounted (no matter how crazy such a prospect might appear).

Both the NATO doctrine and the French strategy are geared to a first nuclear strike in the event of conflict in Europe. Should this happen, Britain, France and their partners in Western Europe can easily imagine the consequences of a Soviet retaliatory strike, from which America will not save them.

Such projections, sinister as they are, have to be discussed because a whole science or profession concerned with various scenarios for the escalation of nuclear conflict has been evolved in the West. In one current version, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. exchange nuclear strikes fighting a nuclear duel. Do Britain and France, which possess nuclear weapons, and other West European countries, which have these weapons deployed in their territory, really hope to be left on the sidelines?

It is unreasonable to expect that a country subjected to a nuclear strike would place its trust solely in the good intentions and Christian virtues of the West Europeans, and waste precious time finding out whose particular missile (British, French or one deployed in the F.R.G.) has been fired at the target. The target, incidentally, are known to have been distributed between the Western allies in advance, and they are situated in Soviet territory.

What, then, is the insurance value of the British and French nuclear forces? A more appropriate term for them would be weapons of assured suicide.

On the other hand, reductions in these weapons, with equivalent cuts in the Soviet arsenal, would at least bring down the level of nuclear tension in Europe and reduce the danger of an accidental nuclear war. Such measures would be of great political significance as they would demonstrate that it is possible to stop the buildup of nuclear arsenals and start scaling them down and eliminating them. They would prove the existence of the will to do so.

When the British Labour Party adopted a nuclear disarmament programme, Moscow promised to cut its arsenal to match the number of nuclear warheads eliminated by London. [paragraph continues]

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has declared that it would have no nuclear missiles targeted on Britain if foreign nuclear weapons were removed from the British Isles. It may of course be argued that this would not save Britain from the "nuclear winter" which would set in if a global nuclear conflict flared up. True enough. The only safeguard against that is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, but partial steps leading in that direction are also important. So, the way for Europe to insure itself against catastrophe is to renounce nuclear weapons and not improve them.

But perhaps Britain and France need nuclear forces for political rather than military reasons, as an attribute of modern diplomacy, a status symbol?

Such illusions might have been understood in the 1960s, at the dawn of the nuclear-missile era. But not today.

Every state is entitled to have adequate means to ensure its own security. But to aggravate the danger of global catastrophe for parochial considerations of prestige is dangerous egoism. This policy, moreover, has no justification in the history and political practice of Britain or France.

It will be recalled that de Gaulle's foreign policy earned France wide international authority at a time when its "strike force" was still in embryo. Paris is unlikely to find nuclear weapons useful in Chad or the Middle East (to secure the release of hostages, for example) or, say, in New Caledonia. Its tests on the Mururoa Atoll and the brutal measures the French secret services have taken against the environmentalist opponents of the tests have encountered deep resentment rather than approval.

Britain's example is equally instructive. The British nuclear navy did not deter Argentina from entering into armed conflict with London over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Fortunately, British nuclear-armed ships made no immediate contribution to the "glorious" victory of Her Majesty's armed forces. Yet even their presence in the zone of hostilities (reported by the British press) could have had the most dramatic consequences.

In general, given the present level of nuclear armaments and the world balance of forces, it is impossible to imagine an effective political role for nuclear weapons in the service of British and French diplomacy.

This is the line of thinking that has been adopted by influential political forces in Britain. The Labour Party believes that NATO should scrap its out-dated nuclear strategy. They have declared with good reason that when President Reagan agreed in Reykjavik to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, his position was closer to

that of the British Labour Party than the Conservatives (much to the latter's alarm). The Liberal-Social Democratic alliance is steering a middle course: Its leaders think the fate of the British nuclear weapons should be decided through negotiation, but they oppose the increase of the British nuclear potential.

In France, divisions on the issue of the national nuclear deterrent are not so clear-cut. This can be traced to the postwar period when many Frenchmen felt the atomic bomb would help France regain its great-power status. Can it be said that the worship of a nuclear force (even an independent one) has remained the same in the modern inter-dependent world, which is in danger of nuclear death?

Hardly. There are already signs of a changing mood in various strata of French society. Of late not only the Communists but the peace movement and some retired high-ranking officers have been coming out in support of an end to nuclear tests, which would mean freezing nuclear arsenals at their present level. Socialists, too, seem to be leaning towards modifying the military doctrine. The debate on the role of the French nuclear forces is apparently beginning at various political levels.

One would like to hope that the understanding will gain ground on both sides of the Channel that Britain and France, both members of the Security Council, have sufficient political, economic, diplomatic and military (non-nuclear) resources at their disposal not only to uphold their own interests in the international arena, but to play a constructive role in the settlement of conflicts and the defusing of tensions.

What is to be done with the British and French nuclear forces?

The only sensible course is to work to reduce and eliminate them. London and Paris (as well as Bonn) should not see this as an encroachment on their sovereignty, their independent role in world affairs or their West European identity.

They might have grounds for feeling so if the Soviet Union were at the same time insisting on keeping its own nuclear arsenal undiminished, if it were seeking a nuclear-missile monopoly in Europe. But this is not the case.

Moscow is not demanding the immediate reduction or elimination of British and French nuclear forces. It is the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. that are to lead the way. As proposed in the Soviet statement of January 15, Britain and France would only have to join the process at the second stage, i.e., in 5 or 8 years' time. And all nuclear weapons should be eliminated before the end of the century.

British, French and other West European leaders should not try to alarm the public in their countries with the prospects of a return to the age of seven-, thirty- and even hundred-year wars. There is no danger of a return to bows and arrows. The power of modern non-nuclear weapons is so great that they are well able to act as deterrents. If, that is, Western leaders insist that international stability can only be based on deterrence, and not on a system of confidence. It would be far better of course if they get rid of this syndrome.

Be that as it may, Europe's chance of survival does not reside in a "European nuclear bomb" or Anglo-French nuclear forces used on behalf of the West European countries. Salvation lies elsewhere. True safeguards of national security today can only be offered within the framework of universal and general security equal for all. This is a job for politicians and not for the military.

Britain and France, like their non-nuclear allies in Western Europe, can make a considerable contribution to this process. As a minimum, they should resist from erecting additional barriers along its way.

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CSO: 5200/1295

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TURKEY: INONU, SDPP NUCLEAR ARMS STANCE—The Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] has declared its opposition to the deployment of nuclear missiles in Turkey. The SDPP miniconvention declaration disclosed yesterday by party leader Erdal Inonu says: "The SDPP will request the review of bilateral agreements in accordance with our national interests and will oppose the deployment of nuclear missiles in the bases in Turkey and the use of the bases outside the goals of NATO." The views expressed by the SDPP miniconvention declaration are, in summary, as follows: "A review of bilateral agreements in accordance with our national interests will be requested, and the deployment of nuclear missiles in bases in Turkey and the use of the bases outside the goals of NATO will be opposed." [Excerpts] [Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 11 Nov 86 pp 1,10] 9588

CSO: 5200/2481

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: JOURNAL ON VIENNA CSCE MEETING, SOVIET PROPOSALS

AU282135 Moscow MEZHODNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 1, January 1987 (signed to press 18 Dec 86) pp 133-140

[Text] The regular, third meeting of representatives of CSCE participant states, which opened in Vienna on 4 November 1986, is taking place in a complex and largely altered international situation. After the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik the struggle for a nuclear-free future entered a qualitatively new stage and rose to a higher and more active level. This prompts a new assessment of both European and world realities and lends even greater relevance to the Vienna meeting.

As is known, at the talks held on 5 and 6 November in Vienna between the USSR Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, the American side attempted to carry out a revision of all aspects of the mutual understanding reached in Iceland and to retreat to their former positions. At the same time, in the face of the prospects which have arisen for real movement toward a nuclear-free world, certain political leaders of West European countries have begun to speak about the need to keep American nuclear weapons in Europe, to extend the proposed schedule for reducing the principal nuclear arsenals of East and West, and to link this to cuts in the sphere of conventional weapons.

The synchronous nature of these utterances against nuclear weapons in Western Europe suggests the idea of massive pressure being exerted by Washington on its West European allies. This kind of pronouncement against everything positive that was achieved at Reykjavik undoubtedly attests to the fact that certain politicians in the West are not prepared to think in terms of a nuclear-free Europe, as well as to the continuing inertia of the policy of force which feeds the arms race and poisons the international political climate.

The role and importance of the all-European process, and, above all, of one of its main areas — the real advance in the cause of disarmament in Europe — are sharply increasing in the situation which has developed. The Vienna meeting is expected to make a weighty contribution to the solution of this most important task. Practical implementation of disarmament measures in Europe would improve radically the situation on our continent, and not only here. The fact that this implementation is possible is demonstrated by the successful conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europe.

This would remove fears that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would upset the balance in favor of the socialist countries, which supposedly possess superiority in conventional weapons. A fall in the level of military confrontation in this sphere would ease substantially the stage-by-stage solution of the problem of freeing Europe, other continents, and the whole world from nuclear weapons.

It stands to reason that it is no less important to strive for progress in all other areas outlined by the Helsinki conference in order to create the political, material, and other structures of a European peace, structures which would completely rule out the possibility of the use of force or the threat of its use in international relations.

Security can only be equal and general — reliable security for each state simultaneously must be security for all. This would make it possible to turn Europe into a continent of lasting, guaranteed peace and mutually advantageous cooperation, and into a substantial component in an all-embracing system of international security. Europe would seem to be fully capable of setting an example in the creation of such a system, in the establishment of a policy of detente and peaceful coexistence — both on its own continent and in other regions of the world, in the solution of pressing regional and international problems, and, of course, above all in the implementation of concrete disarmament measures.

History itself has moved Europe onto the frontline of the struggle for general security. The epicenters of both world wars, which led to the death of tens of millions of people, were here. It is here, too, that the two most powerful military-political alliances oppose each other today. In spite of the fact that the territory of Europe is literally crammed with military installations and the latest weapons of mass destruction, these are continuing to increase, contrary to all logic. The categorical demand of our times is to preserve peace, to render Europe harmless, and to free it from the gigantic arsenals of lethal weapons.

By relying on its instructive and frequently unique historical experience, Europe is capable of constructing relations between states on the principles of peace, security, and justice. It is, after all, no accident that it was precisely in Europe that it became possible to break through the front of the "cold war" and turn from confrontation to detente. The Europeans' own experience has convinced them of the vitality of detente, which opens up prospects for all countries, great and small, to play a more independent role in international affairs, and which contributes to ensuring their security and the development of social progress. However, in recent years, Europeans also have come to know the dangerous and negative consequences of the new relapse of the "cold war," which has more than once placed them on the verge of being drawn into serious international conflicts.

That is why the Europeans are vitally interested in making confidence and fruitful cooperation in the revival of detente replace the artificially inflated confrontation and tension. It is necessary to completely rid political thinking of the perception of Europe as a "theater of military operations." Europe, like the whole world, is too small and frail for the policy of force, which must disappear forever from the world arena for the salvation and good of all mankind.

As a constellation of many brilliant national cultures and the greatest achievements of world civilization, Europe can and must take on the task of reviving and establishing detente in the present situation, too. As M.S. Gorbachev has stated, "Europe should be a model for the coexistence of sovereign, different, but peace-loving states that recognize their interdependence and that construct their relations on trust."

Our country consistently comes out in favor of the Vienna meeting being conducted in a positive and businesslike key in order that the Helsinki Final Act be further developed

In substantive new accords on all aspects — political, military, economic, and humanitarian-cultural. This constructive approach, arising from the Soviet Union's principled policy of preserving peace, of disarmament, and of ensuring international and European security, was set out by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze in Vienna. In his speech, which received a large positive response at the forum, he stressed the Soviet delegation's readiness to cooperate with representatives of all European states, the United States, and Canada to make the Vienna meeting end in significant, positive results.

The successful conclusion to the Stockholm conference opened the way for disarmament in Europe and, above all, for the limitation and substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons on the principle of equal security for the sides. The document the conference formulated clearly states that it adopted a set of mutually supplementary measures to build confidence and strengthen security. Consequently, "Stockholm I" leads directly to "Stockholm II," to the adoption of measures for disarmament. The Vienna meeting must have a sizable say in this matter by giving the Stockholm conference a mandate allowing it to work in real earnest on issues of disarmament in Europe.

The balanced program for European disarmament which the Warsaw Pact countries worked out at the Political Consultative Committee Conference in Budapest (June 1986) is completely suitable for discussion at the Stockholm conference. The socialist countries propose that agreement be reached on considerable reductions in all components of the ground troops and tactical air forces of the European states, the United States, and Canada over a broad geographic zone embracing all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This grandiose task should be solved in stages. As a first step, a one-time mutual reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops by 100,000 to 150,000 men on each side could be carried out over 1 to 2 years. A further significant reduction could be carried out, as a result of which the ground troops and tactical air forces of both sides would be reduced to 25 percent of their present level by the beginning of the nineties. This would amount to more than half a million men on each side. To ensure reliable verification [kontrol] of this reduction, the Warsaw Pact countries propose that use be made both of national technical means and of international forms of verification [proverka], including on-site inspection [inspektsiya na meste]

The Soviet Union's approach to verification of disarmament displays the honesty and openness of socialism's policy, which in practice serves the peaceful interests of peoples and of all mankind. This calls for the elimination of all deceit from foreign policy, the verification of fulfillment of international accords, and a correspondence between words and deeds. "Sincerity in policy," V.I. Lenin wrote, "that is, in that sphere of human relations which deals not in single figures but in /millions/ — sincerity in policy is fully accessible verification of the /correspondence between word and deed/." (passages between slantlines published in italics) (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol 32, p 259)

Poland submitted a concrete proposal for a mandate for "Stockholm II" to be worked out in Vienna. Statements also were made on this area by R. Dizdarevic, Yugoslavia's federal secretary of foreign affairs, and by Foreign Ministers S. Andersson of Sweden, P. Jankowitch of Austria, A. Sceberra Trigona of Malta, and others. Noting that the Stockholm conference had "fulfilled its mandate," Greek Foreign Minister K. Papoulias appealed for as rapid a shift as possible to its second stage. In an interview with the newspaper HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, P. Vayrynen, foreign minister of Finland, came out in favor of achieving agreement in Vienna "on a new mandate for the conference" so that confidence-building and security measures and disarmament measures can be "discussed in parallel" at its next stage.

Unfortunately, the NATO countries arrived in Vienna without standpoints on this important issue. According to the evidence of the Paris LIBERATION, the proposal to develop a new mandate will put the United States, which is "at the moment opposed to any forum on the reduction of conventional, non-nuclear forces," in a difficult position.

The agenda of the second stage of the Stockholm conference also contains those confidence-building measures which have not found their solution at the present stage; among these are the notification of independent fleet and air force exercises, and the extension of confidence-building measures to the territory of all states participating in the all-European conference. At the same time, it would be possible to think about inherently new measures for confidence and military-strategic stability in Europe, measures which are directly connected with the reduction of armed forces and weapons and which ease the achievement of agreement on these issues.

The solution of the task of completely freeing Europe of nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as the consolidation of stability and confidence would, of course, be promoted by the creation of zones free of these types of mass destruction weapons in the Balkans, in central Europe, in the north, and in other regions of the European continent.

Recalling the USSR's active support for the idea of creating a nuclear-free northern Europe at a news conference in Helsinki on 13 October, Ye.K. Ligachev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, reported our country's concrete new steps to strengthen security and stability in that region. These include the dismantling of medium-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula, which has already taken place, as well as that of the majority of such missile launchers on the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts and the redeployment of several operational-tactical missile divisions out of these districts.

The Soviet Union also is prepared to withdraw submarines armed with ballistic missiles from the strength of our Baltic Fleet if an accord is reached between the corresponding states on giving the Baltic Sea nuclear-free status. In addition, the USSR has proposed that a start be made in limiting the intensiveness of large-scale military exercises in the region of northern Europe and the adjoining sea areas. For its part, the Soviet Union received with interest the proposal made by President of Finland M. Koivisto on measures to build confidence in northern Europe and on limiting naval activity here.

The USSR's new peace initiative received a largely positive response not only in north European countries, but also among broad circles of the international public, which justly saw these steps as one more weighty manifestation of the USSR's aspiration to build confidence and consolidate cooperation in international relations.

The cornerstone of steady and stable development of the all-European process is respect for the territorial and political realities that have formed as a result of World War II and postwar development and which are laid down in the corresponding treaties and agreements. The activity of revanchist forces and the stimulation of revanchism wherever it occurs not only poisons the political atmosphere and complicates normal cooperation in Europe, but represents a threat to peace and international security.

The interests of peace and European security also are served by the initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union at various times for the dissolution of the military-political alliances that oppose each other, for the conclusion of treaties of nonaggression and nonuse of force, and for the strengthening of security in the Mediterranean region and in northern Europe. They all fit directly into the Soviet concept of a system of all-embracing international security.

A most important area of the all-European process is the introduction of the principles of the Final Act into the practice of international life in order to make them a law that no one can disobey. Here, too, it would seem that Vienna could take an important step: Would this not be furthered if the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act were reflected in national legislation in such a way as to correspond to each country's practice and procedure? As is known, the Soviet Union has included these principles in its Constitution and invariably is guided by them in its relations with other states.

From the USSR's point of view, the need to consolidate security in Europe is met by cooperation on an all-European and bilateral basis in the cause of eradicating international terrorism and the causes which give rise to it, as well as by the application of effective methods of preventing acts of international terrorism, including those directed against the security of land, sea, and air travel, and effective methods of eliminating the consequences of such acts, including punishment of the guilty. The Soviet proposals for cooperation in the struggle against international terrorism elicited a favorable reaction among the participants in the Vienna meeting. As A. Sceberra Trigona, minister of foreign and cultural affairs of Malta, has stated, his government intends to propose the convocation of a conference of experts on the problems of terrorism "in all its aspects."

To a considerable extent, the political climate in Europe depends on the state of East-West economic and scientific-technological ties. Life itself poses questions of economic cooperation, especially those arising from contemporary technological development, within the context of a general system of international security as an economic guarantee that peace is ensured. Although certain results were achieved in this area during the period between Madrid and Vienna, within the all-European framework, there is undoubtedly an unjustified lag in filling the "second basket," the more so when one considers the fact that the accelerated development of progress in science and technology has led to the appearance of new needs and spheres of all-European cooperation that are not reflected in the Helsinki accords.

At the same time, there are still very considerable unused reserves for the development of economic ties between Eastern and Western Europe, because at the basis of these relations lie factors of geographic proximity and their traditionally mutually supplementary economies. However, it is necessary to eliminate the discrimination and artificial barriers impeding the natural development of events, to put foreign economic ties at man's service, and to expand the scope for the economic rapprochement of peoples.

For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared for further development and intensification of all-European trade, economic, and scientific-technological cooperation, involving both existing and promising new forms of cooperation, including industrial cooperation, the creation of joint enterprises, direct ties between firms and associations, and mutually advantageous ties in the field of the latest technologies. The Soviet Union considers that the measures it has taken to cardinaly restructure its own economy and to radically improve its foreign economic activity, as well as the fulfillment of the "Comprehensive Program for the Scientific-Technical Progress of CEMA Countries Until the Year 2000," will create the necessary conditions for shifting business ties with CSCE participant countries to a qualitatively higher level.

The Vienna meeting presents good opportunities for working out concrete measures that would serve as the necessary impulse for the development of all-European economic cooperation and for the strengthening of trust in the relations between states. The scientific-technological revolution urgently dictates the need to combine experience and skill in industrial development and scientific research. [paragraph continues]

For this reason, the Soviet Union wholly supports the CSSR's initiative with regard to holding an all-European economic forum to which it is ready to come with a broad program derived from the measures it is conducting to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development and to reconstruct its national economy on the basis of scientific-technological progress; it also supports Romania's proposal for a meeting of experts on cooperation in the field of science and technology.

One does not need to be a great specialist in ecology to sense the full acuteness of today's problems in protecting nature and making rational use of its resources. The growth of various environmental protection movements in Europe attests to this. "Green" parties have even appeared in a number of European countries. The solution of this truly urgent task goes beyond a national framework and calls for combined efforts by all European states on the basis of their recognition of their real community of fate. To be specific, this goal is pursued by the convocation of a representative ecological forum proposed by P. Mladenov, Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs.

The interests of developing the process of all-European cooperation are also served by the IAEA's increased role in resolving security issues connected with the development of nuclear energy and that have a direct bearing on the protection of nature and man's standard of living.

The Soviet Union attaches the gravest importance to ensuring human rights and basic freedoms. Its principled approach to this important problem arises from the humanistic nature of the socialist system and from the indissoluble unity of socialism, democracy, and peace. Our society sees the main force of the new society's development in the democracy and living creativity of the popular masses, in the reality of people's power, in the de facto equality of rights of nations, and in the creation of conditions for the comprehensive development of the individual. It was precisely to achieve and establish people's rights that the Great October Revolution was accomplished, and its 70th anniversary will be celebrated by all of progressive mankind in the near future.

In the Soviet Union, all the objective preconditions have been created for the realization of the great humanistic principle of Marxism-Leninism: The free development of each person is the condition for the free development of all. This is laid down in the CPSU Program. Everything in our country's economy and in its political and spiritual life is subordinate to this most important social goal. The human personality has a central place among the values of the socialist way of life. The human factor is regarded as the main motive force in the revolutionary reconstruction now taking place throughout Soviet social life, in all the processes of that society's democratization, in the development of socialist self-government of the people, in the expansion of openness, and in the consolidation of socialist legality. The more rapidly Soviet people build up the country's economic potential and perfect their society, the broader the possibilities will become for free and full development of the individual, for revealing his abilities, and for enriching his spiritual life.

On an international plane, too, the problems of human rights and of man's development, predestination, and the future have appeared now in their full magnitude. Ensuring man's right to life, freedom, and dignity represents the most important practical task, one might say, of saving people from death in a nuclear war. This graphically reveals the profound meaning of Lenin's statement that "the greatest manifestation of democracy is basically the question of war and peace." (Footnote 2) (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol 40, p 92) Those who consciously or unconsciously lead matters toward war, who whip up the arms race, and who aggravate the international situation are essentially encroaching on human rights.

The USSR is a staunch supporter of the increasing development of human rights and basic freedoms in all countries. This is an essential sphere of international cooperation. It is necessary to adopt a fully serious and responsible attitude toward this sphere, as indeed toward all other aspects of mutual relations between states. This issue simply must be freed of hypocrisy and speculation and of attempts to interfere in other countries' domestic affairs. It is necessary to lend this issue such forms and methods of solution as would really correspond to the broad concept of human rights as reflected in the Final Act and other international documents, including international human rights pacts.

Our country is in favor of the fullest embodiment of these accords in order that civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights are really ensured, and that the worth and value of the individual, the equality of men and women, and the equal rights of great and small nations are established. The socialist countries also are actively in favor of the development of European cooperation in the sphere known as "humanitarian." In practice rather than in words, they are seeking mutually acceptable outcomes in this sphere, too, as was the case at the Bern conference of experts on interpersonal contacts.

The USSR recently adopted major legislative and administrative measures to further develop the international contacts of Soviet citizens and organizations and to solve in a humane and positive spirit questions of reuniting families and contracting mixed marriages. It stated its readiness in practice to be guided on these matters by the draft document of the Bern conference (although this was not formally adopted due to a U.S. veto). The Bern document itself is, incidentally, published in its entirety in the USSR.

The Soviet side has a right to expect that other countries, too, will take steps toward bringing their legislation and rules on matters of contacts into line with international documents and obligations, and, most importantly, that they will take a self-critical look at their own practice in this sphere from the point of view of its correspondence to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

We have taken a number of measures to broaden the exchange of information and improve the conditions of work of foreign journalists. For instance, the group of foreign journalists invited to the Semipalatinsk region was able to convince themselves of the fact that the nuclear weapon test range there has been mothballed for a long time now. Unfortunately, U.S. authorities clearly lack the willingness for serious cooperation in humanitarian spheres. For example, a pamphlet containing the text of M.S. Gorbachev's news conference in Reykjavik and his speech on Soviet television was held up at American customs. The Soviet Union is also in a position of inequality with regard to its exchange of films and books with the United States. A large number of American films are shown on our screens, and through them Soviet people have an opportunity to gain a picture of the Americans' way of life and thinking. In "free" America, however, virtually no Soviet films are shown. It is possible to cite a considerable number of other analogous cases.

Peoples' attraction toward expanding the exchange of spiritual values grows from year to year. Mutual enrichment with the best that each country's culture has created is a powerful means of increasing mutual understanding, strengthening friendship between countries and harmony between states, and enriching each person's spiritual world with the ideals of humanism and progress. It is necessary to make full use of all that has been laid down in the Final Act to further deepen cooperation in the sphere of culture. Europe, which gave the world its great enlighteners, the immortal creations of geniuses of culture and art, and revolutionary inventions in the sphere of mass communication, can set an example of the broadest spiritual ties between peoples.

As a whole, the issues of humanitarian cooperation deserve close attention. Since a considerable number of problems of humanitarian cooperation have accumulated, all of which require a major approach using new historical yardsticks, the Soviet Union proposed in Vienna that a representative conference, comprising all states participating in the all-European conference, be convened in Moscow to deal with the entire range of humanitarian problems, including contacts between people and matters of information, culture, and education. On 10 December — Human Rights Day — the Soviet Union submitted a developed Soviet proposal on this issue in Vienna. Our country proceeds from the view that its initiative will be assessed according to its merits and that it will help to pave the way toward a productive conclusion to the Vienna meeting.

The socialist countries invariably stress their resolve to contribute in every way to the progressive development of all aspects of the all-European process, taking into account the legitimate interests of its participants. Both at the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states held in October last year and in the course of the Vienna meeting, the fraternal countries came out in favor of the achievement of concrete accords on all sections of the Final Act as a unified, balanced whole.

The basic trends of the contemporary world, which express the vital needs of all mankind, are interpreted on a European scale in the development of this process. The realities of the nuclear and space age authoritatively demand that international cooperation and mutual understanding be organized on matters of war and peace and in the solution of a range of pressing regional and global problems. The most important, invincible tendency of our age — the need for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems — is reflected in the multilateral collective efforts to consolidate security and cooperation in Europe. A productive conclusion to the Vienna meeting undoubtedly would be one more major step toward easing tension and improving the international climate, a step which would promote effectively the progress of other negotiations and the solution of urgent international problems.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR, VIENNA PRESS REPORTS ON CSCE SECOND SESSION

Kashlev on Expectations

AU301810 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 29 Jan 87 p 3

[Text] On Tuesday [27 January] began the second stage of the Vienna meeting of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. What does the Soviet Union expect from this forum? Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation, stated his position on this question for VOLKSSTIMME:

"We expect at the second stage of the Vienna meeting that the delegates will no longer engage in general discussions about the implementation of the stipulations of Helsinki and Madrid, but that they will discuss practical proposals. It is necessary to discuss in a businesslike and constructive manner the new concrete initiatives that are already on the table as well as those that will be submitted after the reopening of the conference.

"We request that close attention be devoted to the draft document on complementing the mandate of the Stockholm conference submitted by the Polish delegation. This draft document proceeds from the position of the Warsaw Pact member-states concerted last June in Budapest. In addition, the pertinent interest of many Western countries is being taken into consideration there. We are convinced that its adoption will help to ensure that the Vienna meeting effectively promotes the improvement of the political climate on the European Continent and makes it possible to switch to practical negotiations within the CSCE framework on a broad reduction in the armed forces and armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains.

"Unfortunately no serious steps in this direction have been undertaken to date by NATO. Nor can any trace of such steps be found in the Brussels declaration which was adopted by the NATO Council session on 11 December last year. We are being told that the destruction of nuclear weapons in Europe is impossible without a reduction in the high level of armed forces and conventional armaments. But whenever we propose that this level be reduced, the NATO countries try to evade serious negotiations on this topic.

"One of the tasks of the Vienna meeting consists of finding ways for deepening all-European cooperation in the economic and scientific-technical fields in order to strengthen the material texture of detente and to guarantee economic security and cooperation on the continent. In my opinion the CSSR proposals for convening an economic forum and those of Bulgaria for holding an ecological forum fully and entirely agree with all this.

"The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with all states on the basis of equality and mutual advantage and to take advantage of the most progressive forms of cooperation in trade contacts with the West, such as the establishment of mixed enterprises on USSR territory.

"Unfortunately it must be noted that elevating economic cooperation between the East and West to a qualitatively new level is being hampered mainly through a policy of discrimination by several Western countries. In my opinion it is important that a new way of thinking also prevail in a thorough and business-like manner about the entire complex of humanitarian problems. It is precisely because of this that the Soviet delegation proposed that a conference of the CSCE member-states should be held in Moscow about cooperation in the humanitarian field. A comprehensive discussion of humanitarian problems oriented toward practical results—contacts, information, culture, and education—in the context of human rights would undoubtedly help to achieve our common goal. We hope that this proposal will be the subject of objective discussion at the Vienna meeting.

"The proposal was submitted in short version for the time being. We will explain at the second stage what specific meaning we attach to this initiative. Those countries that to date have not yet stated their positions on it will have to take up a clear-cut stand.

"I would like to recall in this context that the leading NATO countries have not yet submitted any concrete proposals in Vienna. At the second stage of the forum the delegates and the European public will strive to find out how these states envision the development prospect of the all-European process.

"A great deal of work is in store for us in Vienna. The Soviet Union favors a dynamic course of the second stage of the meeting. Basic principles should be discussed and insignificant topics should be avoided. Nor must one hold sessions for such a long time as was the case in Madrid. It is important to work more rapidly and productively because this is in line with the dynamism of our epoch.

"The Soviet delegation hopes that common sense, good will, and the general interest will prevail and that the Vienna meeting will be successful."

Kovalev Addresses Session

PH031145 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "The Vienna Meeting: A Crucial Phase"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday the plenary session of the Vienna meeting of representatives of CSCE participant states was addressed by A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs. The general discussion at the Vienna meeting, he said, is drawing to a close in accordance with the meeting's schedule and agenda. Work concerning the submission and examination of states' proposals, which was begun before the recess, is moving to the forefront. A number of states, including the Soviet Union, have already submitted a number of their proposals. Others, it appears, are about to do so; it is to be hoped they will do so fairly soon. Thus, we are about to embark on an especially crucial phase of work--the preparation of tangible accords--for the purpose of which the present all-European meeting was convened, after all.

Here at the negotiating table we all understand perfectly and are constantly aware our meeting is not taking place in a political vacuum. On the contrary, the events on the European continent, which we share as our home, and the events taking place beyond its confines have a profound effect on the atmosphere of the meeting of 33 of the continent's states and the United States and Canada. The multifaceted and multilayered international and domestic events affect, in one way or another, the course, rhythm, tenor, and productivity of the meeting's work.

The entire experience of the all-European process which began in Helsinki more than 10 years ago enables us to draw at least two conclusions.

This process has proved its viability, and I would even say resilience. Despite its vicissitudes and serious setbacks caused by the policy of confrontation and arms race, including attempts to extend the arms race to space, the all-European process continues to serve the aims of detente, cooperation, and security in Europe and throughout the world.

A.G. Kovalev then detailed the recent CPSU Central Committee Plenum held in Moscow, describing it as an event which, even according to the strictest standards, is of crucial importance for the present and the future of the Soviet people.

Proceeding from the fundamental values of our domestic and foreign policy, which coincide with the supreme human values, the Soviet Union will continue to struggle for a world free from nuclear weapons. The concept of such a world and ways of achieving it were formulated in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement. The Soviet Union will continue to seek the solution of disarmament problems proceeding from the high ground achieved in Reykjavik.

Returning to the question of the cooperation, the co-creativity, of all states taking part in the all-European process, I would like to highlight the following thought: Such cooperation, such co-creativity is possible only on the basis of equality, regardless of whether the state is large, medium, or small. It is also achievable here at the Vienna meeting given general awareness of the need to achieve mutually acceptable accords on all the main baskets of questions outlined in the Helsinki Final Act -- political, external economic, and humanitarian questions. We propose to resolve political problems only by political means and humanitarian problems in a humane manner.

We hope the Vienna meeting, whose success the Soviet Union intends to actively promote will become a good example of the productivity of the new thinking in the affairs of Europe and the entire world community, the speaker stressed.

Bloc Proposals

LD031907 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Text] Vienna, 3 Feb (TASS) — The Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has entered a new stage of its work. Examination of the proposals by the delegations on all aspects of the European process has started.

Poland's proposal that the next stage of the Stockholm Conference should discuss in parallel measures for strengthening trust and practical matters of the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, is being energetically debated.

The USSR delegation set out the approach of the Soviet Union in principle to the whole range of these issues at a plenary session today. Concerning the content of future talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, Yu. B. Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delegation said the joint position of the socialist countries is precisely set out in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact member-states, adopted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee in June 1986. It presents a balanced program worked out in detail for European disarmament in a broad geographical zone—from the Atlantic to the Urals. It also proposes a schedule for reductions under which the level of military confrontation in Europe would be reduced, the danger of sudden attack would be decreased and military-strategic stability would be strengthened.

It is proposed that the reduction be implemented under reliable and effective monitoring [kontrol] using both national technical means and international verification [proverka] procedures including on-site inspection.

The head of the USSR delegation also set out a number of principled provisions concerning the forms and frameworks of future talks.

The problem of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons on the scale of the whole of Europe should be discussed on an all-European basis with the participation of all 35 participant states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Such an approach presupposes that neutral and nonaligned states should participate in the talks in an acceptable form. It would be extremely unwise not to make use of their political potential and experience when one recalls the positive role they played at the first stage of the Stockholm Conference. It would be possible to make use during the second stage of the flexible mechanism for conducting the talks which arose earlier.

The Soviet delegation proceeds from the premise that the mandate for the future talks should be determined by the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The USSR intends to raise, at the next stage of the Stockholm Conference, the question of notification of major independent exercises of the airforces and navies, limiting the scale of military exercises, and the issue of notifications, which should include the territories of all the participant states.

The head of the Soviet delegation stressed that at the talks on disarmament in Europe, the subject of discussion should be real reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons, and not concepts of "imbalance" and "asymmetry" imposed by certain NATO countries. Debate about this obviously invented subject can only prolong the transition to serious negotiations for many years and sink the very idea of European disarmament.

The Soviet spokesman noted that the USSR's principled stance does not rule out the possibility that, to speed the transition to a thorough consideration of questions of disarmament in Europe, any forms of work might be used, including unofficial contacts, both bilateral, and in a broader circle.

In conclusion, the head of the Soviet delegation stated the European process has, at its disposal, sufficient possibilities to add to the pace of resolution of the vitally important problem of reducing the level of armed confrontation in Europe.

Tatarnikov: Reductions Overdue

LD100925 Moscow TASS in English 0840 GMT 10 Feb 87

[Text] Vienna, 10 Feb (TASS)--Reductions in the armed forces and armaments in Europe are an urgent and long-overdue need, Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation for the meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, said in an interview to TASS correspondent Anatoliy Tyupayev. The proposal made by the Warsaw Treaty countries at the Vienna meeting for reducing the armed forces of the two sides in Europe by one million men is very substantial and its implementation could make it possible to achieve a considerable relaxation in Europe.

The major general continued that, although there was no imbalance in the conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization, the West continued deliberately to misrepresent the picture.

Making comparisons, the West does not count mobilisation and human resources, reserve forces and stockpiled armaments and technology of NATO, excludes from the count the French and Spanish forces and the forces under national commands, inflates figures for the Warsaw Treaty organisation and deflates those for its own forces.

But if we evaluate the balance of forces objectively rather than for propaganda purposes, there is rough parity between the two groupings in Europe. This explains the position of the Warsaw Treaty countries. This explains the position of the Warsaw Treaty countries at the talks: They are seeking reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments in all Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, in accordance with the proposal made in the Budapest address of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, the Soviet delegate said.

He expressed the conviction that since the problem of reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments concerned all the European countries without exception, it should be considered on an all-European basis with the participation of all the 35 CSCE states. The lawful interests of neutral and non-aligned states must not be ignored either.

The Soviet delegate also believes that the next round of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament is the right forum to discuss reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments.

The proposal of the Polish delegation for extending the mandate of the conference envisions talks on disarmament measures in parallel with proposals for confidence-and security-building measures which were made at the first round of the Stockholm Conference or will be made in the future. This proposal, supported by the other Warsaw Treaty countries, is on the negotiating table of the Vienna meeting. It can ensure broad progress in every area, including confidence-and security-building efforts and disarmament, Major General Viktor Tatarnikov said.

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CSO: 5200/1285

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET-NETHERLANDS CSCE MEETING HELD IN MOSCOW

PM041411 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Soviet-Netherlands Meeting"]

[Text] A Soviet-Netherlands meeting organized by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and the Netherlands European Discussion Center was held in Moscow 27-29 January. [paragraph continues]

Representatives of various Netherlands political and public circles, members of parliament, academics, and military figures showed great interest in the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum that has just ended.

There was an exchange of opinions on problems of the international situation, European security, and ending the arms race. L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union, and G.A. Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada, pointed out that the program for a nuclear-free world advanced in M.S. Gorbachev's statement last January makes it possible to balance carefully the interests of all states, including those on the European continent. There is full confidence in the possibility of reviving detente in Europe — which would be a considerable practical step in solving major international problems.

E. Van (Egen), general secretary of the European Discussion Center, said that the Moscow meeting will help to strengthen ties between the two countries, which have never fought each other. He emphasized that in our age, under conditions of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is a pressing need to develop relations of friendship and cooperation among states with different social systems.

Problems of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, the prospects for continuing and developing the process of the all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation, and the role of economic, scientific, technical, and humanitarian cooperation as a factor of peace and detente on the continent were also discussed at the meeting, which was held in a spirit of benevolence and frankness.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

MOSCOW: CD SESSION OPENS—A session of the Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva today. The most striking thing about the multilateral talks within the framework of the conference—and there are participants from 40 states—is the universal nature of the tasks which requires urgent solution. These include preventing an arms race on earth and in space, banning nuclear weapons tests and eliminating nuclear and other types of mass-destruction weapons, including chemical weapons. The prospects for specific ways toward solving these tasks have been pointed out in the Soviet program of 15 January of last year, the immense significance of which is being stressed by many delegations. What is needed to move forward and to reach practical accords is a responsible approach and, at the same time, a rejection of narrow, mercenary objectives which some people here are putting forward and slowing down the work of the conference. [From the "Vremya" newscast; correspondent V. Dmitriyev video report] [Text] [Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1285

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR COMMENTARY ON 3 FEBRUARY NEVADA TEST

Still Time for 'Wisdom'

PMO31209 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 February 1987 carries on page 5 a feature entitled "Just Enough Time" published under the general heading "The Main Topic: Moratorium, Day 547." The feature comprises background data on U.S. reactions to the Soviet nuclear test moratorium, brief correspondents' reports from West Berlin and Copenhagen on local protests against U.S. policy, and the following "Observer's Opinion" by Tomas Kolesnichenko:

"So it is a matter of days, one might say, hours and minutes now. If, the day after tomorrow, on 5 February, the ground at the U.S. test site in Nevada is shaken by ("Kheysbrok")—the codename of the next nuclear explosion, the Soviet Union will discontinue its unilateral moratorium.

"It will not only be a ground tremor. It will cause a tremor in the hearts of millions of people the world over. In fact, all of them, some overtly and some in their heart of hearts, hoped that the example of the Soviet Union, which has not had a nuclear explosion for nearly 18 months, would make Washington see reason and that common sense would ultimately prevail there. And then mankind would see a real prospect of a nuclear-free world.

"But Washington responded to the Soviet peace initiative with 24 nuclear explosions. And now it is ostentatiously preparing not just for the 25th explosion, but for the one which will destroy hopes of rapidly releasing mankind from the insane arms race with all the disastrous consequences it entails.

"No, they are not just testing a new weapon at the Nevada site. What is being tested above all is the policy of the present U.S. Administration, the sincerity of its widely publicized statements about wanting peace, and its genuine intentions toward the Soviet Union, rather than any pretense.

"So, the 25th explosion, if it takes place, will be this year's first graphic 'physical' exposure of U.S. imperial plans to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union, of the United States having opted for a policy of force and creation of first-strike space weapons.

"Clearly, such a turn of events is bound to affect our security. That is why the Soviet Union was forced to decide that the extension of the moratorium would remain in force until the first U.S. nuclear test in 1987. We will not allow the United States, having violated the principle of equal security, to forge ahead in improving strategic armaments. This real danger exists already because Washington has carried out one-third more nuclear tests than we have, for the purpose of modernizing its strategic arsenals.

"So what now? The door remains open. As M.S. Gorbachev said in his recent message to the leaders of the "Delhi six," the Soviet Union, even if it is forced to resume nuclear tests, will be prepared to return to a moratorium if the United States decides to halt its nuclear explosions. We are prepared even now to start full-scale talks in any form at any level, with the participation of the United States, of course, on the problem of curtailing and then eliminating nuclear armaments.

"Most important of all is the fact that the door is open over the next 48 hours. Time enough to display wisdom. Particularly in comparison with the moment of madness it requires to press the button in Nevada."

TASS Notes Protests

LDO40811 Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT 4 Feb 87

[Text] San Francisco, 4 Feb (TASS)—U.S. news agencies report from Mercury, Nevada, that the local authorities arrested four anti-war activists, who penetrated inside the nuclear test area to prevent a nuclear explosion there on Tuesday.

They were discovered by a helicopter inside the test area, detained by ground guards and taken to Mercury for questioning.

A spokesman for the U.S. American Peace Test Public organization said that a mass demonstration in protest against the U.S. continuing nuclear tests would be held near the Nevada test site on Wednesday.

Several U.S. congressmen, prominent scientists and cultural figures would take part in it, he said.

Challenge To Mankind

LDO42219 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Feb 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video talk by Tomas Kolesnichenko, PRAVDA editorial team member]

[Text] Hello, comrades! As already reported, a nuclear explosion has been carried out at the American proving ground in the state of Nevada. This is not just another nuclear weapons test; this time, the Nevada proving ground has become a test site for the whole of U.S. policy. The

fact is that the latest explosion is a demonstrative challenge to all mankind. It is not only kilotonnes of a nuclear device which have been exploded, but also the hopes of putting an end now--today--to all nuclear tests, and hence the arms race, which became possible as a result of the Soviet unilateral moratorium which has been in force for 18 months now.

The explosion in Nevada occurred on the 547th day of the Soviet moratorium which has been extended five times, the last one before the first nuclear explosion in the United States in 1987.

So that is Washington's response. It is hard to say what it contains more of--imperial arrogance toward public opinion or political foolhardiness, or perhaps the recklessness of a heated gambler. One thing is clear--the explosion in Nevada showed the true attitude of the Washington administration to the Soviet peace initiatives on the most important problems of disarmament. In words it would seem that in Washington they even welcome them, but in fact they reject them, placing their stakes on achieving strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.

The United States has once again shown that it is trying to push forward, ever improving the system of the mass destruction of people right up to the creation [sozdaniye] of first-strike space weapons. That is why the teleprinters and VDU screens of news agencies throughout the world are today full of reports about the wave of protests, including in the United States itself. This explosion was planned for 5 February, but it was carried out unexpectedly, one might say in secret, 48 hours in advance. By switching the date of the explosion, the Washington authorities were counting on quelling the mass protests which hundreds of Americans were intending to hold in the test area on 5 February.

But it had the opposite effect. These last few days millions of people have symbolically joined the demonstrators in Nevada. In many countries the U.S. embassies are virtually in a state of siege. Telegrams angrily condemning the administration's policy are arriving at the White House in an endless torrent. And this is understandable, for it is a matter of something which is all too important--the survival of mankind. One would like to believe that all this will dawn on Washington, especially as this door is still open. Our position is such that the Soviet Union, even if it is compelled to resume nuclear tests, will be prepared once again to return to a moratorium if the United States ends its nuclear explosions. So the administration only has to show common sense which, unfortunately, Washington is now so short on.

'Whirlwind of Anger'

LDD41754 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 4 Feb 87

[Commentary by Viktor Levin]

[Text] He who sows the wind reaps the whirlwind. Today a whirlwind of anger, a whirlwind of indignation at the irresponsible militarist actions of the U.S. Administration is sweeping the world.

At the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen there was an angry protest demonstration immediately after the news of the blast at the nuclear test site in Nevada. Today a demonstration against Washington's dangerous actions will be held at the Nevada test site. Several members of the U.S. Congress, eminent scientists, cultural figures and representatives of public organizations have announced their intention to take part in it. Peace vigils and protest demonstrations are being held in many FRG towns.

Washington will not be shielded from this whirlwind of anger and indignation either by the demagogy or by the cynicism to which they are resorting in the U.S. capital. The Soviet moratorium is propaganda, it is alleged in Washington by those who are attempting to justify themselves in some way. We need tests in order to carry out the SDI program, say the advocates of the military industrial complex with brazen openness.

But the people of the world make their own assessment of this challenge to commonsense. Mai-Britt Theorin stated that the holding of nuclear tests is an insulting challenge to international efforts for a total ban on nuclear weapons testing.

Patricia Schroeder, member of the U.S. House of Representatives, called 3 February when the first nuclear explosion of this year was carried out in Nevada a sad day. Kevin McNamara, eminent figure in the British Labour Party, in charge of defense matters in the shadow cabinet, described the new nuclear weapon test in the United States a shameful political step in the spirit of the cold war.

Today every inhabitant of the planet earth is being convinced by the evidence of their own eyes as to who is who in world politics.

The Soviet Union has extended five times its unilateral moratorium on carrying out nuclear explosions. Five times we have appealed to the U.S. Administration to follow our example, to take the path leading to a full ban on nuclear testing. We have good will and a sincere striving to start the process of curbing the arms race, and we have demonstrated our readiness for a reasonable compromise. I mean the readiness to reach agreement on a gradual halt to nuclear testing.

By yesterday's blast Washington has replied for the fifth time a categorical no!. This is an open challenge not only to the Soviet Union, but to the entire world community, to all people on earth.

It looks as if the view prevails in the U.S. capital to the effect that the United States can do anything it likes. This is a delusion, a dangerous delusion. And there is no doubt that Washington will be forced to recognize this.

'Whole World' Indignant, Shocked

LD042218 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1950 GMT 4 Feb 87

[Report from "The World Today" program present by Igor Kudrin]

[Excerpts] Yesterday was the 547th day of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, the 547th day of silence at our test sites. The world public was waiting alertly for reports from the United States--would they decide over there to carry out the 25th blast since our cessation of testing? People were still expecting prudence from Washington, still hoping for restraint and the desire to meet at last the initiative of the USSR.

Everyone knew that once the latest nuclear explosion had boomed in Nevada on 5 February [date as heard], our country, proceeding from the interests of its own security, would be forced to resume its testing. The blast, as you know, still took place. [Video shows aerial view of test site.] Under the codename Hasbrook, it was even carried out almost 2 hours earlier than planned.

Weinberger cynically called the general concern of millions of people "collective naivete." He put it like this: "A rational American policy cannot be built on Soviet rhetoric. Our aim is to ensure the security and freedom of America. The Soviet Union is creating new weapons. The Soviet Union is threatening Western democracy. So stopping the explosions is not in the interest of the United States."

And once again false articles and fantasy cartoons of invented Soviet weapons are going round the whole world [video shows cartoons depicting weapons]. The authors are telling the reader: "How can we fail to arm ourselves, how not continue the explosions, how not push through the Star Wars program, if such a Soviet threat hangs over us all?"

The whole world is indignant at these new challenges by America. You know this from the "Vremya" program and from news bulletins. People are shocked by the ease with which the United States has perpetrated the latest blast in Nevada, the total irresponsibility of the White House for the fate of humanity.

And yet, we must not throw up our hands: All is not lost. We remind you that the Soviet Union, even if it is forced to resume nuclear testing, is always ready to return to the moratorium, of course, on condition that the United States nevertheless decided to stop its explosions in Nevada.

'Test' of Political Wisdom in U.S.

PMD41651 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 87 First Edition p 5

[Commentary by Boris Orekhov: "The Bit Between the Teeth"]

[Text] Late one February evening the teletypes brought alarming news from across the ocean which has shaken the world: At the nuclear test site in Nevada the United States has carried out an underground explosion of a nuclear device with a yield of 20 kilotons. The report contained technical details: the site's distance from Las Vegas and the depth of the silo where the charge was placed.

But the main matter, of course, was not the technical details. Nor was it even that this explosion marked a "jubilee"—the 25th by the U.S. side since the Soviet Union's imposition of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. No, the main thing is that it took place after the Soviet Government had been forced to take the decision that the unilateral moratorium would last until the first U.S. nuclear test in 1987.

How is the Washington administration's action to be characterized? What words should be used? "Arrogance of power"—that was how former Senator Fulbright once described the conduct of the U.S. ruling circles. Now this senior politician's words are more fitting than ever for characterizing the Washington administration's irresponsible actions.

The unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has been in force for 18 months. The United States could have joined it as any moment of any day. But it did not want to. For 18 months the world's peace-loving public tried to persuade Washington to show sense—at least once—and take the step which the world expected from it. They did not heed. Twenty-four times they rent the ground in Nevada with nuclear might, trying to force our country to slam the door shut and abandon the moratorium. They failed.

The forces of imperialism and reaction have taken the bit between their teeth and thrown down a challenge to the Soviet Union's goodwill and to the hopes and aspirations of all who value peace. Well, after this, perhaps, the world will see still more clearly where, on which side of the ocean, the "focus of evil" is...

The nuclear explosion in Nevada is just a link in a whole chain of events attesting to the ever greater haste with which the implementation of the notorious SDI program is being put on a practical footing in the United States. Precisely this is shown by a secret conference held in Washington on the day of the Nevada explosion. An interdepartmental group met there under the chairmanship of the country's president at the level of cabinet members to plan policy in the national security sphere, and it discussed the question of the phased implementation of SDI. All this put together betrays Washington's militarist plans. Like a cancerous tumor in the brain, the maniacal idea of achieving military superiority over our country will not leave the heated heads of the trans-Atlantic strategists.

No, the "Hazebrook" explosion, as its initiators called it, was not just a test of a 20-kiloton nuclear device. It was a test of the conscience and political wisdom of those who are at the helm of power in the United States today. They did not pass that test, which took place before hundreds of millions, before all mankind.

The struggle of the forces of peace against the forces of evil and aggression is continuing, and the Nevada explosion will be a catalyst in intensifying it. This struggle must end and cannot fail to end in victory for the forces of peace, in the triumph of reason. The ending of nuclear tests is the command of the times. The Soviet Union will be ready to go back once again to the moratorium if the United States decides to stop its nuclear tests.

'Acute Negative Reaction' in U.S.

PM051046 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 87 First Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent V. Gan: "Against the Voice of Reason"]

[Text] Washington, 4 Feb—So the United States has committed an act of political and militarist arrogance. There is not and cannot be any justification for it. And this act was committed in the style of people with an uneasy conscience—perfidiously and unexpectedly, so as to take people unawares.

"The American Government does not announce the dates of nuclear tests. And in general we should take into account that this is not the first, but the fourth explosion in the current fiscal year. The administration operates on the basis not of the calendar year, but of the fiscal year, which begins on 1 October and ends on 30 September," Jim (Boyver), spokesman for the U.S. Energy Department at the Nevada testing range, said in a conversation with me.

He was being cunning, to put it mildly, since he knew very well that it is not a question of the principles by which the federal authorities operate, but of the USSR's good intention not to resume nuclear tests before the first American explosion in 1987, of the ending of the unilateral Soviet moratorium, and of Washington's disregard for American and international public opinion. By bringing forward the explosion by 2 days, the administration hoped to thwart the mass protest demonstrations which were being prepared and to neutralize the growing political pressure from Congress in favor of canceling the test.

Was this hope justified? As your correspondent saw for himself, the "small underground nuclear explosion"—that is how (Boyver) described it—instantaneously caused an acute negative reaction here. "The majority in Congress," G. Brown, member of the House of Representatives, said in an interview, "has already expressed its opinion. The legislators would like to stop nuclear tests and adopt the Soviet proposal for a moratorium and some kind of agreement on banning nuclear tests."

Clear and unequivocal opinions were expressed by representatives of public organizations in conversations which took place today. "We had a chance of achieving real progress toward a total ban on explosions. But the administration has demonstrated that it is more interested in developing new weapons than in ending the arms race," said H. Ris of the Union of Concerned Scientists.

It is hard, of course, to predict whether the administration will continue to succeed in sabotaging the peoples' hopes and aspirations. It is significant that the White House at once held a conference between President Reagan and his leading advisers, including National Security Adviser Carlucci, Defense Secretary Weinberger, SDI director General Abrahamson, and Secretary of State Shultz.

ABC television described the Nevada explosion and this conference as "two signals" from the White House in the nuclear arms sphere, since these two events were as interrelated as they were sinister, providing an exhaustive characterization of the administration's position. The conference, it was reported, discussed the question of the future of the "star wars" program, which is hypocritically described here as the "strategic defense initiative." Although the White House spokesman announced that the President had made no decision, there was no doubt as to the results of the discussions. They were summed up by ABC, which pointed out: "The strongest evidence to date has appeared in the White House that before Reagan leaves his post in 2 years' time, he will try to deploy some part of the 'star wars' technology in space."

Limit to Patience Charged

PMO41643 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by political observer V. Matveyev under the rubric "Facts, Events, Opinions": "Obsession"]

[Text] Another nuclear explosion--the 25th since our country introduced the unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapon tests--was carried out at the underground test site in Nevada 3 February.

The time that has elapsed since this important step by the Soviet Union has shown: The top echelons of power in Washington have behaved as if there were no Soviet unilateral moratorium at all. Not only did they not slow down the nuclear weapon test program adopted by the Pentagon, they actually accelerated it.

Don Cook, a well-informed U.S. journalist from THE LOS ANGELES TIMES who visited the IZVESTIYA editorial office not so long ago, announced that the Pentagon is thinking of 100 nuclear tests a year!

This can be believed in the light of what is happening at the Nevada test site. Even the explosion that has just taken place had been planned for somewhat later.

What is the reason behind this hurry which—if we are to call things by their proper name—is a slap in the face for millions of people and many governments which made persistent appeals to the U.S. Government not to take this fatal step and to respond to the call of common sense?

There is no mystery here. People are speaking cynically from lofty official rostrums in the United States of the reasons why the U.S. military are hurrying to test new types of nuclear weapons.

SDI is a large-scale U.S. military program in space aimed at the deployment of the most destabilizing weapons, including nuclear weapons, there. This is the heart of the matter. This is why the Pentagon, having taken the bit between its teeth, is unwilling to even hear of any slowdown, let alone an end to nuclear tests.

Nuclear devices are buried deep beneath the ground in Nevada, but they are intended to operate in the vastness of space.

Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger "marked" the start of 1987 with direct calls to embark on the deployment of elements of the space military program in the immediate future.

These speeches—his was not the only such statement in Washington—brought about a negative reaction among U.S. allies in West Europe. Until quite recently the Reagan administration was assuring the governments of West European countries that it would not plan any steps going beyond the framework of "research and design work" [issledovatel'sko-konstruktor'skiye raboty].

The U.S. allies should have come to their senses earlier, when Washington demonstrated with utmost clarity that it had no intention of responding to the Soviet Union's goodwill step—the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests announced by our country and the call on the U.S. Government to follow this example.

It has been known for months that the nuclear tests being carried out in Nevada were directly linked to the Pentagon's so-called "strategic defense initiative."

This is by no means the first time in the postwar period that Washington has nurtured ambitious plans to achieve military superiority over our country. This time SDI with its nuclear test program has become the hobbyhorse of militarist circles across the ocean.

It is self-evident that our country cannot ignore such a state of affairs. We have never compromised and will never compromise our security.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the path to a nuclear test ban remains open unless Washington stands in the way. The message from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania on the

occasion of the declaration they adopted at the end of 1986 points out that the USSR, as before, perceives the complete banning of nuclear weapon tests as a measure of primary importance along the path of curbing and subsequently eliminating nuclear arms.

There is a limit to everyone's patience. Now this limit has been reached. The struggle in this important sphere continues. Like before, everything is up to the United States. Its leaders must take the necessary step which will make it possible to advance along the path of nuclear disarmament. This is demanded by the whole of mankind.

'Latest Act of Madness'

PHO41905 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Feb 87 First Edition p 3

[Vasiliy Pustov "Observer's Opinion" article: "Fatal Recklessness"]

[Text] Something has happened that is regarded as an ostentatious challenge to the increased sense of responsibility of the peoples and governments of all countries for the future of the world. Something against which people's common sense and natural desire to survive and to preserve life itself on earth rebels.

During the 18-month unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions, the United States carried out 24 nuclear explosions. The 25th was the test on 3 February, codenamed "Hazebrook." Every underground nuclear explosion at the testing range in Nevada was invariably accompanied by an explosion of indignation and angry protests on all continents, including America itself because every underground explosion reminds people of the growing threat of nuclear apocalypse and undermines their faith in the possibility of preventing it.

"Hazebrook" was further graphic evidence of the American administration's cynical hypocrisy, and exposed all the falsity of its peacemaking expatiations. Let us recall that on setting off for Reykjavik to meet with M.S. Gorbachev, President R. Reagan stated he intends "ultimately to achieve a total nuclear test ban," and that he is "fully determined to take practical steps toward this goal in the near future." As we can see, "steps" were taken, but in precisely the opposite direction, toward a further escalation of the nuclear arms race.

There is also a false ring to the White House incumbent's repeated assurances that his ultimate goal is a world free from nuclear weapons. When it comes to the point, it has always turned out this is a case reminiscent of the popular saying: Not everyone says what they think. However, to be fair, let us note there are also people--very influential people--in the U.S. Administration whose deeds do not diverge from their words. What words, what deeds! It isn't without reason that the notorious C. Weinberger, the defense secretary, is described as a "committed opponent to any agreements with the USSR." He has come out repeatedly against the idea of a nuclear-free world, attaching highly unflattering epithets to it.

Washington today makes no secret of the fact the explosions in Nevada are not being conducted solely to build up and improve the American nuclear arsenal, although that should not, of course, be left out of consideration. In the years since the atom bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States, according to unofficial calculations, has manufactured 60,000 nuclear warheads of more than 70 types. Now the total stockpile of nuclear warheads there is more than 26,000.

U.S. experts acknowledge that without nuclear tests it is impossible to create such types of sophisticated new weapons as, for instance, nuclear-pumped x-ray lasers. The Pentagon needs these weapons to implement the "Star Wars" program, the purpose of which, as THE WASHINGTON POST admits, is "the prospect of new fairytale wealth for the military-industrial complex." Such wealth for the major death merchants across the ocean requires the carrying out of six more nuclear explosions in the next few months. For the SDI program as a whole it is planned to carry out between 500 and 1,000 nuclear tests.

Highly significant too is the time chosen for the latest act of madness confirming the U.S. Administration's pernicious course toward confrontation. Washington was in such a hurry it saw fit to switch the explosion from 5 February, as previously planned, to 3 February. The intention was not only to avoid protests by the people, but also to pre-empt the vote on the draft resolution submitted by Congressmen Gephardt and Schroeder envisaging no more funds for the U.S. programs of nuclear tests with a yield of over one kiloton as long as the Soviet Union continues to observe its moratorium. Even in the United States nuclear tests are becoming so unpopular more than 120 members of the House of Representatives have declared their support for the draft resolution.

The disgraceful act occurred in Nevada also at a time when the world public and prominent politicians and statesmen of many countries, including capitalist countries, are still pondering deeply on the historic decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January plenum. Foreign commentators stress the plenum's society's activity enables other governments to continue to forecast with 100-percent reliability and confidence the peaceful foreign policy of the USSR and its constructive course toward eliminating the nuclear threat and developing stable and mutually advantageous cooperation with all states.

The Soviet Union is a staunch advocate of the total cessation of all nuclear tests as a most important paramount measure in the matter of attaining the chief goal—curbing the nuclear arms race and the subsequent elimination of nuclear arms. Convincing evidence of this was the repeatedly extended unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions. It has been strictly observed for 18 months, despite the considerable cost the USSR has borne in the sphere of its own security.

Washington has again crudely demonstrated its reluctance to join the Soviet moratorium. The nuclear explosions in Nevada are an element in the U.S. policy geared to acquiring military superiority over the Soviet Union and

over the socialist countries. On 3 February the U.S. rulers, continuing to operate in terms of military force and rejecting the new political thinking which is needed in our anxious times, again rejected yet another opportunity to curb the exceedingly dangerous nuclear arms race.

The situation is the Soviet Union cannot display unilateral restraint and infinitum without harming its own security and the security of its allies. As is known, last December the Soviet Government stated: Our country will resume nuclear tests after the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987. It was a decision that had to be taken and it cannot be ignored.

Military Observer's Comments

PM051659 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Feb 87 p 3

[Colonel V. Morozov "Military Observer's Comments": "Along the Path of Nuclear Adventures"]

[Text] American militarism has thrown down a brazen new challenge to humanity: An underground nuclear explosion code-named Hazebrook was carried out at the Nevada test site on 3 February. It was the first explosion in 1987 and the 25th since the Soviet Union introduced its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. The Nevada explosion took place on the 547th day of the Soviet moratorium. It could have lasted even longer if the U.S. Administration had heeded the voice of reason and refrained from nuclear tests this year [on mog by dlitsya i dalshe, yesli by administratsiya SSHA vnyala golosu razuma i vnderzhalas ot yadernykh ispytaniy v nachavshemya godu; also translatable as "It could last even longer if the U.S. Administration heeded..."].

The explosion conducted on 3 February took place 2 days ahead of schedule. According to American press reports, several more nuclear explosions are planned in the next few months. According to a U.S. Department of Energy statement, "the number of explosions will steadily increase over the next 5 months." The following figures are cited: It is intended to conduct around 1,000 nuclear tests in the next 10 years. Assistant Secretary of Energy S. Foley has stated that "it can be expected that testing and manufacture of nuclear arms will be continued into the 21st century."

Thus the reliance on continuing nuclear tests is made plain. To what purpose? Washington stubbornly refuses to relinquish its feverish dream of gaining military superiority over the USSR at any price. That is why the United States continues to develop the arms race in new areas and is trying to transfer it to outer space, seeking to break military-strategic parity in its favor.

Let us remember that there is a close link between nuclear tests and the qualitative modernization of nuclear arms. Development [razrabotka] of "third generation" nuclear munitions has long been under way in the United States. Twenty-two programs were started up back at the beginning

of last year for that purpose. Tests were then completed and 10 types of munitions were put into large-scale production. And around 10 more types of nuclear munitions also went through the test and trials stage last year.

The nuclear tests in Nevada are now primarily trying out new warheads for the highly accurate MX and Trident-2 missiles and nuclear combat charges for future long-range ACM cruise missiles, with which it is intended to equip the new B-1B and A10 strategic bombers. And a number of explosions (around 10 have been carried out during the Soviet moratorium) have been carried out specially to try out nuclear charges for space armaments being developed [razrabotka] under the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI).

Advocates of SDI and the Western mass media have heaped up a whole series of spurious arguments in its defense to hide the special danger that the "Star Wars" program poses to the cause of peace. They thus initially plugged the fallacious thesis that SDI is "nonnuclear" in character and that it will make nuclear weapons "unnecessary" and "useless." Information later came to light that X-ray lasers powered by the detonation of a special nuclear device are one of the space strike armaments. Then the champions of the "Star Wars" program began claiming that nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers would not be so dangerous because they are only one nuclear component among several other nonnuclear components of space-based weapons.

The facts, however, say otherwise. Washington is not restricting itself to creating [sozdaniye] just one nuclear-pumped X-ray laser. It is intended to create [sozdaniye] a whole series of other nuclear devices which it is planned to use in space strike weapons as part of the SDI program. This involves nuclear devices which generate powerful directed beams of high-energy particles, produce directed electromagnetic pulses (EMP's), and create a directed stream of strike [udarniy] elements with high kinetic energy and also devices whose energy derived from a nuclear explosion is used to pump gamma-ray lasers (grasers) and high-energy lasers.

It is important to stress that the point of the underground nuclear tests at the Nevada test site is to check out the design concepts of all these "third generation" nuclear devices. That is why Washington so stubbornly refuses to stop testing. A whole chain reaction is set up: If there are no nuclear tests, there will be no nuclear-pumped X-ray laser or other "third generation" nuclear devices, the "Star Wars" program as a whole will not be implemented, and the unprecedentedly huge profits from SDI, which the U.S. military-industrial complex sees as a giant moneyspinner and a kind of latterday El Dorado for very many years to come, will fail to materialize.

A number of West European firms in NATO countries (Britain, the FRG, and Italy) and Japan are now standing "eagerly in line" to obtain their portion of the dollar-rich cake. In exchange, and contrary to their countries' national interests, they are offering up the achievements of modern technology to create [sozdaniye] components of Washington's space strike weapons.

The involvement of West European and Japanese concerns, with the consent of those countries' government, in work to create [sozdaniye] space strike weapons is still further exacerbating the situation bound up with the implementation of America's SDI programme. I would like to recall the words of the physicist (Berkhard Gonxior), who is well known in the FRG, used in the course of polemics with Volker Ruhe, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union faction in the pages of the West German magazine STERN: "Politicians should know the potential of equipment. Nuclear weapons are a real and lethally dangerous thing. This is now known by virtually everyone. But not many know what SDI is: SDI destabilizes an already complex situation."

If the United States nevertheless risks deploying space strike weapons, the Soviet Union will certainly make an appropriate response. But this is not its choice. There is only one choice here: It is essential to stop the nuclear arms race. The other route is the race to nuclear catastrophe. Mankind must not allow that.

U.S. Researcher Hopes For End

LD052348 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Report from the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent V. Lyashko]

[Text] [Announcer] Our correspondent presents a report from one of the stations monitoring the nonconducting of nuclear tests:

[V. Lyashko] Until 3 February the participants in the joint Soviet-U.S. experiment to monitor the nonconducting of nuclear tests were still hoping that the instruments set up at their stations would not only be registering the silence of the Soviet nuclear testing ground but also of the U.S. ground. The explosion carried out in Nevada the other day emphasized these hopes, and at the same time put in question the further conducting of a joint monitoring experiment.

[Begin recording of (B. Hondznes) identified in a caption as a research worker at Nevada State University, in English with superimposed Russian translation] I think that the Soviet moratorium was an important positive step. I am sure that the consequences of its ending caused profound disappointment among most people. Now, the leaders of your country and mine have again simultaneously found themselves faced with the prospect of a large-scale arms race, during which nuclear weapons will be perfected.
[End recording]

Replying to a question as to whether he believes in the aggressive nature of the Soviet people, (Bill Hondzhes) said: The Soviet people, like the American people, want peace. The Soviet people cannot forget the consequences of the last war. Therefore, I am profoundly convinced that the Soviet people are not striving for war. I hope that both countries will be able to end nuclear tests. I am a scientist and am not into politics, and so I do not know why my country does not end testing. But I call on

both sides to end the arms race and to ban all nuclear tests. [Video shows interior of monitoring station with group of people operating equipment and looking at screens, one of which has a graph; cut to interview with young man in glasses. Soviet and American flags are shown affixed to one of the sets]

'Common Sense' To Prevail

LD060403 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Commentary by observer Vladislav Koryakov]

[Text] Good evening. On Tuesday when a nuclear explosion was conducted in Nevada a meeting of high-ranking leaders took place in the White House. They discussed plans for early deployment of SDI weapons. Speaking of the debate, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said we believe we are close to being able to recommend a deployment decision. The statement was made on Wednesday in a House of Representatives subcommittee when congressmen asked if Weinberger thought a decision by Reagan might lead to deployment by 1994, he answered: I would hope so. This explains, I believe, what is behind the blast in Nevada. An assistant defense secretary, Richard Perle, was even more frank than his chief. Speaking at a NATO seminar in Munich, West Germany, on Sunday, that is 2 days prior to the explosion in Nevada, he called a comprehensive test ban dangerous and undesirable. He also pointed out that the United States would reject Soviet calls for a nuclear test ban as long as the West had to rely on nuclear arms. Richard Perle went on to say that Mikhail Gorbachev's January 1987 proposal to scrap all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was dangerous nonsense.

Many Americans are today engaged in an anti-nuclear campaign protesting against nuclear tests in Nevada. One hundred and thirty Democrats in the House of Representatives unanimously approved a resolution on Wednesday condemning Tuesday's blast in Nevada and urging President Reagan to seek a nuclear test ban. The resolution calls for halting funds for United States nuclear weapons tests, postponing further explosions and pursuing immediate test ban talks with the Soviet Union.

My personal view is that common sense with regard to a complete and universal test ban will get the upper hand in the United States. Congress has just overridden the President's veto of a bill to clean up the nation's waterways such as the Great Lakes and others. Now to get rid of nuclear blasts is an even more important task than this popular anti-pollution measure. To halt nuclear tests everywhere would mean not only to make our planet cleaner, it would mean to largely contribute to building a non-nuclear world, to human survival.

Until next time, goodbye.

Congressional Opposition Cited

PM061445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 87 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch by correspondent V. Gan: "'The Ultimate in Perfidy'"]

[Text] Washington, 5 Feb—Even though Nevada's soil, after writhing with explosions, has settled down since the nuclear test, the test's political shock waves in Washington persist—the Reagan administration's irresponsibility is rather too obvious, having deliberately wrecked the unilateral Soviet moratorium.

The White House's stance was totally demolished at today's urgently convened session of the democratic faction in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. After sharply condemning the latest explosion as "a heavy blow against arms control efforts," the faction unanimously adopted a resolution demanding that the President postpone all further nuclear tests. The legislators insist that the administration immediately begin talks with the Soviet Union, which "has refrained from nuclear explosions throughout the last 18 months." The objective of these talks, in the congressmen's opinion, should be "to achieve a mutual, simultaneous, and verifiable ban on nuclear weapon tests."

At the same time, the Democrats called on congressional committees to refuse the White House any appropriations of funds for nuclear explosions in excess of a 1-kiloton yield, provided the USSR does not exceed this threshold. The faction has submitted a resolution to this effect to be examined by the House of Representatives as a bill coauthored by a total of 140 congressmen.

Following the session, the main initiators of this measure P. Schroeder (Democrat, Colorado) and R. Gephardt (Democrat, Missouri) decided to share their opinions with journalists in the House of Representatives Press Gallery. They emphasized the "fundamental differences" between Congress and the President on questions of arms control policy. "Congress," Gephardt said, "would like the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty and a return to adherence to the SALT II Treaty. Regardless of what the President says, I think that his policy means a comprehensive arms race. We have no plans to remain inactive and we intend to fight him on these issues."

Schroeder used the words "ultimate perfidy" to describe the change in the timing of the explosion by the administration in order to "avoid protests."

Realistically appraising the situation, both legislators declared that they expect the President to veto the nuclear test bill. This supposition is not groundless, especially bearing in mind the fact that the White House is rebuffing all protests. Here is what his spokesman (D. Govard) told journalists today: "The latest test is part of our ongoing test program. The reaction to it is standard. The fact that it is standard does not

mean that it is incorrect [as published]. It is up to the Soviet Union how it approaches the question of tests. If it intends to resume explosions, it has the right to do so."

Everything has been said with utmost clarity and cynicism. A unique chance to take advantage of the USSR's good gesture was, is, and will be ignored even at the price of unbearable costs--moral, political, and civil. But, as people know, hatred is blind.

Bogdanov on Testing

LD051153 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 6 Feb 87

["Daily Talk" by Vladimir Pozner, state television and radio political observer, with Dr Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, Moscow]

[Text] Thank you and hello. As the world now knows, at 7:20 local time on Tuesday morning, the United States conducted its first nuclear test of 1987. It was the first nuclear test of 1987 and the 25th nuclear test conducted by the United States since the Soviet Union imposed upon itself a unilateral test ban. That was back on 6 August 1985. So the score has been 25 to zero in favor of the United States. As we all should know, the Soviet Union made an official statement to the effect that should the United States continue testing in 1987 the Soviet Union would have no choice but to resume its own nuclear tests.

With me in the studio today is Doctor Radomir Bogdanov of the well-known and respected United States and Canada Institute in Moscow. Dr Bogdanov, consider these facts: Number one, the test was conducted 2 days ahead of the officially announced date, because it was supposed to be done on the 5th of February, it was conducted on the 3d. Number two, the United States Government knew very well and knows clearly that this particular test probably brings down the curtain on the moratorium. Number three, it was done to a background of noises coming from different official quarters about the desire of the United States to achieve a nuclear-free world, with the exception of Dr Perle, who does not want to see a nuclear free world...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] and some other people.

[Pozner] Well, at least he says so openly and officially.

[Bogdanov] Yeah.

[Pozner] With these things in mind, how do you evaluate, how do you assess, what does this nuclear test mean?

[Bogdanov] You know, I never belonged to the school of thought, members of the school of thought, which expected this administration to reciprocate the Soviet Union. And to be honest with you I expected that. What I

didn't, that they will produce that 2 days earlier, and they may have some technical explanations for that, but it doesn't matter at all, because it's a political business, not a technical one. You know, somebody, I don't remember exactly who, defined the present White House as the ultimate bunker, and I thought, what does it mean, what they had in mind you know. Now I understand. They are just really living in the ultimate bunker for the last 2 years, cut from the realities, cut from the real life, believing in their own world and doing their own job. And my conviction is that they have done it deliberately, having in mind two things: Number one, the next presidency; number two, the Congress.

[Pozner] Would you please enlarge on that. What do you mean by the next president?

[Bogdanov] The next presidency—you never know who will catch the White House, and whoever is in the White House will be tied up by this act because they now provoke the Soviet Union; they know our latest position about that, to resume testing, and if you do that Pandora's box is opened, and the next administration will have not only tied by in this way given a free hand to continue building up American nuclear superiority.

[Pozner] In other words, they're trying to create a situation where the next president, regardless of what he wants, will be forced to continue along those lines.

[Bogdanov] Yes, yes, he will be forced.

[Pozner] Ok...

[Bogdanov] Number two...

[Pozner] What about Congress?

[Bogdanov] Congress, they know, and we know and the whole world knows, that the Congress is going to introduce some resolutions limiting freedom of actions for this administration in the field of nuclear testing, and they have done their job now. They have demonstrated to the Congress that they will sabotage any of their decision, they will weather any of Congress' resolutions. And they have demonstrated, if you like it's a kind of contempt of Congress [laughter] I'm sorry it's none of my...

[Pozner, interrupting]...contempt of the American people, the majority of whom would like to see a stop to nuclear testing...

[Bogdanov] Yeah, but, Vladimir, my view they're living in the ultimate bunker, they don't care about that. That's my explanation, that's my explanation. How rational it is I don't know, but it's very sad event. Maybe it's the beginning of the very, you know, I wouldn't like to say the beginning of the end of serious, you know, arms control, things like that, but I'm very pessimistic.

[Pozner] Thank you very much Dr Bogdanov. Let me say in conclusion that this last, or latest, test was not simply number 25. I tend to agree with you that it's a test that has in addition to military meaning, perhaps a far greater political meaning...

[Bogdanov] Yeah, yeah.

[Pozner] And that it will take an enormous amount of foresight and even courage on the part of the Soviet Union to handle this. What I mean is, I don't believe—there has not yet been an official statement by the Soviet Government as we tape this discussion—I don't believe the Soviet Union will react in a kind of tit-for-tat sense, and I do believe that regardless of what we do we will leave the door open to conclude an agreement on a general test ban. I'm sure of that.

[Bogdanov] It is very much on the agenda, very much, and I'm absolutely sure that the American side will not be able to provoke us, to destroy everything. That is their aim but it doesn't mean they will succeed.

[Pozner] Thank you very much Dr Bogdanov. This is Vladimir Pozner.

Gerasimov: Free To Test

LD062218 London BBC Domestic Service in English 0710 GMT 6 Feb 87

[From the "Today" program, presented by John Timpson: telephone interview with USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov in Moscow—live]

[Text] [Timpson] Good morning.

[Gerasimov] Good morning.

[Timpson] Can you tell me, is the Soviet Union about to start testing nuclear weapons again?

[Gerasimov] We think that we are now free to start testing, but it does not necessarily mean that we are going to test tomorrow. I think that the decision to test will be taken—with considerations to be taken [as heard]: political, military and other considerations. But now we feel free.

[Timpson] Is there considerable pressure from your military men to start testing again?

[Gerasimov] We have this pressure, that's we decided that we cannot continue this forever. We had 542 days without testing, and the Americans had 25 tests during this period, and overall, in general, the Americans had more tests than we had, so they must be ahead of us. If we assume that the American military brass shines as well as the Soviet military brass, then the Americans must be ahead of us. So our military are saying:

Look, we cannot continue with this forever because there is a danger of a technological breakthrough. And maybe I can emphasize that we said--and we're going to say it again--that we are ready to stop testing as soon as the Americans stop their tests.

[Timpson] But can I just press you on this a little? You say that you've gone 542 days now without testing; for how much longer can you go without testing?

[Gerasimov] Well, I can only repeat that the decision to test, if and when, will be taken with all these considerations, with the developments [as heard].

[Timpson] So it might be in a matter of days, weeks, months? You simply don't know at the moment?

[Gerasimov] Well, my personal feeling is that it is not a matter of days. But because the Americans had their test in Nevada, with great regret we are saying now: look, we tried hard, we invited them five times to join us in our good example. We think that the matter of control, which the Americans cited as one of their objections, doesn't exist any more, because almost everybody agrees that this matter of control can be settled--the technical means are here. So the Americans are now saying that they are going to test as soon as they rely on nuclear deterrence [as heard], which means forever.

[Timpson] If you do start testing again, will it be to test new nuclear technology, or to make sure that your existing stock of nuclear weapons is working?

[Gerasimov] I think that it will be the testing for new technology, because we think that we have another method to check on our nuclear arms, to see if everything is in working order, if our powder is dry, so to speak. We have even said that if America cites this particular reason for their testing, we are ready to give them all our secrets--how we manage to test our nuclear weapons without actually having nuclear explosions.

[Timpson] Can I ask you about the statement by Mr Gorbachev to some United States senators yesterday? He said that relations are now at a crossroads. What did he mean by that?

[Gerasimov] I think he meant that we must now decide if we are going to continue this road of confrontation, which America testing, I think, emphasizes. Because for instance in Geneva we have negotiation. And at Reykjavik we were pretty close to a nuclear-free world which if you believe what President Reagan is saying, is his dream--a nuclear-free world. I know it is not the dream of your prime minister, but the American President said that it is his dream, and we came quite close to having this dream a reality. Unfortunately, we moved backwards from Reykjavik and that's why I think that we are now at a crossroads. Which road to take: the road to a new escalation of the arms race, which American testing emphasizes so well, or the road to accommodation, the road to behave as civilized natured man behaves in a nuclear age.

[Timpson] Mr Gerasimov, thank you very much.

CD Delegate: No Longer Bound

LD062332 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Feb 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; announcer-read report over video of Nazarkin, deputy head of Soviet delegation, addressing session of conference on disarmament in Geneva]

[Text] The new U.S. nuclear test at the test site in Nevada has been condemned by the participants of the session of the conference on disarmament in Geneva.

Comrade Nazarkin, deputy head of the Soviet delegation, recalled in his speech: As the Soviet Government has warned, in connection with what happened on 3 February in Nevada, the Soviet Union is no longer bound by its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear tests. The Soviet representative also said the USSR is ready, on a reciprocal basis, to stop the implementation of its test program if the United States discontinues its program.

Kirghiz Writer Cited

LD091626 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 9 Feb 87

[Text] Frunze, 9 Feb (TASS)--"One is indignant at the new nuclear explosion in Nevada. This is the manifestation of evil which is defiance to entire humanity," said president of the Issyk-Kul forum, People's Writer of Kirghizia Chingiz Aitmatov.

"I hope that people will not leave the globe at the mercy of fate, that they will be protecting it," he said. The Issyk-Kul meeting held in October last attracted workers in culture from many countries. They discussed, specifically, the problem of mankind's survival in the nuclear age.

"The ideas that emerged on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul are being developed," the writer said. "We maintain correspondence and receive large mail from workers in science and culture in many countries."

A working group of the Issyk-Kul forum will meet in mid-February in Moscow. "We shall discuss questions of preparation for a new meeting to be held in Spain. Whatever the topics of the conversations, we shall be dealing with the vital needs of humanity, with the main problem of the century, that of war and peace."

"I hope that new contacts and new actions of workers in culture from all over the world will prompt all sober-minded people to thoughts about the destinies of world civilisation," Aitmatov said.

Returning to the topic of nuclear weapon tests in Nevada, Chingiz Aitmatov noted that every such explosion enhances and aggravates the complexities of the world today. He expressed the hope that workers in science, culture and art inspired by noble ideals of peace, good and beauty will be vigorously helping humanity overcome the nuclear dead end.

USSR Needs to Resume Nuclear Tests

PM101029 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 10 Feb 87 p 4

[Letter from World War II veteran V. Kovrigin under the "Reader's Voice" rubric: "Multiplying Efforts"]

[Text] Thousands and thousands of kilometers separate the quiet snow-covered village of Kalikino from the U.S. testing range in Nevada. But the wave of the latest nuclear blast reached even us, because that blast was a challenge. A challenge to us, to Soviet people, to the entire world public.

On hearing of this on the radio, I immediately recalled May 1945. The sacred moment of Victory.

Who now needs weapons, who needs war, if the tragic battle between two worlds has brought so much grief and destruction, we thought at the time. But so little time has elapsed and some people on our planet have managed to forget the lessons of history. My frontline comrades and I needed only one human lifespan to pass through the most terrible war and join the ranks of the fighters for the conservation of peace on earth. And now that truly revolutionary transformations are taking place in our country, we must multiply our efforts even more vigorously in the struggle to avert the threat of nuclear war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the peoples. The materials of the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum stated with complete clarity what must be done to achieve this sacred goal. We must raise the might of our motherland still higher, strengthen organization and discipline, and be more active in introducing socialist norms to all links of our life. It is the further flowering of socialism and democracy which is the guarantee of our successes.

...The eternal flames of memory are burning today throughout the country. Even now the war is making itself felt. Its traces can be found in many of our problems, because 20 million of the strongest, healthiest workers remained on the battlefield and thousands of cities and villages had to be resurrected from the ashes. We cannot allow even the possibility of the resurrection of war in the world today. That is why throughout the postwar years we World War II veterans have been urging each generation to struggle by every means for peace and to strengthen the motherland's defense might.

The Soviet Union has frequently given the Washington ringleaders the chance to consider. I am proud that it was my government which was the first to

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST TALKS

HK261451 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 24 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Fang Min (2455 2404): "The United States and Soviet Union Resume Talks on Nuclear Tests"]

[Text] Synopsis: The United States and Soviet Union began talks on nuclear tests in the second half of last year and agreed in principle to discuss a gradual reduction in nuclear tests with the ultimate goal of banning nuclear tests. Over the past 2 years, the United States and Soviet Union have been engaged in a heated debate on issues concerning nuclear tests, thus showing that nuclear tests are components of their nuclear arms race. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of the 1960's-1970's failed to restrain the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. At present, due to their different views on nuclear tests, the possibility of the two sides truly reaching a nuclear test ban agreement is remote and their talks will only be another type of competition. [synopsis ends]

The United States and Soviet Union began their fourth round of talks on nuclear tests on 22 January. In addition to U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear and space weapons, this is another round of U.S. -Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva.

During the summer-autumn period last year, U.S. -Soviet relations were relaxed a little and the two sides' positions on arms control became a bit more flexible. Under the background at that time, neither country wanted to overly rigidify the atmosphere, thus agreeing on holding nuclear test talks at the level of experts. Three rounds of such talks were held without making any major progress. The Soviet Union stressed that the United States and Soviet Union should reach an agreement on a total cessation of nuclear tests, while the United States stressed that regarding nuclear test, priority should be given on-the-spot verifications. Due to their different starting points, the U.S. -Soviet talks were mostly confined to expounding each side's position. However, some changes were made in their positions during the U.S. -Soviet summit in October last year in Iceland: The two sides agreed in principle to discuss a gradual reduction in nuclear tests with the ultimate goal of banning nuclear tests and to discuss issues concerning supervision, reduction in the equivalents (dang liang 3981 6852) of nuclear tests, and reducing the number of nuclear tests.

Over the last 2 years, the Soviet Union and United States have all along been at strife over nuclear test issues. In particular, at the end of July 1985, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced its temporary cessation of nuclear tests, called on the United States to follow suit, and exerted powerful pressure upon the United States, thus aggravating the heated bilateral debate. The Soviet Union stated that a cessation of

nuclear tests was an "important factor that is indispensable" to a cessation of the arms race and was also "the most realistic way." At the same time, the Soviet side charged that the U.S. refusal to cease nuclear tests resulted from "pursuance of a policy on nuclear confrontation" and from its attempt to disrupt strategic balance and to seize military superiority. In the face of this offensive, the United States made strong countermoves. It not only continued conducting nuclear tests, but also bluntly rebutted the Soviet argument, saying that the Soviet proposal for a cessation of nuclear tests was aimed at employing "propaganda tricks" in the face of world opinion, attempting to "freeze the Soviet nuclear superiority," and preventing the United States from improving its deterrent force.

It stated that a complete prohibition of nuclear tests was America's long-term goal, that a cessation of nuclear tests at present "does not accord with the security interests of the United States," and that prior to complete destruction of nuclear weapons, nuclear tests are indispensable to ensuring the reliability of the Western nuclear deterrent forces.

These two sharply contrasting positions of the United States and Soviet Union show that nuclear tests are in essence components of their long-term nuclear arms race. Following their first nuclear explosions in the mid and late 1940's, the United States and Soviet Union have over the past several decades conducted large numbers of nuclear tests for developing all kinds of nuclear weapons. According to a recent report issued by the Swedish Defense Research Institute, up to now, the United States has conducted 812 nuclear tests while the Soviet Union has conducted 563 nuclear tests. At the same time, talks on banning nuclear tests, with the United States and Soviet Union as major opponents, have been continuing off and on for over 30 years; the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (which bans atmospheric, outer space, and underwater nuclear tests) was signed in 1963; and the treaty on limiting underground nuclear tests was signed in 1974. This 1974 treaty, which remains to be ratified, stipulates that the equivalent of an underground nuclear test must not exceed 150,000 tons. However, every treaty they signed imposed restrictions only on testing spheres in which they already had achieved their goals and in which tests were no longer required, thus presenting no obstacle to their development of new weapons for the nuclear arms race. For example, prior to the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the United States and Soviet Union had conducted 216 and 162 atmospheric nuclear tests respectively and had begun to switch to underground nuclear tests. Therefore, this treaty failed to restrain them. Moreover, over the past 20 years and more since the signing of this treaty, the United States and Soviet Union have conducted 495 and 400 underground nuclear tests respectively, thus far exceeding the numbers of their atmospheric nuclear tests. From this, we can see that regarding the nuclear test ban, the United States and Soviet Union are just playing tricks to deceive world opinion.

At present, the armament conditions of the United States differ from those of the Soviet Union. As far as nuclear arms are concerned, the Soviet Union and United States, are on the whole, evenly matched. The U.S. side stated: The Soviet Union is in a favorable position in certain areas; because it conducted 190 underground nuclear tests from 1976 to 1985 and because it has, on the whole, conducted all the necessary tests for a new generation of nuclear weapons, it can announce time and again a temporary cessation of nuclear tests without impairing its superiority. By so doing, the Soviet Union not only can prevent the United States from continuing its current modernization plan for nuclear forces, but can also "throw serious obstacles in the U.S.' way to realize its Star Wars program" (words from TASS). In addition, by so doing, the Soviet Union can win over world opinion and propagate the Soviet aspiration

for peace. The Soviet Union obviously can gain something from the propaganda in this regard. However, the United States has shown a tough position and refused to cease its nuclear tests, thus landing itself in a somewhat passive position. To complete its development of a new generation of nuclear weapons and to continue research work for its Star Wars program, the United States has no alternative but to hold out tenaciously.

According to some Western experts in arms control, in view of their respective interests, it is most unlikely that the United States and Soviet Union will reach an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

In January this year, prior to the fourth round of talks on nuclear tests, the United States reiterated that it would continue conducting new nuclear tests, while the Soviet Union announced that it would resume nuclear tests if the United States continued nuclear tests in 1987. This indicates that regarding the nuclear test issue in 1987, the United States and Soviet Union will possibly continue holding talks while conducting nuclear tests. Although it is possible they may reach some compromises, the possibility of the two sides truly reaching a nuclear test ban agreement is very remote. Holding talks will only be another type of competition.

/6091

CSO: 5200/4052

RELATED ISSUES

SHEVARDNADZE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, INF, REYKJAVIK

AD091543 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 6 Feb 87 p 1

["Full Text" of interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, by RUDE PRAVO chief editor Zdenek Horeni, "at the close of his 2-day visit to the CSSR": "Answers to RUDE PRAVO's Questions"]

[Text] [Horeni] Three political parties — the SED, SPD, and CPCE — have launched an initiative aimed at setting up a nuclear-free zone in central Europe and a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. How do you assess the significance of this regional initiative from the viewpoint of the aims of European and world security?

[Shevardnadze] We greatly appreciate and support this initiative for many reasons. First of all, the Soviet Union regards the very fact of cooperation between three recognized political parties of three European states standing on opposite sides of the military dividing line as a new positive feature and a new phenomenon in international relations. Second, the implementation of this proposal undoubtedly would improve the political climate in Europe.

The value of this proposal also lies in the fact that it organically fits in with the set of prevailing views on ways of ensuring European security and reducing the risk of a conflict, and it develops and complements these concepts.

Besides, this "proposal of three" is highly topical because it conforms with the view in Europe, a view that has been formulated with sufficient clarity, that it is high time to begin to implement substantive measures providing a guarantee that no unpleasant situation will occur at the border between the two military-political alliances.

Focusing their heightened attention on this issue in the Budapest appeal, the highest representatives of the Warsaw Pact member-states proposed a package of measures to reduce and completely rule out the likelihood of a sudden attack. The main idea is to initiate some sort of a "pruning" process in the zone of contact aimed at withdrawing from there weapons that could be used for a concentrated attack.

The idea is simple. The fewer tanks, tactical aircraft, and other devices employed to break through the enemy's defense lines amassed at the front line, the more stable the situation will be and the greater the certainty that aggression is impossible. Ultimately, such a course of events would result inevitably in a situation in which it would be possible to mutually dissolve the two alliances' military organizations.

Europe needs the largest possible area free of dangerous weapons. All proposals that zones free of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction be established in Europe, especially in its central and northern parts and also in the Balkans therefore deserve attention and support.

The Soviet Union, as all countries of the socialist community, consistently affirms its loyalty to the idea of establishing such zones.

The people of Europe have the opportunity to evaluate everything according to deeds, and not according to statements made by one statesman or another.

The military-political alliances facing each other in Europe were not formed at the socialist countries' initiative. We have still not abandoned our conviction that they should not exist at all. Because they do exist, however, we must do all we can for their mutual confrontation to be on the lowest possible level. That is exactly the purpose of the proposal submitted by the Warsaw Pact member-states to conclude a treaty with NATO countries on mutually refraining from the use of force and maintaining relations of peace. The same aim also is pursued by the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact member-states to start specific negotiations on reducing the number of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

A contribution to easing tension also would be made by promoting dialogue between the Warsaw Pact states and NATO and by establishing direct working contacts between the two organizations. We regret that NATO does not want to react to our proposal for the establishment of contacts between Marshal Viktor Kulikov, chief commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and General Bernard Rogers, supreme commander of NATO. Herbert Krolikowski, general secretary of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, and Lord Carrington, general secretary of NATO, would also surely have something to talk about. As is known, while the first is ready for such a dialogue, the other has been avoiding it. What is it that hinders Mr Carrington? Could it be that his colleague and possible negotiating partner does not have a lordly title?

As you see, the situation is not developing very positively. We are making proposals and they are turning them down.

Are these facts, perhaps, not enough for nations to be able to get an idea of who is really working for security and cooperation in Europe, and who only puts on the mask of pseudo peace-loving rhetoric?

[Horeni] What needs to be done for the Vienna meeting to expand the mandate of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europe?

[Shevardnadze] First of all, we must strictly observe agreements reached previously within the framework of the all-European process. Let me recall that these agreements provide for progress from confidence-building measures toward a reduction of military confrontation by means of substantial cuts in the numbers of troops and armaments in Europe. These agreements are enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act as well as in the closing document of Madrid. Incidentally, this latter document explicitly mentions disarmament measures to complement the mandate of the Stockholm conference.

The question of the fastest possible transition toward actual disarmament measures in Europe concerns the interests of all European states without exception — members of military-political pacts as well as neutral and nonaligned states. The Soviet Union believes that the most suitable forum for talks on all questions concerning negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe, including the mandate of these negotiations, is the Vienna meeting of representatives of states participating in the all-European process.

However, there are regrettably those — I am thinking, in particular, of the United States — who, while proclaiming their commitment to a balanced development of the all-European process and to the fulfillment of all commitments formulated in its documents, now contemplate excluding the problem of disarmament from this process and setting it apart. They claim that, supposedly, these problems have not been "inherent to the all-European process from the very beginning." I would say that this is a very liberal interpretation of this issue. It could generate the impression that the problems of arms buildup in Europe and European security have nothing in common.

But let us return to serious attitudes and proposals. During the first stage of the Vienna meeting, the Polish delegation explained the view of the allied socialist countries on expanding the mandate [of the Stockholm conference] and proposed that the mechanism of the first Stockholm conference should be used for negotiations at a second Stockholm conference on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

We consider it logical and essential that all European states, including neutral and nonaligned countries, should participate in the solution of these issues.

In our opinion, it would also be expedient to hold consultations with NATO countries. Bilateral and multilateral contacts not only between the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but also with neutral and nonaligned countries, could help to reach mutual understanding.

However, the Vienna meeting is the main field of activity. Only this meeting is authorized to approve the decision on complementing the mandate of the Stockholm conference. Collective, united work of all 35 participants could make this possible.

[Horen] The opinion is often expressed in the West that the question of medium-range missiles should be taken out of the Reykjavik "package." What do you think about this?

[Shevardnadze] I would say that such words are irresponsible and, to use stronger terms, I would even say immoral.

There is so much talk about the package that the meaning of this word has been rather obscured.

Let us thus make the meaning clear. A comprehensive solution for virtually all types of nuclear weapons was found at the meeting in Reykjavik, and it is this comprehensive solution that makes up the so-called package. We, for our part, have defined it as a package of agreements, compromises, and mutual concessions. On some points the two sides reached complete agreement and on some points we met our partners halfway. In doing so, we did not stop short of concessions. One of them, a concession of principled importance, was made by us in the question of British and French missiles. We said: Well, we agree that these weapons will not be included in the liquidation of American

and Soviet medium-range missiles in the interest of achieving the main goal -- the preservation of the ABM treaty and the prevention of the militarization of space. Even though it is clear to everyone where the British and French missiles have their targets, we accepted this risk in the interest of that goal.

He who suggests that we "unpack" the Reykjavik package is at loggerheads with logic and conscience.

After all, it is not so much a question of medium-range missiles, although this example clearly shows the illogical conduct of some Western statesmen. Once they claimed that they could not wait to see the happy day when medium-range missiles will disappear from Europe, and now when this could become reality, they have started to "enwrap" it in a number of additional demands.

However, I respect that the package contains something much more important than the question of medium-range missiles. If we agreed with the opening of one part of the contents of the package, we would legalize space weapons and give our consent to their deployment. The problem of the Reykjavik package contains a response to the question of whether to agree with the militarization of space. To liquidate the only obstacle to space weapons -- the anti-ballistic missile treaty? Our answer is a clear no. That is a matter of principle, honor, and conscience.

[Noren] How do you assess the international situation in the wake of the Soviet-American talks in Reykjavik and what, in your opinion, are the prospects for the further development of relations between the USSR and the United States during Reagan's presidency?

[Shevardnadze] Despite all the complications thus far and, I would say, differences in the internal charge [roadilnost vnitriho naboje], there has been a change in the situation. Reykjavik has left its mark. It was a good spur to the formation of a broad global consensus in support of the radical and simultaneously carefully thought-out and balanced proposals of the Soviet Union for reducing and liquidating nuclear weapons.

The strip of pure water cleared by the Reykjavik "icebreaker" in the ice remains pure and we will not permit the formation of another layer of ice on it. This strip washes away all kinds of pretexts, with the help of which the United States and NATO try to block all disarmament proposals. The innovative proposals and bold actions of the fraternal socialist countries in all directions, including questions of verification, settlement of regional conflicts, or social and humanitarian cooperation, widen the canals leading to the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security.

As far as the prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations are concerned, we see them in the general international context of renewal and do not assign them to any protected or "icy" area. I think that it is not necessary to explain why the efforts to proceed in this direction are particularly uneasy. However, each constructive step taken in this area is of exceptional importance for the cause of peace and disarmament.

It so far has been hardly possible to point to some hopeful features in the stand of the U.S. Administration -- rather on the contrary. Concepts of policy from the position of strength leading to a blind alley, which have been confirmed by the President in his State of the Union message, the allocation of new funds for the

program of nuclear rearmament and space militarization of the United States, as well as the continuing U.S. retreat from fundamental Soviet-American agreements — all this gives no reason for great optimism. Hopes are naturally undermined by the latest nuclear explosion carried out by the United States these days. We regard it as another overt challenge to mankind, as an act of disregard for its fundamental interests.

This explosion has made the already gloomy background even darker.

Nevertheless, we have not ceased to seek roads toward agreement. At the Geneva meeting, we have raised the level of the leadership of our delegation; better use is made of the timetable on our proposal; and the method of negotiations has been intensified. Work continues. We would not like to believe that the present U.S. Administration has already taken the final choice and that it is ready to allow the collapse of the whole perspective of an agreement with the Soviet Union and to permit the remaining 2 years to be wasted on the same dangerous rush for the vision of military supremacy. In principle, we have not lost the hope for the successful conclusion of the Reykjavik talks with the incumbent U.S. leadership. I believe that it is also in its interests to get to the final stretch of the incumbent President's term of office with a positive score.

We continue to want the Soviet-American dialogue to be constructive and wish as ever that every effort be made so that the historic "window" of opportunities half-opened in Reykjavik may not be slammed.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: U.S. 'IMPERIAL DISDAIN' ON TESTS, SDI, CDE NOTIFICATION

PH111001 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 87 First Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Golts "Military-political review": "Following the Laws of the Jungle"]

[Excerpts] The American magazine NEWSWEEK has written, not without some irritation, that the inhabitants of many countries see the United States as an "800-pound gorilla brandishing weapons and prepared to furiously sweep away everything in its path." This comparison is of course unjust if we are talking about the American people themselves. It is true, however that a country is often judged by the policy pursued by its government.

The course pursued by Washington is causing just such associations. The week's events have once again convincingly demonstrated the imperial disdain with which the U.S. ruling circles regard the will of other peoples, as well as that of their own, and how flagrantly they flout accepted standards of behaviour in the international arena.

The 25th Step Toward the Abyss [subhead]

A nuclear test was conducted at the Nevada test range on 3 February. It was the 25th such test since the introduction of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. "It was a minor explosion, which is why the population were not given prior notification," a test site spokesman told journalists, as if nothing of moment had happened.

I do not know, but perhaps this time the buildings of Las Vegas really did not feel any tremor. What I do know is this "minor" explosion did shake and anger the whole world. Here are just two opinions out of many that have rattled off the editorial office's teleprinters. Kevin McNamara, member of the British labor Party shadow cabinet, described this explosion as an "ignominious political step carried out in the spirit of the cold war." "The people of Japan are deeply outraged that the United States has ostentatiously carried out a nuclear explosion," Mayor of Hiroshima T. Araki stated.

It is impossible not to share this sense of outrage, given the offhand way Washington dashed the hopes of mankind that the shortest possible route to a nuclear-free world would be opened up. As people are aware, on extending its moratorium for the fifth time our country warned that it would exist until the first American nuclear explosion in 1987.

During the 18 months of silence on the Soviet test sites the objections to the moratorium raised by the U.S. Administration have been analyzed in the closest detail.

The facts have convincingly shown the utter absurdity of claims that the USSR is ahead of the United States in numbers of nuclear tests conducted. The absolute untenability of claims that it is impossible to control. [kontrol] or even necessary to check [proverka] existing weapons has also been demonstrated.

As the far-fetched reasons have disappeared, the true reason has become increasingly clear — namely, the U.S. ruling circles' unbridled desire to secure military superiority. New kinds of weapons are also being developed [razrabotka] in pursuit of this chimerical goal. The explosions in Nevada serve as a kind of ignition key to the infernal machine of the arms race.

The main point to bear in mind is that the "Star Wars" program, on which Washington pins its hopes of securing military superiority, cannot be implemented without nuclear explosions. It is symbolic that on the very day the United States took its 25th nuclear step along this route the President assembled the national security planning group in the White House. The conference discussed Pentagon chief Weinberger's proposal to speed up the phased deployment of SDI. According to U.S. journalists, the head of the U.S. military department considers that the "United States can deploy certain of these weapons systems, including space battle stations, as early as 1994." Gain what we have is not just an absence of balance of power. Consensus, which suggests that placing weapons on outer space undermines the security of everyone and makes control [kontrol] over nuclear weapons impossible.

What we also have is the United States' complete disregard of its commitments, since the implementation of SDI leads to the destruction of one of the most important USSR-U.S. treaties — the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems.

It would be mistaken to think the U.S. Administration regards only treaties concluded with the Soviet Union in this casual way. Its attitude to agreements signed with dozens of other U.S. 5th Army Corps has been holding the "Caravan Guard" exercise in the FRG Lands of Hessen and Bavaria for 2 weeks, involving approximately 23,000 servicemen. You might think this was ordinary troop training. Reporting on "Caravan Guard," the magazine DER SPIEGEL draws this conclusion: "Judging by all accounts, the U.S. Administration is not taking seriously the agreements achieved at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament, which demand that all participating countries give prior notification to one another of certain kinds of military activity."

The magazine points out that, despite the pressing request of FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, the United States refused to announce the start of the exercise in advance or to invite Warsaw Pact representatives. This was done solely on the pretext that the maneuvers had been planned before the Stockholm conference ended and therefore "do not come under the accord." In reality, however, according to DER SPIEGEL, the United States "fears" some of its military secrets will be revealed.

Be that as it may, it is nevertheless quite clear that it does undermine the spirit of the accords, whose essence is absolutely clear, namely, to build confidence in Europe. What we have here is also an arrogant disregard by Washington of the opinion of a very close ally.

These and many other facts show that in resolving virtually all military and political questions Washington continues to operate from a position of strength and endeavors to secure superiority for itself. [paragraph continues]

These attempts, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his recent conversation with a delegation of the American Council on International Relations, are futile and harmful to the world community.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY: SECURITY THROUGH SUFFICIENCY

AU100501 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 1, January 1987 (signed to press 16 Dec 86) pp 3-13

[Article by V. Petrovskiy: "Security Through Disarmament"]

[Text] I

The Soviet comprehensive program of security through disarmament, which was formulated a year ago in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January is now already operating as a real factor in world politics. What is involved is not a speculative construction or some scheme, but a concentrated expression of the new political thinking which is increasingly taking root in international politics.

That is why the statement of 15 January 1986 — this fusion of philosophy and political action — is perceived everywhere as a document of historic significance.

Having carefully analyzed the present world situation, and having assessed the standpoint and practical actions of other states, the Soviet leadership came to the conclusion that in the contemporary world, which is interconnected in the face of nuclear and space reality, it is possible and necessary to take a radical turn for the better in the development of the international situation, and to free mankind from the fear of extermination.

One can no longer use old yardsticks in the qualitatively new situation in which civilization faces the choice of existence or nonexistence. Other approaches are required, as is a new philosophy of policy which refutes age-old ideas about the admissibility and feasibility of war and armed conflict.

It is now no longer enough to recognize that one cannot ride into the nuclear desert "on a white horse." The realities of the nuclear and space age are harsh. The destruction of civilization would be universal. A first nuclear strike, if anyone decided nevertheless to deliver it, would be an act of suicide. Radioactive death and "nuclear winter" know no state, geographical, or ideological boundaries. This threat has made states and social systems equal; it has indissolubly bound them by a common fate, and has made peace the supreme value for everyone in our time.

It follows from this that today no state can any longer nurture illusions about its own invulnerability through military-technological means alone, even if it has created the most powerful defense either on earth or in outer space, ensuring security increasingly represents a political task; it can only be solved by political means.

As the Mexican declaration rightly notes, "to prevent a repetition of Hiroshima on a global scale, it is necessary to have not only more deep knowledge or new technology, but a display of greater wisdom."

Security cannot be built indefinitely on the basis of fear of retribution. The price to be paid for continuing to pursue doctrines of "deterrence through intimidation," which are used in an attempt to substantiate the stubborn continuation of nuclear tests, the renunciation of the SALT I and SALT II, and the undermining of the ABM Treaty, is a high one. The spread of the arms race to outer space would represent a grave and quite possibly insurmountable obstacle on the road toward a nuclear-free world; it would make the borderline between peace and war even finer, and would place the security of each and everyone under constant threat. That is why the "Star Wars" program, which the United States cynically calls the "Strategic Defense Initiative," represents a concentrated expression of militarist designs and of reluctance to remove the nuclear threat hanging over mankind, as well as an embodiment of the short-sighted, narrowly egotistic approach to the problem of international security.

The appearance of new means of waging war threatens to transfer political decisionmaking to computers. As a result, people will end up being captives of technology, which can go wrong, as the catastrophes of Challenger and the Chernobyl AFS tragically reminded us. In addition, there are such refined weapon systems on the way that it will be virtually impossible to agree on controlling them.

The renunciation of reliance on military strength as a means of ensuring security is dictated not only by the destructive power of contemporary weaponry. Perhaps no less important are a number of other political and economic factors. Their significance increases many times over in the conditions where states are globally interdependent.

Mankind is facing many complex problems — energy, raw material, food, and ecological problems. The division between states' levels of economic development is becoming increasingly threatening, and the debt owed by developing countries to the West has reached catastrophic dimensions. The solution of all these problems requires wide-scale, equal, and mutually advantageous cooperation. Meanwhile, the arms race places insurmountable barriers in the way of such cooperation, and thus of the consolidation of national and international security.

As far as military security itself is concerned, the only justified approach to it under present conditions can be the principle of sufficiency, with a general trend toward a steady reduction of weapon levels rather than deterrence or reliance on strength.

How is sufficiency to be characterized? The Soviet Union proceeds from the view that in the arms sphere sufficiency is primarily defined by the requirement for defense against aggression. Historical experience teaches this. Immediately after its birth, the Soviet land, whose first foreign policy act was the Leninist decree on peace, was forced to counter a foreign military intervention. Even then it was necessary to recognize the harsh fact that, as V.I. Lenin, the founder of our state, noted, the most peaceful people and the most devoted defenders of their fatherland "will be swiftly destroyed by the adversary if they are not armed to a sufficient degree." (Footnote 1) (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol 35, p 408)

The Soviet concept of sufficiency is entirely defensive. It repudiates the aspiration for military superiority. On the contrary, in its very essence it envisages a reduction in weapons on the basis of reciprocity with other countries.

After all, we need only as many weapons as the other side. As the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th Congress notes, the Soviet Union regards one of the foundations of an all-embracing security system as being "a strictly controlled reduction in the level of states' military potential until the bounds of reasonable sufficiency have been reached." In this connection it proceeds from the view that the level of confrontation is now inordinately high. Under the conditions of peaceful coexistence it can and must be lowered without upsetting the existing military balance or the established system of security. Here the USSR relies on the indubitable fact that genuine equal security is guaranteed by the lowest possible level of strategic balance, from which nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons must be completely excluded. Limitation of military potential to the scale of reasonable sufficiency means ruling out the possibility of using it as an offensive potential, as potential for aggression.

In this sense the concept of sufficiency is not so much a military as a political one. We would consider it sufficient for us not simply to have the lowest level of military balance, but even better, for this to be replaced by a system of political agreements and international legal norms, and by wide proliferation of the political psychology of peace, which would be a sufficient guarantee of the security of both the USSR and all other states.

In other words, from the point of view of military security, too, it is precisely arms limitation and disarmament which represent the central line or main direction for providing a real material guarantee of the preservation of peace.

All this does not mean, however, that other paths leading to the creation of a system of general international security should be set aside. These include the consolidation of stability on a regional scale, the elimination of various kinds of situations of conflict and crisis, the overcoming of backwardness, and respect for human rights by ensuring them in practice rather than in words. In other words, the acute issue is one of ensuring state security not only in the military and political spheres, but also in the economic and humanitarian sphere, where there can be no place for the use of force, threats, or pressure.

The Soviet Union is in favor of consistent, coordinated international efforts being undertaken in all these areas. However, attempts to establish an artificial — and let us stress artificial — firm link between them are at least impractical. Such attempts often merely conceal a lack of political will and a reluctance to strive for progress in any of the above areas.

II

On a practical plane, the program of security through disarmament which the Soviet Union advanced on 15 January 1986 proposes that all mass destruction weapons be destroyed; that a peaceful outer space be ensured; that armed forces and conventional weapons be substantially cut; and that states' military potentials be confined to the bounds of reasonable sufficiency.

The heart of the program, which is well-proportioned, bold, and concrete, is a plan to free the world from nuclear weapons this century, with an effective ban on space strike weapons. The principled newness of the program lies in the fact that it is not only the end goals which are involved, but also practical disarmament measures which are clearly calculated in terms of time and which are designed to be implemented within a historically short space of time. The security interests of all are taken into account to an equal extent, to the detriment of no one.

The very deep democracy of the Soviet program is also obvious. It is, after all, essentially aimed at the self-imposed disbandment of the "nuclear club." The prestige and worth of a great power must be associated not with nuclear or other mass destruction weapons, but by its contribution to disarmament and to the formation of security for all without exception.

The enormous constructive potential of the program and the new political thinking which engendered it was graphically embodied in the package of major Soviet proposals submitted at the Soviet-American summit. In Reykjavik an understanding was reached about the sequence of practical steps leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and agreement in principle was achieved on an entire complex of nuclear disarmament measures (strategic offensive weapons, medium-range missiles, nuclear weapons tests, non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty over 10 years). However, an agreement, which would have meant the beginning of a new epoch — a nuclear-free epoch — in mankind's life, was not reached, due to the United States' stubborn reluctance to renunciate its attempts to ensure its own security by continuing with its policy of strength, that is, through military-technological solutions and the use of weapons. It is precisely this that explains the United States "unwavering adherence" to SDI, because this program is not an individual entity but a concentrated expression of a definite policy.

In spite of this, the meeting in the Icelandic capital was an important event of international life in the struggle against the arms race, for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for the removal of the threat of war.

As was stressed at the Bucharest session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of Warsaw Pact member-states, held on 14 and 15 October 1986, the Soviet Union and its allies are full of resolve to continue the dialogue and the active struggle to halt the arms race and create an all-embracing system of international security and peace.

The states participating in the session expressed their support for the USSR's stand at the Reykjavik meeting, and for the large-scale and far-reaching Soviet proposals. They called on the United States and the other NAU countries to recognize the full gravity of the present situation in the world and to approach the Soviet Union's proposals constructively, from a standpoint of realism and responsibility.

The participants in the working meeting of leaders of fraternal parties of socialist CEMA member-countries, held in Moscow on 10-11 November 1986, supported the Soviet Union's principled position in Reykjavik and emphasized the need to increase joint efforts in the interests of the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, cut conventional ones, and consolidate peace and international security.

On 7 November 1986 the USSR delegation submitted large-scale proposals on all areas of the nuclear missile complex at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva. It was guided by the principles agreed on at the Reykjavik meeting. Although the "new" U.S. proposals in Geneva are clearly aimed at revising the package of agreements developed in Geneva, the Soviet side is continuing to strive patiently and persistently to prevent any slipping away from the Reykjavik summit and to translate the existing agreements on principles into diplomatic documents.

III

It stands to reason the issues of nuclear disarmament cannot be resolved in the sphere of USSR-U.S. relations alone. What is needed are energetic actions by all states, truly universal efforts, the augmentation and concentration of these efforts in the main areas, and activation of the creative potential of the world community of states. As Swedish Foreign Minister E. Andersson rightly stated at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly, "nuclear disarmament is not the concern of only the nuclear powers."

An important area of international efforts is the cessation of nuclear tests. This is now the simplest and clearest step, and the ripest for solution, toward curtailing the arms race. The Soviet Union considers it urgently necessary to at last begin full-scale negotiations on finally and forever halting nuclear explosions. This standpoint is in accordance with the will of the overwhelming majority of states, which are demanding an end should be made to the extended series of nuclear tests aimed at the improvement of nuclear arsenals and the creation of space weapons.

Now that the horizons of a nuclear-free world are taking shape, the following questions are inexorably arising: How can agreement be reached on the elimination of nuclear weapons if they continue to be improved? How can one demand trust from one's partners if one retains a free hand to undermine parity in the course of disarmament?

It has been known for a long time that politics is the art of the possible. In the nuclear and space age, however, there is arising a new understanding of the art of the possible as the ability and courage to rise above national and state interests and to make a choice, however difficult, in favor of mankind's common interests. For us, a difficult decision of this nature was the fourfold extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. A 17-month silence on the Soviet test ranges represents a real, tangible contribution to the struggle for mankind's primary right -- the right to a future.

What is the meaning of this Soviet action; why has it made such a deep impression in international relations?

First of all, in international life the test ban has assumed the position of one of the key problems of shifting to a nuclear-free world. Furthermore, there is no longer a problem about verifying [kontrol] a test ban. U.S. specialists with the latest apparatus at their disposal followed the situation on the Soviet ranges. The Soviet Union is open to any forms and methods of verifying the cessation of tests, including a readiness to create an international and supranational network or system of verification [kontrol]. The conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Harare voiced valuable recommendations in this respect. Finally, the Soviet moratorium showed that abstention from tests is a real issue, if, of course, there is the political will on both sides.

As a result, the question of starting talks on a complete nuclear test ban has been transferred to a practical plane. This is perhaps the main positive result of the moratorium and of the other Soviet steps in this matter.

Soviet delegation head E.A. Shevardnadze stated from the UN rostrum that the Soviet Union is ready to sign a treaty on a complete nuclear weapons test ban at any time and in any place, including within the UN wall. Any variant is acceptable to the USSR -- bilateral Soviet-American talks, trilateral talks involving Great Britain, and multilateral talks within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

Another important area of increasing multilateral efforts is nuclear disarmament and the achievement of reliably verifiable [kontroluyemyy] accords aimed at the radical reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union proposals that parallel to the USSR - U.S. nuclear and space arms talks, a start be made without delay to an exchange of opinions on these issues between all nuclear powers.

In the course of such a multilateral exchange of opinions it would be possible to discuss a number of important concrete issues, and specifically the production of nuclear fission and fusion materials for the development and creation of weapons, a procedure for eliminating nuclear weapons, fundamental approaches to verifying multilateral nuclear disarmament measures, and also the time taken for the powers to become involved in such a process. This proposal, which the USSR made at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly, proceeds from the view that nuclear disarmament measures concerning the relevant countries would take place in practice after radical cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States.

The Soviet Union is also in favor of making the Geneva Conference on Disarmament finally participate in practical negotiations on nuclear disarmament and measures to prevent nuclear war. It is prepared to support any constructive ideas. For instance, the proposals for the development of multilateral agreements to reduce the danger of nuclear war, as well as the analogous bilateral agreements reached in the seventies with the USSR's participation, are acceptable. The Soviet Union is in favor of practical discussion of the proposal made by UN General Secretary Perez de Cuellar for the creation of a multilateral center to reduce the nuclear danger.

The Soviet Union shares the attitude of broad circles of public opinion, which is in favor of the creation of nuclear-free zones. It supports in principle the proposals for the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe and of such zones in the north of Europe, in the Balkans, on the Korean peninsula, and in Southeast Asia. It calls upon all nuclear powers to guarantee such a zone in the southern Pacific Ocean. The USSR has a sympathetic attitude to the question of creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic, as proposed by Brazil, and also to the idea of declaring the South Atlantic a nuclear-free zone.

Particular importance is being acquired by the task of winning more and more territory away from nuclear weapons. All possible strengthening of the nonproliferation system is becoming a relevant task for multilateral activity in the international arena. It must be solved jointly, by both nuclear and nonnuclear states. A reliable basis for joint actions is the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has proven its effectiveness and vitality. It is, of course, impossible to ignore the growing nuclear conditions of Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan.

In the Soviet Union's opinion, the recommendations of the Third conference to review the operation of the Nonproliferation treaty held in 1985, must be implemented as rapidly as possible. There should be continued efforts to further increase the IAEA's role both in strengthening the nonproliferation system and in creating secure conditions for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

IV

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is a concern of all mankind. At UN General Assembly sessions, over 150 countries vote for the swift solution of this issue. The Soviet Union is deeply convinced of the need for a radical ban on the creation, testing, and deployment of space strike weapons.

At the same time, the USSR is also in favor of any other steps in this area, above all the strengthening of the ABM Treaty system, which it proposed in Reykjavik. U.S. President Reagan stated he needs the SDI program for America and its allies to remain invulnerable in case of a Soviet missile strike. But our country has, after all, proposed all strategic nuclear missiles which the USSR and United States possess be destroyed, and this under rigorous verification.

One asks oneself where the need arises to safeguard "the freedom of America and its friends" from Soviet nuclear missiles — these missiles would no longer exist, after all! If there are no nuclear weapons, why is there a need for a defense against them? In the light of what happened in the Icelandic capital it finally became clear that the entire "Star Wars" venture is of a purely militarist nature and is aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. The chimera of superiority turned out to be stronger than the ability to take the step preventing the sides from making decisions which could assume historic significance for the entire nuclear and space era.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to resolve the question of preventing the arms race in outer space without delay. At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament the time has come to finally begin negotiations on reaching an agreement or agreements on preventing all aspects of an arms race in near-earth space, including the elaboration of accords on such partial steps as a ban on space-to-earth and space-to-space class missiles, abandonment of the creation of new anti-satellite weapons and the elimination of existing ones, and immunity for artificial earth satellites.

V

Mobilization of efforts is also necessary for the solution of another urgent task — that of ridding the world of the arsenals of chemical death. Encouraging progress is being made at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In April 1986 the USSR made new proposals clearing the way for an accord which could be achieved even in 1987. Their essence lies in the elimination of chemical weapons themselves and the industrial base for their production, subject to reliable verification [kontrol] and within a minimal time-span. The American plans connected with binary chemical weapons, which are intended for Europe (whatever reservations might be attached to this), run directly counter to the above goal.

The main task is to urge all states to refrain from the production of new types of chemical weapons, and from placing them on other countries' territories, and to withdraw all those already abroad to their own national territories. Here, too, the Soviet Union's position is flexible and rather than buildup. To be specific, the USSR supports the PRC's proposal that all countries capable of producing chemical weapons should refrain from testing, producing, transferring, and deploying them until a convention which bans them is concluded.

The creation zones free of chemical weapons would seem to be useful. The Soviet Union is in favor of the creation of such zones in central Europe and the Balkans, and is prepared to guarantee their status if the United States does likewise.

An important sphere for the application of wide-scale effort must be that of banning the creation of nonnuclear weapons which are based on new physical principles and which approximate in kill power nuclear or other mass destruction weapons.

Movement toward genuine security through disarmament presupposes that with the elimination of mass destruction weapons, conventional weapons and armed forces must be subject to rapid and coordinated reduction.

The fact is that in a number of their characteristics, modern so-called conventional weapons come very close to mass destruction weapons. Grave alarm is being caused by reports of U.S. plans for the accelerated introduction into the NATO armament complex of technologies for re-equipping conventional warhead delivery systems to deliver nuclear warheads. The implementation of these plans would seriously undermine the possibility of verification [kontrol] of nuclear disarmament measures, it would lower the "nuclear threshold," and threaten to destabilize the military-strategic situation.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are prepared to go as far as other states in the sphere of conventional weapons, too. They have made concrete proposals for a very substantial reduction in armed forces and weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, involving far-reaching verification [kontrol]. What is involved is considerably lowering the level of the danger of war on the continent. At the beginning of the nineties the cuts would amount to 25 percent on each side, a total of more than 1 million men. Success at the Vienna MBFR talks would also be of great importance. The USSR proposes the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons to reasonable sufficiency in Asia, too.

Finally, it is necessary to place reliable barriers in the way of conventional weapons proliferation. Increasing relevance is being assumed by measures to prevent the spread of so-called inhumane types of conventional weapon covered by the 1981 International Convention. The delay by the United States and a number of its allies in ratifying this convention essentially blocks its transformation into an effective instrument for arms limitation.

The USSR's principled position is this: All in all, it would prefer its troops not to be situated anywhere outside its national borders. This issue, too, is open to discussion. It could be completely resolved under conditions in which confidence is consolidated and measures for military detente are implemented.

To shift the question of curbing the arms race in the seas and oceans to a practical plane, it is necessary to begin corresponding negotiations with the participation of all major naval powers and of other interested states. The USSR is in favor of measures in this sphere both on a global scale and above all in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean regions.

The Indian Ocean must become a zone of peace in which there is no place for the naval formations of states whose shores are not washed by its waters. What is meant by this? It means not sending large naval formations there, not conducting military exercises, and not expanding or modernizing the military bases of those noncontiguous states which have such bases.

The USSR has submitted a complex of proposals aimed at ensuring peace and security in the Mediterranean. At the 41st session of the UN General Assembly it spoke out in favor of the creation of an appropriate mechanism, either within or outside the UN framework, for developing practical measures aimed at turning the Mediterranean into a region of stable peace, security, and cooperation.

The time has come to start negotiations on reducing the activity of naval fleets in the Pacific Ocean, and above all that of ships armed with nuclear weapons. The consolidation of stability would be furthered by the limitation of rivalry in the sphere of antisubmarine weapons, and specifically by an accord on refraining from antisubmarine activity in certain zones of the ocean. This, incidentally, would also represent an important confidence-building measure.

It is natural that in matters of limiting and reducing naval activity and weapons, attention is primarily concentrated on the U.S. Navies — the largest in the world. The measures and talks proposed by the Soviet Union in this sphere could involve the USSR and the United States at the first stage, with the other major naval powers being drawn in subsequently.

In connection with the fact that a number of countries are raising the issue of limiting naval nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union is willing to examine possible ways of cutting this component of states' naval power both within the general context of measures to limit this power and at the corresponding nuclear weapons negotiations. As a whole, however, the matter would be radically resolved through implementation of the program proposed by the USSR for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the task of increasing the security of maritime lines of communication and building confidence, urgency has been acquired by such an issue as the development of multilateral accords on the prevention of incidents on the open seas and in the airspace above them. Here it would be possible to use as a basis the already existing USSR-U.S. and USSR-UK agreements on this count.

VII

An obligatory accompanying measure of all bilateral and multilateral measures is all-embracing, rigorous verification [proverka] at all stages of arms reductions, with the use of both national technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspection [inspektziya na mestakh]. The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate on any additional verification [kontrol] measures. What is more, if the USSR and the United States start along the road of nuclear disarmament, such measures will assume an increasingly stringent nature. In a nonnuclear world requiring particular responsibility, verification [kontrol] must be real, all-embracing, and convincing; it must create complete confidence that agreements will be reliably observed, and it must include the right of on-site inspection.

A tangible consequence of the implementation of disarmament proposals would be the release of material resources and of intellectual and technological potential, and the channeling of these toward the needs of development and toward the solution of global problems of the contemporary period, including the elimination of economic backwardness, hunger, poverty, and disease.

Each measure of arms limitation and reduction and each step toward a secure world must bring people a real improvement in their standard of living. It was specifically by this that the Soviet delegation to the 41st UN General Assembly session was guided when it proposed that an International Fund for Aid to Developing Countries be established once an accord on a real cut in states' military expenditure has been achieved. Part of the funds saved by member-states of the military alliances, as well as by other industrially developed countries participating in these accords, would be allocated to this fund. The USSR would be agreeable to the projects and programs of the International Fund being carried out through UN channels, with appropriate control exercised by the fund.

All in all, the USSR proposes a truly peaceful alternative to the spinning of military conveyor-belts. Instead of rivalry in building up nuclear arsenals it proposes cooperation in utilizing the peaceful atom under the conditions of an international system for safe development of nuclear energy. Instead of "Star Wars" it proposes "star peace," that is, interaction in a peaceful outer space, the creation of a world space organization, and the implementation of large-scale projects through joint efforts. Instead of chemical weapons production it proposes combined efforts in developing the peaceful chemicals industry. Great satisfaction is to be derived from the decision to develop peaceful cooperation in promising spheres of bacteriology, which was made at the second conference to review the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, held recently in Geneva. This all represents a progressive sphere for developing of the latest technology, gaining profit, and creating workplaces, under the conditions of either a market or a planned economy.

The program of security through disarmament proposed by the USSR envisages all possible consolidation of the legal basis of this process, proceeding from the view that the path to genuine security lies through the achievement of binding, reliable accords on arms limitation and reduction. At the present moment of great responsibility, when there is such urgency in the task of developing and concluding new agreements to materially reduce the threat of war, there is an especially pressing need to have a careful attitude toward already existing agreements, and for all signatories to fully and rigorously observe them. It is extraordinarily important to refrain from any action which would lead to these agreements being undermined or evaded.

In this connection the harshest condemnation is deserved by the actions taken by the United States, which has, by exceeding the limits set by the SALT II treaty, for all intents and purposes, trampled on this most important agreement. The unfading value of this treaty consists in the fact that it secured military parity between the USSR and the United States and that over a number of years it limited the central area of the nuclear arms race -- the sphere of strategic offensive weapons. Observance of this treaty ensured strategic stability and served as the starting-point for seeking ways toward the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. The U.S. decision to nullify the SALT II treaty was dictated by nothing other than Washington's aspiration to upset the military parity between the USSR and the United States and to secure military superiority for itself.

In accordance with a number of agreements, signatories to these do, of course, have the right to abrogate their corresponding obligation when acting in the highest national interest. Today, however, the supreme interest of all mankind is that of narrowing the sphere of material preparation for war. For this reason the Soviet Union proposes that states should voluntarily renounce their right to withdraw from arms limitation agreements and should scrupulously follow the obligations which they have assumed.

VIII

The role and responsibility of the United Nations Organization in states' collective efforts are especially great. The age of concrete and largely nonstandard actions which is opening up sets new tasks for the organization and calls for serious reorganization of it in the interests of increasing its effectiveness and turning it into a real center for the coordination of states' actions to eliminate the material basis of the danger of war.

The United Nations Organization is expected to play a unique and irreplaceable role in the advance toward a world without nuclear weapons, a world where the security of each is based on the security of all, on strength of law and morality rather than weapons. As Miguel de la Madrid, president of Mexico, rightly noted in his speech at the 41st UN General Assembly session, the organization must "guarantee peaceful and reasonable coexistence."

The Soviet Union is in favor of increasing the effectiveness of the UN mechanism in the disarmament sphere, of conducting the 1988 UN General Assembly third special session on disarmament in a productive manner, and of rapidly creating a preparatory organ for this purpose. It actively supports the proposal by Cyprus to hold UN Security Council special sessions to discuss questions of preventing nuclear war and disarmament. This is consonant with the Soviet idea of setting up a dialogue between the nuclear powers which are permanent members of the UN Security Council and holding a round-table meeting of their leaders.

The 41st UN General Assembly session graphically demonstrated a turning-point in the attitudes of the world community — the orientation toward concrete tasks, the augmentation of constructive efforts, and the aspiration to begin a real advance toward a nuclear-free world, toward general security through disarmament. Weariness from the rhetoric which has piled up in recent years is clearly being replaced by the energy of action.

Recent events provide convincing evidence that movement toward a secure, nuclear-free world is possible in practice and feasible from the material point of view. The accords on confidence-building measures in Europe which were achieved in Stockholm, the conclusion in Vienna of two conventions which form the basis of an international system for the safe development of nuclear energy, and the positive results of the second Conference to review the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons all attest to the fact that the new political thinking and behavior of states is breaking through, if with some difficulty. Together with Reykjavik they represent a call to action for all who can and must play a role for the good of peace, detente, and disarmament.

"Security through disarmament." It was thus that the first UN General Assembly special session on disarmament defined the main area of states' efforts in the nuclear and space age. This area has also been formulated in the documents of the conference of heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries in Harare.

It is really difficult to overestimate the significance which the socialist countries' initiative on the creation of an all-embracing system of international security possesses for the task of introducing new thinking into the practice of contemporary international relations. A system of nuclear-free peace represents an alternative to a system of international relations resting on a precarious "balance of fear." As was shown by the discussion of the question of creating an all-embracing system of international peace and security, a question which was submitted by a group of socialist countries for discussion by the 41st UN General Assembly Session, such a system is in accordance with the world community's interest in having reliable guarantees that it will survive in the nuclear and space age. The Delhi declaration, which was signed by the top leaders of the USSR and India on 27 November 1986, formulates principles for a nonviolent peace free of nuclear weapons, principles which provide a concrete answer to the question of the actual nature of all-embracing system of secure, nuclear-free peace.

It stands to reason the supporting structure of an edifice of general security must be based both in the military and in the political and economic spheres.

It is not a question of what comes first — disarmament or confidence, a reduction in military arsenals or the settlement of regional conflicts. It is possible and necessary to move simultaneously toward security in all areas, augmenting efforts in all spheres. Political realism, however, requires recognition be made of the unique importance of disarmament as a process which creates a material guarantee of security and confidence and which sets up a physical barrier to wars. Only disarmament can become a firm foundation for the edifice of a safe world. Building such an edifice on mountains of weapons is the same as erecting it on sand.

As is emphasized in the USSR Supreme Soviet's address "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World," adopted on 19 November 1986, "there is a place for all states in the general process of freeing mankind of the nuclear burden. When what is involved is the salvation of civilization, there are no great or small countries and peoples. This concerns all and must be the concern of all."

The price of time — each month, week, and day — is rising extraordinarily rapidly today. One cannot return to the past to put something right or change something. Only the present and future — our common future, which will very rapidly become history, before we have had a chance to get used to it — are subject to change. The nature of this future and the claims which our descendants present to us will depend on the will and reason of all states participating in international relations. Taking into account the critical urgency of the time factor, it is necessary to make a rapid start along the road leading to security through disarmament.

The Soviet Union is doing everything in its power to achieve this.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: FOURTH EDITION OF 'WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE'

U.S., NATO 'Threat'

PM190931 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Whence the Threat to Peace"]

[Text] The Military Publishing House and the NOVOSTI press agency publishing house have brought out a book entitled "Whence the Threat to Peace" [Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru] (Fourth Edition). The book examines the nature and scale of military preparations by the United States and the NATO bloc and reveals the role given by the U.S. Administration to its Armed Forces in world affairs. On the basis of facts and figures, the book analyzes the correlation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact military potentials and exposes claims put abroad by Washington officials and many members of the Western mass media regarding the alleged military "gap" between the Warsaw Pact countries and the United States and NATO and the supposed "aggressiveness" of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. The book also reveals fundamental differences in the stand taken by the USSR and the United States, and the Warsaw Pact and NATO on questions of creating a nuclear-free world, reducing arms and strengthening international security.

The book gives a clear, well-argued answer to the question raised in its title: The threat to peace comes from the Pentagon, the U.S. military machine, and the militarist course pursued by the U.S. Administration. A real threat to peace is posed by the U.S. military-industrial complex, which tries to control international affairs from a position of strength and is counting on a further increase in military preparations, the escalation of the arms race, and its carry-over into space.

The book has been published in large print in both Russian and English.

Chervov, Zubkov Discuss Book

LD140016 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2045 GMT 13 Feb 87

[Interview with Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, directorate head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Georgiy Zubkov, political observer, on the publication of the book "Whence the Threat to Peace"; Zubkov and Chervov seated at round table; date, place not given — live or recorded]

[Text] [Zubkov] We have asked Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, a directorate head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, to comment on a new edition of the book "Whence the Threat to Peace." Nikolay Fedorovich, this is the fourth edition of the book. Obviously it is not an end in itself, to increase the print-run of the book, I have acquainted myself with it, and it has quite a few new facts. What is the main idea behind the new edition of the book at this time?

[Chervov] The basic idea of the brochure is given by its title, and is shown in the illustrations and on the cover of the book. [video shows cover depicting giant Pentagon with one corner touching planet Earth; Pentagon and Earth are shown about equal in size] As you will see, lying over the United States is the black shadow of the Pentagon, which is at the moment striving to take weapons into space, so the Pentagon's black shadow might cover the whole globe.

The threat to peace is not a mythical one but a real one, it stems from the military machine of the United States, from the militarist course of the U.S. Administration and its efforts to control international affairs from a position of strength, including the use of armed force. This idea is backed up in the book with specific facts. First and foremost is the fact that it is the United States which, ever since the first year after the war, 1945, has been waging an arms race. It is the United States and the United States alone that is the instigator of this arms race. At the moment, the United States is striving to take weapons into space as quickly as possible, and to threaten the whole of mankind from space. There are convincing specific facts and illustrations backing this idea up as well. [video shows diagrams comparing Soviet and U.S. strength in various weaponry, artist's impressions of Star Wars weapons in space, photographs of U.S. warplanes]

The leaders of the U.S. Administration are at the moment trying to cover up their belligerent course with peaceable speeches. For example, they offer humble prayers for peace daily, but in practice, in fact, they are building up their warlike preparations on an immense scale, they are conducting nuclear explosions one after the other -- as you know, another nuclear explosion has just been carried out -- and they put ever more new types and kinds of weaponry into commission. With one hand the President of the United States signs political declarations to the effect that there must be no nuclear war, that there can be no victors in a nuclear war, while the other hand he sanctions the Pentagon's military programs oriented toward preparations for war using the most barbaric methods and all kinds of weapons for mass annihilation of people, including chemical and biological ones.

They are talking a lot in Washington at present about strengthening strategic stability -- while in practice wrecking treaties and agreements and destroying what had been created before them, before the present U.S. Administration, in the sphere of disarmament and security.

[Zubkov] Incidentally, you know, the eternal thesis of Western propaganda, including that of the Pentagon, is, of course, the alleged Soviet threat; the supposed discrepancy between East and West in armed forces. So what is new, what new facts, are given in this edition of the book?

[Chervov] The edition of the book contains a great deal in the way of new numerical data. The figures given in the fourth edition have been almost completely revised, and they confirm once again that there is still an approximate military equilibrium between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. That can be

confirmed, concretely, say in the nuclear sphere. Take strategic offensive armaments. The military parity, strategic parity, between the USSR and the United States was established in the early 1970s. In 1979, with the signing of SALT II, that parity was officially consolidated and acknowledged by the leaders, and it exists at the present time. During the meeting in Reykjavik, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev handed to President Reagan a table of data on the quantity of strategic offensive armaments possessed by Soviet Union and the United States.

[Kubkov] The one that's here. [video shows tables of data for different strategic weapons]

[Chervov] Yes, it's given in the book. It confirms that today we still have strategic parity between the USSR and the United States. The U.S. Administration, and that includes President Reagan and the whole U.S. delegation, took no exception to that assessment, and agreed with it. I can't help asking myself the question: Where, then, is the Soviet military superiority in strategic armaments? Where is the window of vulnerability that the present administration has been shouting about since 1980? For 6 years in fact, they've been shouting about some window of vulnerability.

In reality, it doesn't exist and never has existed. That window of vulnerability was thought up at the White House for the sole purpose of working up anti-Soviet propaganda and extracting more and more dollars for the strategic rearming of the United States.

[Zubkov] But, of course, in the West they talk a lot about the superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries over NATO in conventional arms. How does the booklet deal with that problem?

[Chervov] Before going on to conventional armaments -- I will come to that, I'll answer your question -- I'd like to examine a question, that is, what's shown in the book is the existence of an approximate military equilibrium in mid-range nuclear weapons as well. And on mid-range missiles, the situation now is...

[Zubkov interrupts] In Europe.

[Chervov] In Europe, yes. The situation is that on the NATO side there are 542 missiles, while the Soviet Union has 373. One-third of these are old missiles.

So, for quantity of missiles, as you see -- this is very well shown in the book -- and also for quantity of warheads on those missiles, NATO has a certain advantage. But taking into account the Soviet countermeasures that have been taken in response to the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe -- the measures include siting [razmeshchiye] of operational tactical missiles in the GDR, on the territory of the GDR, and in the Czechoslovak Republic, and other countermeasures -- we can say, today, we have grounds for saying this, that in this sphere, too, an approximate equilibrium is there to see.

Now, concerning your question about conventional weapons. The book emphasizes the particular acuteness of this problem. This is connected first and foremost with the fact that Reykjavik opened up the prospect of a nuclear-free world and a nuclear-free Europe. When such a real possibility emerged, the leaders of the United States and NATO started backtracking. Now they are trying to prove that one cannot get by at all without nuclear weapons, since the Warsaw Pact allegedly has superiority in

conventional weapons, and Europe, so they say, might fall victim to this superiority. In fact, there is no superiority. The reality is being deliberately distorted in the West. I can tell you, nevertheless, you will probably find your way very well. How is the reality distorted? They exclude the armed forces of France and Spain from the balance on NATO's side. The total is an army of approximately 1 million.

[Zubkov] The French program envisages a build-up.

[Chervov] They are building it up even more. How can there be a balance? Of course, you end up with a superiority when a whole million-strong army is excluded. Apart from that, they do not include reservist formations in the calculations on the NATO side; these are a large quantity of troops and weaponry. They do not include stockpile reserves of weapons and equipment. On the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact side, all this is taken into account, and moreover is exaggerated. This is, the leaders of the United States and of NATO do not give an objective and truthful assessment of the correlation in conventional weapons. What, then, is the current picture for the correlation of forces in conventional weapons?

Overall, if the combat capabilities of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact are compared, then an approximate equilibrium can be seen. So, when they talk about Soviet military superiority in the West, other aims are behind such statements, and these are a desire to preserve nuclear arms, to build up stocks of them, and to try to gain military superiority in conventional weapons as well.

I would like to say again that the book counters the militarist course of the United States and NATO with the clear and precise peace-loving course of the Soviet Union, describing all the peace initiatives, the compromise proposals, and constructive proposals on issues of disarmament and security. This Soviet course was formulated in brief by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, a quote from whom is given in the book, if I may read it: We sincerely stretch out the hand of friendship and cooperation to all who are in favor of immediate talks on lasting cessation of nuclear tests, in favor of reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons, in favor of development of international relations on the principles of equality and universal security. Our door remains open for talks. Another thing must be clear to all: Our peaceability has nothing to do with weakness. The peaceful labor of Soviet people is reliably protected; standing guard over the gains of socialism are the mighty armed forces of the Soviet Union, equipped with all they need.

[Zubkov] Nikolay Fedorovich, I see some photographs, they are in this book, aren't they, and they are of a somewhat different nature. If I am not mistaken, they are photographs of a radar station in Greenland. [video shows Zubkov holding enlarged photograph containing indistinct view of dark shapes against snowy background]

[Chervov] That is the old one, but the new, major radar station using a phased array antenna which is being built in Greenland by the Americans, in Thule, is shown in our book. This new station is intended for long-range detection of ballistic missiles and can be used in a wide-scale U.S. system of antimissile defense; that is, as a Star Wars element, for the U.S. Star Wars. The power rating of the station under construction is 3 million kilowatts per square meter. [as heard] The deployment of such stations beyond national territory, that is, outside the territory of the United States, is banned by the ABM Treaty, and even on the United States's territory it is permitted to build only in definite areas, in particular on the periphery, with these stations facing outwards, and also in permitted areas. The U.S. Administration states that it is building such a station in Greenland supposedly as part of the modernization of old

radar stations. This is not true. I have picked up these two photographs; please compare them, and you will see that in place of the old radar station without a phased array, a very big station with a phased array antenna is being built. [video shows two pictures in opposite quadrants of the screen; one, the picture originally shown by Zubkov, still not very clear; the other a large pyramid-like structure under construction] Is this really modernization? That is like saying that in place of a wood-fire stove you are building an atomic power station, and calling the process modernization. The United States plans to build a similar radar station in Great Britain as well. Thus they are violating the ABM Treaty in the crudest fashion, since neither Britain nor Greenland are on the periphery of the United States.

[Zubkov] In short, it is still further evidence, more facts, about where the threat to peace comes from.

[Chervov] Quite so.

[Zubkov] Thank you for this short, but at the same time very detailed interview, and for your comments on the new edition of the book.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TV: UK'S RENTON ON REYKJAVIK, CW, CONVENTIONAL ARMS

OW240933 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0510 GMT 24 Jan 87

["Studio 9" presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, with Mr Timothy Renton, UK minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. Renton speaks in English with superimposed translation. Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer, are other members on the panel.]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. We meet in Studio 9 at the Ostankino television center for our monthly program devoted to topical problems of international life. The problems today are very substantial and complex. We are now at an unusual moment in international politics. Much of what has been immobile is now in motion, many things are being reviewed and evaluated anew. Important foreign policy initiatives taken by the Soviet Union have played a great role in this area. A year ago, on 15 January 1986, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his statement outlined a concrete program for eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world within a definite period of time, up to the year 2000. The proposals outlined by the Soviet leader laid down the beginnings for new initiatives, which in their totality amounted to a program for a substantial change for the better in the world political atmosphere.

The issue of most concern for all people on earth, irrespective of their political views, is how to remove the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind. In today's Studio 9 discussion, we would like to assess the current situation, look at it from different points of view, and evaluate and compare these points of view. This will be made possible by the fact that one of the participants in our discussion today is a guest from Britain whom I would like to introduce to you -- Mr. Timothy Renton, minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. Also taking part in our discussion are Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer.

We say the past year was very significant in the international aspect. I propose to begin our discussion today with a question about the past year's characteristics and the legacy it has left us. I shall ask you, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, to begin.

[Zhurkin] First of all, it was a year which produced many hopes. It was also a year that produced quite a few disappointments. Summing up, however, I would say we ended the year by laying some kind of foundation for new hopes. I shall explain what I mean. For us Soviet people... of course we Soviet people link these hopes first of all with what our country has done during the year. That is normal. The main thing that started the year of hopes was the 15 January 1986 statement of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary which outlined a realistic, concrete, practical program for nuclear disarmament. It was not only a nuclear disarmament program. It included very concrete proposals aimed at chemical disarmament, for the destruction and banning of chemical weapons. It included concrete proposals for limiting and reducing conventional arms and a range of other issues. New radical approaches have been made in the sphere of control. It was accurately and clearly said that strict control is needed in arms limitations and reductions, even up to on-site inspection. The Soviet Union has practically implemented the program during the course of the year. The Soviet Union and its allies, in June in Budapest, outlined a very concrete and very detailed plan for limiting and reducing conventional arms.

Our leader arrived in Reykjavik with a very detailed, exceptionally large scale, exceptionally far-reaching program for practically advancing the cause of preventing the transfer of the arms race into space, radically reducing strategic nuclear arms, reducing and subsequently eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and taking a serious approach to the problem of ending nuclear tests.

Unfortunately, we have to stir old problems. Reykjavik ended in failure. Reykjavik failed to produce positive results. At the same time, there were positive changes during the year when both sides found sufficient courage, energy, and determination to reject old approaches and approach problems in a new fashion. Problems were solved. For the first time the two sides spoke seriously about the most radical reductions of nuclear weapons, about nuclear disarmament. They still have arguments over these issues, there are different positions, but this subject is lying on the negotiating table. It has become something real, something practical. I think that in this sense, in the final balance, the past year was still a year of hopes.

[Zorin] Mr Minister, what could you say on this issue?

[Renton] I agree with many things Mr Zhurkin has just said, that a basis for more hope was laid in 1986. I think that this is the result of a movement forward after years of immobility and stagnation in the field of arms control. I have been given the honor of participating in today's program. I want to take this opportunity to say that I am very happy to participate in the Studio 9 program, to address an audience that I imagine amounts to about 120 million throughout the Soviet Union. I very much hope that some of these viewers also have the possibility of listening to our BBC programs in Russian from London. A day may come when there will be an international television service which will enable us to watch each other's television programs.

It is precisely in connection with the new interest in arms control that I am now in Moscow, and am taking part in this program at your invitation, for which I am very grateful. Mr Zhurkin and you have very correctly mentioned the beginning of the year, when the general secretary came out with his statement on 15 January, and also the summit meeting in Reykjavik. But I would particularly like to dwell at length on how the year ended.

At the end of November our prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, met President Reagan at Camp David in the United States. They evaluated what was discussed by the United States and

the Soviet Union at the Reykjavik meeting. President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher came out with a very clear three-point program: a 50 percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic arms, an agreement on increased intermediate or intermediate-range [povyshennoy promezhutochnoy ili sredney dainosti] nuclear arms [Renton says in English: long-range intermediate nuclear weapons] — which we in Great Britain would frankly like to see completely banned in Europe — and a complete ban on chemical weapons.

We could call that our program for the coming 5 years. Because if we -- I am talking about powers possessing nuclear arms -- can achieve these three conditions, which are not connected to each other, in the next 5 years, that would represent the most substantial reduction of nuclear arms ever to have been achieved. And of course if we can manage to fully ban the terrible chemical weapons -- and we are ready to sign an agreement on this in the nearest future on condition that proper control is assured -- then the coming years will be positive and stirring in the field of arms control. I mention this as a step which brought the year 1986 to a close. This step was the statement made by President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Camp David, in the United States, which is supported by all our NATO allies.

The United States and the Soviet Union have just resumed their talks in Geneva. I ardently hope that these talks will be productive. I know that you have appointed a new delegation leader with a very high rank to the talks. I hope that he and his U.S. partners will perform their roles to the fullest. But we and other countries like ours must also play a role. I had very interesting discussions on this issue with Secretary Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze [Renton says in English: in the last 2 days]. I hope that by the end of 1987, which has just started, we would, if we do not sign agreements, at least have prepared draft agreements which would take us closer to these concrete and attainable goals in the field of arms control which I have just mentioned. These agreements will not be just diplomatic papers. It is difficult to imagine anything that would more greatly affect the life of our children and grandchildren in your country and in mine than progress achieved in the attainment of these goals.

Just like Mr Zhurkin, I hope, I think that there is still a considerable amount of work to be done. I consider that the year 1986 saw the beginning of moving out from a difficult position in arms control. Now, in a spirit of goodwill, we must all develop this success from all sides in the year that has just begun.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, what can you say?

[Bovin] My general appraisal is about the same. Certainly, it was a year of hope and disappointment. It was a year which showed that agreement is possible, and at the same time has shown how difficult it is to reach agreement. However, when we speak about what has happened we are thinking about what will happen. This is most important for us. It is in this that the passing year has left a good inheritance for further progress.

However, it appears that when we think about this progress, perhaps we should think in terms of an overall picture of the events. When we start to discuss specific items, say chemical weapons, intermediate-range weapons in Europe, and a 50 percent reduction, then these are all elements of the total picture. In our point of view, in our approach to the problem, we feel that to work out some of the specific elements, it is necessary to see the total picture of how events are developing. First we must see where we are going, what all this is for. Fine, this is the first step, this is the second step. But a step in what direction?

This point of view is very important to us, and therefore I wish to emphasize the statement of Comrade Gorbachev, which specifically includes these separate steps into the general picture as we see it. These steps must be taken towards a nuclear-free world. The situation is such that any half measures or partial solutions do not remove the main danger. They do not remove the danger of a nuclear war. This is elementary logic: As long as there are nuclear weapons there is the danger of a nuclear war. This is the starting point of our thinking, the starting point of our policy. It is possible to debate the probability of a nuclear war, but this is another question. What we wish is to make it completely improbable.

So the first thing I wish to stress is the need to examine every specific step in the disarmament problem as a step toward that goal we have set for ourselves. In this matter I sometimes feel our western colleagues, our western partners somehow -- how could I say it -- underestimate the importance of understanding this final goal. They somewhat underestimate the need to set themselves the direct task -- to strive for a nuclear free world.

There is a second lesson the last year has also taught us, and which was very clearly emphasized: It is very difficult to talk of concrete and productive steps aimed at destroying a certain part of the weapons on earth when, at the same time, very specific, very definite steps are being taken to take the nuclear arms race into space.

From our point of view, when I attempt to understand the logic of our Western partners, I find it at times not entirely clear. We say: Weapons exist on earth, let us reduce them. At the same time let us not take weapons into space. No, say our Western partners, let us reduce those on earth but at the same time let us think about adding some more to space. This too we perceive to be not very logical. I am afraid that if we should start formulating a positive program, forgetting about the fact that we are all faced with this problem of space militarization, or Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars -- call it what you wish -- then perhaps we would not be entirely realistic in evaluating the situation if we ignore this circumstance.

So, as they say, it is always necessary to establish certain parameters in posing each task. I see them to be, on the one hand, the problem of Star Wars and the problem of preventing a parallel arms race in space, and on the other hand, the goal -- the notion that to liquidate the danger of a nuclear war, we must achieve a nuclear free world.

[Zorin] The topic of our discussion leads us to the problem of new thinking -- thinking in a nuclear age. It seems a totally new situation in which contemporary mankind has found itself makes practically unacceptable that which people have gotten used to over centuries -- the method of thinking that existed among politicians and others for centuries. I wish to ask you, Mr Minister, how you conceptualize the development of a nuclear world in which it is essential to avoid a war, how and in what form in current conditions should thinking in the nuclear age be personified?

[Renton] Forgive me for not answering immediately, I wanted to listen to the end of the translation. First, I wish to say that I do not think that the new form of thinking about which you have spoken -- and since I have been here I have clearly seen the extent to which the turn to a new way of thinking has been taking place in the USSR -- is applicable only to the nuclear problem. It is relevant to other questions as well, such as the spread of culture between our two countries; a better acquaintance with each other; greater opportunities to visit each other; human rights, the question relating to the opportunities for individuals of a country, including your own, to depart the country more easily, if they so desire, to visit friends or relatives, or simply for a holiday in another country.

All this taken together also appears to me to be a part of the new thinking. This is being discussed quite correctly at the conference devoted to the Helsinki Final Act, which is now taking place in Vienna.

Now I will move on to the nuclear problem. There are matters in which I cannot agree with Mr Bovin, who twice returned to the idea that it is necessary to achieve a nuclear-free world. Personally, I do not believe that it is possible to shelve the discovery of the wheel. And I do not believe that after the invention of the machine gun, which was widely used against both our countries World War I and World War II, that it is possible to discard them or order our forces to return to the use of old rifles.

When Mr Bovin speaks of the necessity to achieve a nuclear-free world, I remind myself that such statements somewhat resemble utopian dream.

In any case, that is how I see them. We are all obviously entitled to our dream. It is characteristic for all of us to dream. But in the final analysis we are forced to live under conditions of practical reality. Presently, nuclear weapons are part of the deterrent forces which ensure stability for both our countries and for both of the alliances to which our countries belong. The NATO alliance, of which my country is a member, unequivocally promises never to be the first to make use of weapons. We will use them only in retaliation to an attack. [Iverdo obeshchayet nikogda pervym ne primenyat oruzhiya. My primenim ego tolko v ovet na napadeniye] The fact also remains that NATO strategy, which is based both on conventional and nuclear arms, has been one of the factors of the strategy of deterrence that has helped preserve peace in Western Europe, where I live, all these years since the end of the tragic World War II in 1945 -- a war in which both our countries participated and in which we fought shoulder to shoulder. Therefore I do not agree that the goal of achieving a new, nuclear-free world is a realistic and practical task for the near future. I would rather concentrate my attention on a gradual, step-by-step, very substantial reduction in arms, as well as on talks for the reduction of conventional arms. In this way we could show our children something positive at the end of this or the next year, rather than speaking about concepts, which, I repeat, contain utopian elements of hope. We have a saying in Britain, and I am certain that you have a similar one in the Soviet Union; Don't try to run until you have learned to walk. We are also very pragmatic people, and the essence of my talk boils down to precisely this, to the practical aim of achieving a substantial reduction. I feel that this is possible for us, including the complete destruction of chemical weapons. I think that it is better to concentrate on this than on striving, at this moment, for the ideal of a nuclear-free world.

[Zorin] I think that my colleagues will respond to you. Before they do, I wish, Mr Minister, to express the opinion that your comparison of machine guns with atomic weapons has not convinced me. And the new thinking

[Renton interrupts] I do not attempt to draw an exact parallel between these. I merely tried to make a historical analogy that inventions, the wheel, for example, cannot be ignored. Obviously, as we all know, nuclear weapons contain frightening power. Various statesmen in the world have said on many occasions that there should never be a nuclear war. I agree with this...

[Bovin interrupts] But you are proposing to reject chemical weapons. Therefore it is possible to reject the wheel.

[Zorin] I wish to complete the thought...

[Renton] I will come back to that.

[Zorin] New thinking occurs because mankind finds itself in a new situation. Not one of all the thousands of generations that existed before us was faced with the situation where mankind can destroy itself. Now such a situation exists. To affirm that an attempt to prevent this self-destruction of mankind is utopian is, in my opinion, pessimism, and I might add, dangerous pessimism. Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, you wanted to say something.

[Bovin] Now, that is the first point that I would like to draw attention to: The fact that in history, that which appears impossible becomes possible -- it can become possible. The second point is that it is more pragmatic to say nuclear deterrence exists. For 40 years it has guaranteed peace, so what more do we need? After all, things are good and this deterrence is working perfectly well.

But what is deterrence after all? If you will, it is the conservation of the potential for self-destruction. This is what deterrence really is. Yes, today you have managed to deter, but what if you cannot? This is where the problem lies. According to our logic, we say deterrence is a reality we cannot avoid. This is not an ideal situation -- it is not a policy that can be an aim. While deterrence exists it is precisely... [changes thought] It gives us time -- it gives us breathing space to try and find an alternative to deterrence, an alternative that would not harbor the possibility of mankind's self-destruction. Because I would like to reiterate this again: Despite the fact that deterrence really exists and we do deter one another, nevertheless one cannot deny that in this deterrence there is nothing to restrain events. What if things do not work? Then we will all perish. Hence, our logic lies in getting away from this at all costs. We should move to another system of reference, where we would not be threatened by this Sword of Damocles, this self-destruction. I would like to repeat again that the only system of reference accomplishing this task is a nuclear-free world.

Of course, we do not maintain that this may be tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. The Gorbachev plan we have been talking about envisages precisely certain definite steps, certain stages of development in this direction. Nevertheless, if you do not have this aim as a realistic aim -- if you consider this aim to be utopian -- I am afraid that you will never get away from the world in which you must deter one another with the threat of self-destruction, because ultimately this is the result of deterrence.

Now, we have already spoken about a new political thinking. It seems to me that it is precisely when I hear these arguments in favor of deterrence that it seems to me this is a manifestation of the old pre-nuclear thinking in the new nuclear age, when old categories are already useless -- they do not work. It is very difficult to admit to oneself that we do not have a guaranteed future -- that we may be the last generation or our children may be the last generation. It is very difficult to come to grips with this, and one constantly wants to alienate oneself from this prospect, to say that it was someone's and this may not be so at all.

It seems to me that in these circumstances it is better to rely on the worst version, and to seek solutions that would deliver us from the worst version. I would like to reiterate again there is no alternative to a nuclear-free world in this sense. All other decisions will be half-measures. They may somehow alleviate the probability of war, but the possibility of war will remain. This is what we are talking about in the framework of the new political thinking.

[Zorin] By the way, I would like to remind you, Mr Renton, that when a year ago this program was outlined in Comrade Gorbachev's statement, many, including people in your country, declared it utopian. Several months have passed and what was declared utopian became reality on the Reykjavik agenda. You have to agree that at the conversation in Camp David you refer to...

[Renton interrupts in English without Russian translation superimposed] On the agenda of what? I (I did not catch it).

[Zorin] The proposals contained in Gorbachev's statement were discussed as a real political issue and as realities during the meeting between the President and general secretary in Reykjavik. Consequently, what was said to be utopian has all of a sudden — or rather by natural law — become a political reality. Irrespective of what happened later or what Western leaders said after Reykjavik, Reykjavik is a contemporary fact from which you cannot escape.

[Zhurkin] I would like to return to a remark by Mr Renton and to an objection which cannot be simply laughed off. It concerns his remark about it being impossible to un-invent the wheel.

I think this is a serious consideration which requires much thought. Today we do not have a program, some kind of developed proposal on how measures will be taken in a nuclear-free world to prevent the resurgence of nuclear arms. That is a great challenge for the human mind, I think. I think this will have to be considered. Maybe accumulated experience will be used. Some experience has been gained in banning chemical weapons. Or there is the experience of the IAEA which exercises serious control over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in countries of the world.

Well, that is a big challenge, a big problem we shall have to solve at some point. Personally I think this problem can be solved. Of course, it will require a change in the political situation in the world. Most probably it will require a greater prevalence of the new thinking in the contemporary world. All the nations, all the states must take part in the development of new thinking, because new thinking is not somebody's monopoly, but a big practical issue which will have to be solved. I am convinced that this issue can be solved.

[Renton] You promised me a minute before turning to another question. I would like to answer very quickly what Mr Bovin has said.

Naturally we all have a utopian dream and we all hope it will be realized sometime. I am second to none in my aversion for nuclear weapons, and I no less than anyone else am aware of the terrible destructive power of these weapons. My utopia is total and universal disarmament and we all support it, through the United Nations for example.

To achieve it we have to cover a long road in reducing the size of conventional arms and armed forces and eliminating the imbalance, existing at present between them. We in NATO must consider that Warsaw Pact countries have at their disposal considerably larger conventional non-nuclear forces than us. We are ready to begin discussing this problem with the participation of our country and other NATO countries, your country and other Warsaw Pact countries. In our point of view, many years will be required to achieve the realization of this utopia of total and universal disarmament, however hard our political leaders and diplomats work at it. This is why I offer immediate and practical alternative steps which represent these concrete measures for reducing

strategic arms by 50 percent, for example, or a complete ban on chemical weapons. These are measures we can implement in the nearest future in the course of a practical step-by-step approach, which I think would bring great benefits to the people of our two countries.

[Zhurkin] I think 40 years of the nuclear age is a sufficiently long period at which to look back, to rejoice that we are still alive after these 40 years, and nevertheless to look at what was not achieved over these 40 years. It was not only nuclear deterrence which played a definite role, not only the policy of these or other states, but sometimes it was just chance or luck that saved mankind.

I think there is now sufficient ground to think about building a peace which will not be dependent on chance or luck. That will have to be a peace with clearly defined ultimate goals. This program aimed at the ultimate goal must include concrete practical steps for limiting and reducing arms; the more radical and greater these concrete steps are, the better. This is our approach; this is the approach of the Soviet Union, the approach of the Soviet people to this issue.

[Zorin] I do not think there is any point in comparing ultimate goals with concrete measures. They are interconnected, and the concrete measures acquire a meaning only if those who implement them visualize the ultimate goal.

Rejecting the idea of an ultimate goal, declaring it utopian, and concentrating everything on concrete steps means cheapening the program of concrete steps. The fact that we are viewing this as indivisible, Mr Renton, is borne out by an analysis of all the documents of the past year including the same 15 January 1986 statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich and subsequent statements. These statements, in addition to the goal of creating a nuclear-free world by the year 2000, include a large number of realistic proposals which can be viewed as concrete steps. There are not only proposals. I cannot fail to mention the Soviet Union has not conducted nuclear tests for a year and a half, observing a moratorium which has been extended five times. These are precisely concrete measures aimed at attaining the ultimate goal, which we do not consider to be utopian.

[Renton] I cannot say that I agree with you or your colleagues concerning the great significance you attach to the declaration on final goals. Speaking frankly as a practical Briton, I think that declaring such final goals has more to do with political speeches and declarations. It lacks a substantially important element, that of practicality.

As to the problems of any arms control agreement, the devil is hidden in the details, as they say in Britain. It is too easy to say that we want to eliminate all these categories of arms. What has to be done in actuality -- and this is where the experts start their work -- is to sit at the table with the understanding that we are striving to achieve the same goal, and discuss the details. As to chemical weapons, we have laid on the table our proposal concerning verification on request [proverka pozaprosu], which represents a key element in verification. I am very happy that this proposal is being studied by the Soviet side.

But it is quite evident that to verify if anyone possesses chemical weapons -- and I have to say that according to our estimates the Soviet Union has approximately 300,000 tons of chemical weapons while we destroyed ours 20 years ago already -- to establish that all stocks have actually been destroyed, and that their production has not been resumed it will require extraordinarily detailed talks, discussions, and agreements on the system of control, and verification that the other side is not cheating.

The same applies to the nuclear test ban treaty. All the sides wish to move toward a provision under which the nuclear explosions will be very small and limited to peaceful purposes. That will require very careful control. I regret that our proposal presented at the disarmament conference in Geneva that provided for meetings of experts to study all the difficulties which we still see in the issue of control of the nuclear test ban, was not supported by the Soviet side. You preferred to limit yourselves to declarative gestures.

I would like to think with respect to chemical weapons and settlement of difficulties connected with control of the ban on their production and stockpiling, as well as with respect to verifying the cessation of nuclear test explosions -- with the exception of very limited explosions for peaceful purposes -- I think that in order to solve all these problems we must sit all together at the negotiating table, at forums like the disarmament conference in Geneva.

[Zhurkin] I would like to say a few words first about chemical weapons. I could agree with Mr Renton when he compared Britain with the Soviet Union in this regard. I reject the figures because you can argue forever about figures. I would agree with him if we lived in the world of Christopher Columbus before he discovered America. But behind Britain, beyond the Atlantic Ocean, lies a country which not only has very powerful chemical weapons, but is now entering the stage of actively producing binary weapons. For this reason it would be more correct to characterize the situation this way.

Let us approach chemical weapons from another perspective. We have no problems concerning chemical weapons. Mikhail Gorbachev's statement, to which we referred, says plainly that we are in favor of the complete destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union presented in Geneva a detailed and extensive proposal precisely concerning verification and inspection, and not only destruction of chemical weapons but also how to conduct verification in laboratories, at enterprises producing chemical weapons, and how they would be controlled.

[Zorin] I would like to continue our talk by posing the following question: In the presence of differing points of view on many questions, I feel we can all perhaps agree the present situation existing in the world is unsatisfactory to all of us. The dangers inherent in the existing situation are obvious. Therefore, I would like to ask all of you the same question. Do you consider a turn from the existing state of affairs to be realistic? Obviously, I mean a turn for the better. Let us start with you, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich.

[Bovin] Well. If we are speaking about possibilities in the near future, say in 1987, then I would probably be a pessimist. As long as the present administration is in the White House, I cannot imagine the possibilities for large, strategically meaningful agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is one of those rare occasions when I would like to be wrong. I would very much like to be wrong. But, unfortunately, events, at least in the past 6 years, have not permitted me to view the situation more optimistically. I think that certainly we will continue to have talks with the Americans. We will continue to discuss all these problems. We will continue to preserve maximum patience and maximum will to achieve some results. All this goes without saying. But, I wish to repeat once again, speaking quite plainly, I do not believe the present U.S. President and I do not believe it would be possible to reach significant agreement with him. Even more so since we have seen clearly that Reagan's presidency has slowly gone into decline.

Some pose the following logic: Perhaps precisely because of this Reagan will attempt to compensate for his various difficulties in certain areas by actively meeting with the Soviet Union in an effort to reach some meaningful agreements. If this were the case, then it would be wonderful. One could only welcome such an eventuality. But I repeat, this does not seem to be likely. Therefore, I will repeat it again, I do not think that 1987 will bring about significant political change, either for better or worse. It will remain approximately the same as 1986.

Furthermore, the question is even more complex because it is not merely a question of foreign policy. In the final analysis, foreign policy is a reflection of deeper social processes. I feel the wave of neoconservatism which is to be seen in the Western world since the end of the seventies -- not only in America -- this wave of neoconservatism is perhaps making Western foreign policy harder, less flexible. This obviously is also being reflected in some specific things with which we must deal.

Therefore, I feel on the one hand we must continue with active attempts to reach some form of agreement, while on the other hand we must already think in terms of the post-Reagan period.

[Zorin] I am forced to disagree with my colleague. I see the situation differently. [Renton says: So do I] because the matter here is not in subjective factors but in objective ones. If someone would have attempt to forecast, a few months prior to Reykjavik, what President Reagan's position would be there, then such a seer would simply have been laughed at. But Reykjavik did take place, and even the fact that later people in the White House started to backtrack on it does not change that which had taken place. There are personal wishes, there are specific circumstances that have formed in Washington, but there are also objective factors, objective factors which influence the President. There is a certain new distribution of forces in Washington. There is a new situation in Congress. Therefore, I cannot join the ranks of those who see 1987 in a pessimistic way.

I feel that chances for progress do exist. If Aleksandr Yevgenyevich ended his evaluation with the conclusion that 1987 will not be any better than the preceding year, then it will be wonderful, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, if it does not turn out to be worse. That will be wonderful, Mr Renton.

[Renton] I agree with much of your optimism, Mr Zorin. It is important not to look at the temperature chart, not to measure the patient's temperature every day, but rather to look at definite progress. And if, as you have said, we will make similar progress after a long period of stagnation, and progress in the area of arms control in 1987, as we began to do in 1986, then such steps can be considered very positive. I do not feel the need to defend President Reagan or the U.S. economy.

[Zhurkin] Therefore, taking a more serious tone, I feel that certainly it is difficult now to predict how events will realistically develop. A struggle between two tendencies is taking place. One is a positive tendency, the other a negative one. Which one of these will prevail is difficult to say. Personally I feel that despite all, the positive tendency is gaining strength. Let me give you a small example. Mr Renton spoke about the verification of, say, nuclear tests. Whoever in England would have thought 2 or 3 years ago the Soviet Union would bring foreign correspondents to its nuclear test range, or invite the Americans to check...

[Zorin interrupts] With their own equipment.

[Zhurik] With their own equipment. I think this would have been considered unbelievable. This is a big change. Nevertheless, I feel it is better to believe in these positive changes. By the way, it is a pity that trilateral talks are not beginning about the ending of nuclear tests. These talks were pointlessly broken off by the West. Should they be resumed, certainly the question of verification must play a very significant role. This is the Soviet position.

Therefore I am on the side of the optimists, even though I realize the difficulty of the situation, and the great force counteracting this factor.

[Renton] Of course difficulties exist, but one of the positive aspects is the fact that the four of us are sitting at a roundtable and discussing all this. I would like to think that the Soviet side could have accepted the official U.S. proposal to send its observers to the Nevada test range, so as to note and implement control over U.S. nuclear tests. I feel this would have been a very positive step.

[Zhurkin] I am restoring to my right to interrupt. This proposal is surrounded with such difficulties and such conditions that it makes it difficult for our physicists to accept.

[Renton interrupts] This is not my understanding of the question. I find it difficult now to understand why the Soviet Union is prepared to accept U.S. scientists and an official delegation at its test range, but refuses to accept an invitation and officially visit the U.S. test range. Should there be some conditions related to this invitation, then I feel that this question should be looked into and resolved. As I understand it, there has been no reply to the invitation. I wish to end on a positive note. The fact that the four of us are discussing these questions is symbolic of the long ties between our countries -- historical, trade, and culture ties, and our joint struggle in the last terrible war. We fought in the last war on the same side. We have a common interest in [words indistinct] the massive reduction of nuclear arms. And if I do not see a totally nuclear-free world, about which General Secretary Gorbachev spoke, it is because I believe, nevertheless, in all the practical steps -- the gradual, step-by-step approach -- which I have outlined. I hope that it is more probable that this could be reached in a reasonable time. Therefore, I feel this to be a positive goal and it should be aspired to. If we should get close to an agreement or to a draft agreement in 1987, then this year will be an extraordinarily good year in the cause of peace in which our countries and our peoples are interested.

[Zorin in English] Thank you Mr Minister. [continues in Russian] Our time is running out. Before ending our program I wish to add a reference. We have determined our position on the reason why we do not wish to be officially present at tests in the United States. We are for a ban on the tests, but our presence at the tests could be construed as agreement to the continuation of these tests. This position has been determined by us.

[Renton interrupts] But this would help with the problem of verification. This really is the case, in terms of control. This would have helped with the joint solution of verification.

[Zorin] It is not the tests that should be verified but the fact that they are not taking place. This is the position of the Soviet Union. We are for banning these tests. However, for all to feel secure these tests are not taking place, there should

be complete control, including onsite control. In the course of our discussion today differing views were expressed. It became clear that we and the representative of the West diverge over a number of questions, and this should not surprise anyone. It is normal. I feel what is far more significant and consistent with the spirit of the times is the fact that in the course of our discussion we have touched on points of convergence and mutual points of view. This is very important. If you wish, this too is a result of the events of the past year, a year that in my opinion will be remembered by history above all as the year in which the call for the creation of a nuclear-free world has been transformed from a dream into a political reality and has turned into a concrete agenda placed on the table of most important talks. It is a pleasure for me to thank the participants in our discussion today, and to express the hope that this will not be the last opportunity for such a discussion, especially since the discussion has been fruitful; and to thank our viewers for their attention. Until we meet again here in Studio 9, Thank you.

[Renton] Thank you very much. Most interesting. Thank you. [in English]

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RELATED ISSUES

MONGOLIAN MINISTER VISITS MOSCOW, DISCUSSES ARMS RACE

Meets With Gromyko

LD302232 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 30 Jan 87

[Excerpts] A meeting was held in Moscow between the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Andrey Gromyko, and the Mongolian foreign minister, Mangalyn Dugersuren, now in this country on an official visit.

On behalf of his leadership, Mangalyn Dugersuren fully supported the view that the entire path covered by the two countries since the times of Lenin and Sukhe Bator is a road of friendship. Today Mongolia is a full-fledged member of the socialist community and its relations with the USSR have been successfully advancing all the time. The people of Mongolia, the minister noted, are infinitely grateful to the Soviet Union and its people for the generous help and support and the efforts to build up the country's independence and develop its economy and culture. Along with all the states campaigning for peace and disarmament and against nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and Mongolia have been vigorously working to preserve peace and prevent a nuclear catastrophe. This extremely important issue has been repeatedly discussed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Jambyn Batmonh during their meeting, to which both sides attach primary significance.

Talks With Shevardnadze

LD310011 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2110 GMT 30 Jan 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)--Talks took place in Moscow today between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and M. Dugersuren, member of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and MPR foreign minister, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

There was an exchange of views on topical international problems. Concern was expressed over the escalation of the arms race, over the danger of it spreading to outer space, and over the complication of the situation in the world for which imperialist forces are to blame. The sides voiced their support for the interaction of all peace-loving forces so as to remove the threat of war, to create an all-embracing system of international security, and to safeguard the preservation of human civilization. The special importance of the Soviet program for creating by the end of the century a nuclear-free world and for eliminating all forms of mass destruction weapons was noted.

Shevardnadze Luncheon Remarks

PH021214 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Excerpts] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, gave a luncheon in honor of Mangalyn Dugersuren, member of the Central Committee of the MPRP and minister of foreign affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, today.

The Mongolian foreign minister is currently in the USSR on an official visit.

"It is quite obvious that neither the prospect for a nuclear-free world nor comprehensive international security are conceivable without drawing into the process such a vast domain of the world with such huge manpower resources as the Asia Pacific region.

"It is difficult to find a country or people in this vast region which would not suffer from misfortunes brought on by aggression and war. It was precisely in that part of the world that the first-ever U.S. atomic bombs were detonated. The first plans for the use of U.S. nuclear weapons against the Korean, Vietnamese, and Chinese peoples are also associated with Asia. And it is precisely in Asia that the U.S. military unleashed the two largest-scale military ventures since World War II: in Korea and Vietnam."

"We do not have, of course, any panacea for all misfortunes in the Asian Continent. But the peoples and governments of Asia have a wealth of historical experience in the fight for the assertion of the principles of nonviolence, nonuse of force, the principles of good-neighboring relations, trust, equal cooperation, and action against imperialist diktat. Suffice it to recall the five 'pancha shila' principles or ten principles of the Bandung conference.

"From the undeclared wars against Afghanistan and Cambodia, from support for Punjabi extremists to the shameless annexation of Micronesia, to interference in the political processes in the Philippines, and to pressure on New Zealand -- such is far from being a complete list of the imperial hegemonistic doings of the neoglobalists.

"It is precisely U.S. leaders that urge Japan on to a material and spiritual revival of militarism. We can only wonder at the facility with which the Japanese Government has cancelled its own decision on limits to the growth of its military budget, and is bringing the country into a space arms race through participation in the U.S. so-called Strategic Defence Initiative, without giving thought to all the dangerous consequences of such steps".

Despite negative manifestations in Japan's policy, we are striving to conduct a course at establishing with it relations of good-neighbourliness, confidence, and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The wisdom of statesmen and politicians of the present lies not in clutching at outdated concepts based at justifying the big stick, no matter in what ideological package they are presented. The only criterion for statesmanship now is the ability to think in a new way with full account for realities and vital needs of a multiform and interdependent world.

Regrettably, this cannot be said of the U.S. President's State of the Union message to Congress delivered the other day.

Let a rosy picture of the state of the U.S. economy and the position of ordinary Americans, painted by the leader of the United States as well as the glorification of U.S. democracy in the speech, remain on his conscience. But one cannot overlook the foreign policy section of the address, which is studded with old clichés about a "Soviet menace," "expansionism," and so on, and so forth. The President clearly sought to distract attention from burning problems of his own country and, while about this, to persuade the Congress, closing its eyes to a huge national debt, to endorse a new record military budget, including appropriations for "Star Wars" and programmes of aid to Afghan counter-revolutionaries and Nicaraguan "contras." All this was accompanied by sallies against sovereign states whose policy does not suit the White House. Figuratively speaking, they were given bad marks for unsatisfactory "conduct," and all this despite the well-known "Iranian story" in which Washington got entangled.

The President's program speech is not free from tall stories about the life of Soviet people.

It is characteristic that there was no room in the President's speech for any positive proposals for the solution of international problems. Even the Reykjavik meeting was mentioned merely for emphasizing once again the adherence to the notorious SDI.

In contrast to the logic of neo-globalism, the Soviet Union and socialist countries show an innovatory approach to world affairs in the interests of all humanity. This is confirmed by the Soviet Union's practical steps from bold proposals in Reykjavik to the Soviet-Indian summit talks in Delhi. By their example, the USSR and India gave a strong impetus to positive processes in Asia. The Delhi declaration signed by the leaders of the two countries embodies what is close and understandable to any people, no matter in what part of the world it lives. We describe the Delhi declaration as a historic document with good reason.

"The declaration not only proclaims its goal to create a world free from nuclear weapons and violence, but also formulates a program for the establishment of such a world. The formation of Asian and Pacific security on the basis of nuclear disarmament is a long-term objective which requires a stage-by-stage solution and an advance from the simple to the more complex.

"The Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, together with other socialist and nonaligned countries, follow hand-in-hand along the lines of accomplishing this long-term task. Mongolia makes a worthy contribution to the improvement of the international situation".

"We highly appreciate your activities at the United Nations organization where, on Mongolia's initiative, a number of important documents serving the interests of the cause of peace and mankind's progress have been adopted. The importance of Mongolia's proposal to elaborate a convention on mutual non-attack and nonuse of force in relations between Asian countries and to create a machinery which would rule out the use of force between countries of the Asia-Pacific region is growing now.

Dugersuren Speaks at Luncheon

LD302250 Moscow TASS in English 2217 GMT 30 Jan 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)--The Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union hold the same view that the strengthening of peace and elimination of the threat of nuclear war are crucial for mankind's future. This was said by Mangalyn Dugersuren, Mongolia's foreign affairs minister, who is staying in the USSR on an official visit. He spoke at the lunch today given in his honor by Eduard Shevardnadze, the USSR minister of foreign affairs.

Mongolia, the minister said, in close cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries does quite a lot to promote peace and security in Asia and throughout the world. The constructive proposals and initiatives of the USSR, Mongolia, the fraternal countries of Indochina and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea receive increasing support.

He stressed in this connection that the large-scale proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok marked a new stage in a joint quest for ways to develop relations of mutual trust, goodneighbourliness and cooperation between Asia and Pacific states, defuse conflict situations in the region and solve contentious issues through peaceful, political means.

The Soviet-Indian declaration on the principles of a world free from nuclear weapons and violence represents a clear-cut alternative to the aggressive power politics, total militarisation and military preparations, the Mongolian minister said.

The intensification of the neoglobalist strivings of the USA and its closest allies in the Asian and Pacific region call for pulling and making more active all forces coming out for peace and against a military threat in the region. Proceeding from these interests, the Mongolian People's Republic advanced the initiative of creating a mechanism excluding the use of force in relations between Asian and Pacific states.

Joint Statement Issued

PM031021 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 87 First Edition p 4

["Soviet-Mongolian Joint Statement"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] M. Dugersuren, member of the MPRP Central Committee and foreign minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, has been in the Soviet Union from 29 January to 2 February on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

In their discussion of foreign political issues, the ministers noted that the main reason for the growth in international tension is the militarist course of the imperialist circles, the United States first and foremost, and their imperial ambitions and striving for military superiority.

The two sides are unanimous that the realities of the nuclear space age demand new thinking in international affairs, based on a realization of the objective need to renounce the use or threat of military force, to settle problems by political means as they arise, to turn peaceful coexistence into a universal principle of international relations, and to assert trust and mutual understanding among states -- regardless of size and irrespective of differences in sociopolitical systems.

The two sides share the conviction that raising the effectiveness of cooperation among the socialist countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of developing the creative initiative of each of the parties and countries while strengthening their unity, is conducive to the growth in prestige and power of attraction of socialism in the world. The united efforts of the socialist community states in the struggle against the nuclear threat and for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security have a beneficial influence on the changing world political climate, and inspire other countries and peoples to seek realistic solutions that could halt and reverse the arms race and reduce tension in the world.

The Mongolian side stressed the historic significance of the foreign policy strategy determined by the 27th CPSU Congress, a strategy which combines dynamism and realism with high responsibility for the destiny of human civilization.

It was noted that the program submitted in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, of 15 January 1986, for the creation of a nuclear-free world and the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction before the end of the present century, is a key to the solution of vitally important problems of world politics and gives a good stimulus to the peoples' anti-war and anti-nuclear movement. M. Dugersuren described the Soviet Union's proposals in Reykjavik as a graphic demonstration of a new political way of thinking, allowing millions of people to gain confidence in the possibility of not only a rapid and significant reduction in nuclear arsenals, but also of their complete elimination.

The two sides condemned the irresponsible course of the present U.S. Administration toward an erosion and undermining of the cornerstone agreements on strategic arms limitation and its striving to extend the arms race into space.

The USSR and the MPR favor the immediate ending of all nuclear tests. The MPR received with understanding the Soviet Government statement of 18 December 1986, and believes that the U.S. Administration should pay close attention to the Soviet proposals for a moratorium on nuclear blasts and to enter into full-scale talks for a complete and universal ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

The two sides agree that an activation of the work of all forums on issues of disarmament, and the attainment of decisions guaranteeing reliable and comprehensive security for all countries on the basis of the new political mentality are necessary.

The two sides reaffirm their support for the United Nations as an important instrument in the preservation and strengthening of a comprehensive peace and security, and they speak out for the continued affirmation of the just and democratic principles in the practice of international relations on which the United Nations is founded.

During the talks, particular attention was paid to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Taking into account the intensification here of the process of militarization and the growth of the military threat, the two sides agree on the urgent need to seek ways of securing peace, stability, and the development of good-neighborly relations and mutually advantageous economic cooperation in this region.

The Mongolian side spoke highly of the Soviet program for safeguarding peace and security in Asia and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins, as stated in the speech by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok and in his speeches during his visit to India. M. Dugersuren noted the fundamental significance of the Delhi declaration and supported the idea submitted at the Soviet-Indian talks of a phased forming of all-Asian security by normalizing the situation and creating an atmosphere of trust and constructive cooperation on bilateral and regional levels. [paragraph continues]

He also supported the Soviet idea of convening at some future date a conference similar to the one held in Helsinki, to formulate a complex of measures on security and broad cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as a conference of Pacific basin countries to examine questions of security, including in the economic sphere.

The Soviet side spoke highly of the MPR's active foreign policy line and of its consistent efforts in favor of peace, including those directed toward Asia. In this connection, note was taken of the topicality of constructive Mongolian initiatives, both of regional and of broader significance, and primarily of the proposal to set up a mechanism excluding the use of force in relations between countries in the Asia-Pacific regions.

According to the opinion of the two sides, the proposal submitted by the leadership of the DPRK to conduct high-level military and political talks between the north and south is of great importance for the alleviation and overcoming of the dangerous tension that exists on the Korean peninsula and for the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful unification of Korea. This and other constructive initiatives of the DPRK, including that of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, are creating a good foundation for resolving the problems that exist here.

The ministers rate highly India's responsible approach to international affairs, its constructive activities in the Nonaligned Movement, in the "Group of Six," and the specific steps undertaken for the improvement of the political climate in South Asia.

E.A. Shevardnadze and M. Dugersuren singled out particularly the role of the Nonaligned Movement as an influential and authoritative force in reducing international tension and assisting in the cause of peace, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence. [paragraph continues]

The USSR and the MPR are in solidarity with its anti-imperialist, anticolonialist, and antimilitarist ideals and support the efforts of the nonaligned states to restructure international economic relations upon a just and democratic basis. The importance of the decisions taken at the eighth conference of heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries in Harare was stressed.

In the opinion of the two sides, an important contribution to the process of forming pan-Asian and Pacific security could be made by Japan. They expressed themselves in favor of developing relations with this Asian state upon a mutually advantageous and realistic basis. At the same time, concern was expressed over the intensification of militarist tendencies in the policies of the Japanese Government, in particular over its decision to revoke restrictions on the growth of the military budget. Nor can one fail to take into account the dangerous consequences of involving Japan in the space armament race through participation in the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" of the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1302

RELATED ISSUES

FRG'S WOERNER INTERVIEWED ON DISARMAMENT, VIENNA TALKS

DW181143 Bonn DIE WELT in German 18 Feb 87 p 4

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by editor Ruediger Moniac; date and place not given]

[Text] *Die Welt*: NATO wants to negotiate with the Warsaw Pact on dismantling the eastern superiority in conventional armament "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Is that realistic?

Woerner: It is realistic if General Secretary Gorbachev means what he says. He stated last year in Paris: "We (the East) will dismantle our superiority where it exists without hesitation." Moreover, he speaks constantly of the principle of equal security. Now he has the chance to prove that he is serious, because the imbalance is nowhere as evident as in the conventional field. The Warsaw Pact is on the average three times superior with regard to tanks, armored personnel carriers, armored and highly mobile artillery, gunships, and fighter planes. Even worse: It has the capability of invading NATO. We do not have that capability with regard to the Warsaw Pact. This imbalance is the reason for instability in Europe. European peace would have been permanently safeguarded if the Warsaw Pact, just like NATO, would be incapable of launching far-reaching offensives in the adversary's area.

Die Welt: What does the West offer in the negotiations?

Woerner: We offer negotiations on the basis of realism. We want a stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe together with effective deterrence. In order to achieve this, the Warsaw Pact's material superiority must be eliminated to establish parity on a lower level, to overcome the insufficient transparency of Warsaw Pact military activities, and to out-balance the geostrategic asymmetry that exists to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact. We offer the Warsaw Pact a concept that seems suitable to us to achieve greater stability on a lower level in Europe.

Die Welt: Will NATO remain in agreement if it proves too difficult in convincing the East, with little or nothing, to dismantle its ability to launch an invasion?

Woerner: I am convinced that NATO will also in the future maintain a joint position in a difficult situation, maintain it as it did in the past. Negotiations will certainly be difficult. We will have to make great efforts to coordinate our negotiation positions.

Die Welt: Is gradual eastern dismantling possible, or local limitations at the northern flank, or with regard to Greece or Turkey?

Woerner: I do not want to anticipate formulations of the alliance before negotiation proposals are made. However, I would like to mention two principles: arms control and disarmament policy measures involving only some fields materially or geographically, must not lead to instability in other fields. Such measures must be taken in such a way that our deterrence ability — measured by the respective threat — will not be decreased. Efforts must at no time ignore the intended result — the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's ability to launch an invasion.

Die Welt: Do you think that conventional disarmament can be linked with that of nuclear weapons? In other words, no "zero option" in the LRINF (long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces) field if there is no chance of achieving a balance in conventional weapons?

Woerner: Such a special linkage does not seem to me to be realistic. However, there is a general connection that must be attended to in the interest of our security and in the interest of preventing war. Abandonment of nuclear weapons — also in the form of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Europe — would greatly increase the danger of conventional wars as long as the existing Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional weapons continues. We, however, want to make it impossible to wage wars — nuclear and as well as conventional ones. Therefore, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and British Prime Minister Thatcher pointed out the necessity of eliminating the conventional imbalance before certain limits will be dropped in the nuclear field.

Die Welt: Do you believe that Gorbachev's "new thinking" is a promise of eastern disarmament?

Woerner: That will be seen very quickly at the negotiating table. We must not permit the Soviet general secretary to deal only with nuclear disarmament — as just now at the Moscow peace forum — to the advantage of the Soviets, leaving the conventional field out that is the real core of the European security problem. These negotiations in particular will be the actual test of Gorbachev's seriousness to disarm.

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CSO: 5200/2498

RELATED ISSUES

GDR POLITBURO MEMBER PRAISES SOVIET PEACE PROGRAM

PM281200 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 87 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Hermann Axen, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, under the rubric "For a Nuclear-Free World, for Mankind's Survival": "A Program That Offers Hope"]

[Excerpts] In the interests of its own security and the cause of peace, the Soviet Union was forced once and for all to eliminate first the monopoly of the atom bomb, and then U.S. nuclear superiority. Socialism had to secure military-strategic parity with imperialism.

It was a long and hard struggle to ensure that the ideas of the anti-Hitler coalition on the new postwar world and the policy of peaceful coexistence firmly determined relations between states with different social systems and the joint life of states and peoples.

Since the formation of the community of socialist countries, the seed sown by the Decree on Peace of the first worker-peasant state has put forth shoots. Peace on earth has been preserved for more than 40 years. The USSR and socialism make considerable sacrifices to this end, not least in order to strengthen their own defense. Hundreds of millions of people come out actively for the noble cause of peace throughout the world. The peoples can breathe but cannot yet breathe freely.

Through the fault of the aggressive circles of imperialism, as a result of their reckless desire to secure military superiority over socialism, weapons of previously unheard-of destructive power are now stockpiled on earth. New types of lethal weapons are constantly being created. [paragraph continues]

If they are used in a nuclear war, all life on earth will be destroyed; all social progress will become impossible. Therefore, the preservation of peace in our time meets the highest class interests of socialism and the international working class. In today's world the historic peace mission of the workers' movement therefore plays an even more important role. The workers' movement bears the responsibility, in the true sense of the word, not only for the existence and victory of the working class and socialism, but also for life and for the further development of mankind in general.

The time is ripe for a new approach to questions of ensuring peace on the planet.

There is a growing awareness in the world that despite different and opposing political and ideological views, we must learn to live together. The nuclear and space age demands that we smooth things out between us. There arises quite logically from this the need to find new forms and methods in relations between systems, states, and regions, so as to ensure peace and resolve other global problems. The most reactionary and aggressive forces connected with imperialism's military-industrial complex resist this.

As a result, despite all the manipulations carried out in Western public opinion, the contradictions are becoming increasingly clear between the vast majority of mankind, who are committed to peace, and the numerically small but powerful, extremely aggressive, and extremely militarist imperialist group that believes that a war can be waged and won and which is preparing for it. Today ever increasingly broad circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie are realizing that military clashes between socialism and imperialism would mean universal catastrophe. They realize that a nuclear conflagration would benefit no one. At the same time, they sense that material preparations for nuclear war are increasingly detrimental to the capitalist process of reproduction.

A sober analysis of today's international situation shows that in the face of the real danger of a world war using nuclear weapons, the policy of peaceful coexistence, substantiated by Lenin, gains new weight.

Although for the socialist countries it already represented the most favorable opportunity for developing relations with countries in the other system, now it has become the only possible form of relations between states with different social systems. Peaceful coexistence between such states does not, of course, eliminate the struggle and competition between socialism and imperialism or the historical confrontation between classes. However, it is crucial to ensure that irreconcilable ideological and social contradictions are not transferred into interstate relations and are in no circumstances resolved by military means.

The socialist society — as was decided at the 11th SED Congress and at the congresses of the other fraternal parties — has embarked on the implementation of impressive plans for the sake of those who are building it. In the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America the peoples are struggling to overcome as rapidly as possible the grave legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism. In the capitalist countries the working people demand the implementation of their vital political, democratic, and social interests; but a worldwide atomic conflagration would make any progress impossible.

That is why the peoples, governments, parliaments, and parties and organizations in the West and East, North and South greeted with such great hope the program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world put forward by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986. [paragraph continues]

It opens up a true prospect of peace for mankind. The program proposes the sole reasonable alternative to war and the decline of human civilization. Comrade E. Honecker quite rightly called this impressive proposal "the 20th century peace charter."

Since the time of its proclamation, this program has inspired hundreds of millions of people throughout the world and given them new strength. The delegates to the 11th SED Congress assessed the USSR's creative approach to questions of world policy as a "new stage" in our peace policy. "We fully approve the proposals put forward by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev and adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress and take part in their implementation. They accord entirely with our ideal of a world without weapons and

violence, a world where every people freely resolves the question of its paths of development. The Soviet initiatives are meeting with a broad, approving response everywhere," Comrade E. Honecker said at the 11th SED Congress.

This program formed the basis for the subsequent proposals of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in June 1986 on reducing armed forces and conventional arms. We now use the broad concept of arms limitation and effectively verifiable disarmament, covering all types of weapons and all spheres — earth, water, air, and space.

What is new is that the realization of this concept is now sought not only by the socialist countries and peace-loving social forces in the nonsocialist world; in recent years mighty collaboration has grown up all over the world between supporters of peace, and this has assumed an until now unheard-of political and social scale. Not only parties, parliaments, public organizations, religious communities, scientists, artists, doctors, and sportsmen are raising their voices in support of averting the threat of nuclear war and of arms limitation and reduction; more and more governments and countries, and even whole groups of states, are calling for peace.

Apart from the socialist countries, today, as the Harare conference showed, more than 100 nonaligned states actively call for peace. The initiative of the six states from four continents and their declarations adopted in Delhi and Mexico City showed that a new grouping of states has emerged, advocating peace.

Here mention must be made also of the Contadora and Support Groups, the OAU, the Arab League, and also the countries of the South Pacific region, which recently concluded a treaty on turning this region into a zone free from nuclear weapons.

In the course of the 41st UNGA session, only two states voted against the draft resolution on creating a comprehensive system of peace and international security, and only three states came out against the majority's demand for an end to all nuclear tests. And only the United States voted against preventing an arms race in space.

The Soviet proposals of 15 January 1986 enriched the content of the dialogue begun in Geneva between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. Their basic ideas became part of the discussion at the Reykjavik summit. In the Icelandic capital it became obvious that these bold Soviet proposals are realistic. The response of the peoples and states to Reykjavik confirms that M.S. Gorbachev's initiatives are shared by the peoples and supported by the majority of states of the globe.

Therefore it was natural that the American delegation at the talks could not close its eyes to this bold project. Historic accords proved to be very close at hand. However, the top representatives of the U.S. Administration did not want to take a historic decision. They insisted and continue to insist on treaty support for the so-called "Star Wars" project to open a loophole for themselves to pursue the arms race in space, create first-strike capacities, and achieve military-strategic superiority.

The peoples will never issue a kind of insurance policy for the senseless SDI project, which would enable the military-industrial complex to receive permission to seek profits and world domination. True security will not be created by a new, even more dangerous weapon placed in space, but only by effective arms limitation and disarmament. What sense is there — the peoples ask — in disarming on earth and, instead, sitting uncontrollable systems of destruction in space?

In the citadels of capitalism, in the United States itself, in the states of Western Europe, and in Asia, there are intensifying disputes about the "pros" and "cons" of the inevitable new approach to international policy. The more fiercely the belligerent representatives of the military-industrial complex cling to their historically obsolete way of thinking and acting and push at all costs their policy of confrontation and the arms race, the more pressure there will be from the peoples and from those realistic circles of the ruling class that want to survive.

The GDR attaches very great significance to the implementation of the socialist peace strategy. The threat of war must never again originate from German soil; it must be a focus of peace.

At enterprises and institutions our working people are guided by the slogan: "My workplace is my sector of the peace struggle." The positive results of the successful conversations held by Comrade E. Honecker during his meetings with leading statesmen of capitalist countries, especially those belonging to NATO, served the cause of peace and cooperation and increased the international prestige of the German socialist state.

A new stage of the struggle to prevent nuclear catastrophe has begun. The GDR unconditionally supports the program for the total elimination of all types of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and the creation of an international security system. It consistently advocates the full implementation of the Soviet proposals submitted in Reykjavik. It supports the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact states to the NATO states and other European countries on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms.

If the decision is made to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, the siting in the GDR of operational-tactical missiles with a range of some 1,000 km also will become superfluous.

The number of initiatives on arms limitation and disarmament that are born and formulated in Europe is great. They include, for instance, the joint SED and SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] proposal on creating a zone free from chemical weapons in Europe, and — developing an idea put forward by Olof Palme — on creating a nuclear weapon-free corridor in Central Europe.

The response with which these initiatives are met beyond the borders of Europe reinforces the peace-loving forces' conviction that what was almost agreed on in Reykjavik could become a reality.

A difficult struggle lies ahead until the forces of reason and realism secure a final victory over the forces that threaten mankind. Every effort must be made to achieve our goals; but there is no easy path. Aggressive imperialist forces must be curbed, and this is possible.

Two important prerequisites exist for this. The first is the all-around qualitative reinforcement and increase in the might and internationally attractive force of socialism, thanks to the increasingly full revelation of its advantages. Here, in Leninist fashion, we consider it necessary, as Comrade E. Honecker has said, "to increase political vigilance with regard to imperialism's military preparations, with regard to the subversive actions of the enemies of peace and socialism, and with regard to the psychological war they are waging." The second prerequisite is the powerfully developing movement and collaboration of peace supporters from various forces and states which differ politically and socially and which form a broad coalition of reason and realism.

The SED and the people of the GDR are taking part in resolving this noble task, and we are confident that we will resolve it with honor.

RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

U.S.-SOVIET RISK-REDUCTION TALKS--Geneva, (TASS)--The first round of Soviet-U.S. talks on setting up centers for reducing the nuclear danger has taken place here in accordance with the accord reached between the sides. The leader of the USSR delegation is A.A. Obukhov, ambassador at large. The delegation of the United States is headed by R. Perle, assistant secretary of defense, and R. Linhard, special assistant to the President. The date at which the following round of talks will be held will be fixed through diplomatic channels. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0625 GMT 14 Jan 87 LD]

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